Does U.S. Soft Power Translate into Foreign Countries' Support for U.S. Foreign Policies?

by

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Abstract

Power is a central concept in the study of international relations. This dissertation explores soft power as a facet of power which is seen as increasingly important. Joseph Nye's concept of soft power has caught the attention of policymakers, scholars, and political pundits for the last thirty years. Scholarly studies of soft power most often focus on measures of public opinion toward a power-wielder and draw conclusions about a state's level of soft power from that opinion. However, scholarship linking public opinion to target state policy decisions is mixed. This dissertation examines soft power influence by focusing on the elite discourse and the foreign policy decisions of states that are the target of soft power influence. Beginning with Nye's conception that soft power is an attractive force that influences state policy decisions and its level of support for another state's policies, this dissertation examines whether U.S. soft power was part of key policymakers' decision calculus in four cases. Using within-case congruence and process-tracing methods, soft power is tested against two plausible alternate explanations – balancing and state identity. Data from the publicly available discourse of key foreign policymakers in France and Germany indicate that U.S. soft power does not account for those states' policy decisions to support U.S.-led policy interventions in Kosovo in 1999, or against ISIS in 2014. Concerns associated with the distinctive French and German identities best explain their policymakers' choices regarding the crisis in Kosovo. France's decision to intervene against ISIS was driven by balancing concerns, while Germany's decision in this case was driven by a combination of balancing and state identity. The results of this dissertation are suggestive regarding the potential of soft power influence and its implications on U.S. foreign policymaking, and further point to the difficulties in testing the underspecified concept of soft power.

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List of Abbreviations

DoD	Department of Defense (United States)
EU	European Union
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

Chapter 1

Research Question, Relevance, and Overview of the Dissertation

Introduction

The concept of power is a central topic in the study of international relations (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 39; Berenskoetter 2007, 1, 15–18; Baldwin 2013). The field of international relations often focuses on a conception of world politics described "as one that is held together by power relations" (Berenskoetter 2007, 1). Thirty years ago – countering those who claimed that U.S. power was in decline – Joseph Nye (1990a) suggested that the United States retained significant power resources which are more relevant under changing global circumstances. These changing circumstances include increased economic and ecological interdependence, a broader range of international political issues, an increased number of relevant transnational actors, and the spread of technology (see Nye 1990a, Chapter 6). Soft power – "co-optive power behavior" – was posited as an overlooked aspect of power in which attraction plays a significant role in "getting others to want what you want" (Nye 1990a, 31). "Soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments" (Nye 2004b, x). This dissertation explores soft power as a facet of power which is seen as increasingly important in an era in which military force is deemed less useful (Nye 2011b, 9; Zakaria 2012, 120–21; Huseynov 2016, 72; Zhao 2017, 16).

Does the United States have soft power? Does U.S. soft power translate into foreign countries' support for U.S. foreign policies? If U.S. soft power does affect other states' foreign policy choices, how does it do so? Nye's (1990a; 1990b; 2004b) theory of soft power has been adopted by policymakers and pundits as a potentially important concept in policymaking, yet,

empirical evidence for the efficacy of soft power has relied primarily on measurements of public opinion (Layne 2010, 58; Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2012, 556). Nye (2004b, x, 46; 2011b, x) has suggested many examples of soft power, but has provided no empirical evidence of soft power as a causal factor in the foreign policy decisions of other countries (Layne 2010, 55); though, as noted below and in Chapter 2, several scholars have attempted to do so. In addition, several complex methodological issues have been identified related to attempts to demonstrate soft power or explain its operation including: how to measure soft power resources, how states might be able to translate those resources into influence, and how to measure that influence in terms of policy outcomes (Kearn 2011, 66; Gallarotti 2011, 39–42; Blanchard and Lu 2012, 570; Seong-Hun 2018, 1; Bakalov 2020, 496–97). This dissertation seeks to address these problems and offers a methodology for linking a power wielder's soft power to a target state's actions.

This dissertation seeks to answer the prior questions related to the plausibility of U.S. soft power through a test of its applicability in the decisions of France and Germany to participate in the U.S.-led military interventions in Kosovo in 1999, and against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014.[1] "The ultimate test of any theory is how it explains events in the real world" (Mearsheimer 2001, 6), and that it "actually works and is applicable in a real situation" (Johnson, Reynolds, and Mycoff 2008, 86). Accordingly, this dissertation applies a qualitative research design to understand the sources of states' decisions to support U.S. foreign policies. In doing so, it develops a method to test Nye's soft power theory and explores its plausibility in accounting for French and German support of U.S. foreign policies toward third parties. This analysis is conducted at the level of discourse of key leaders in target states and their public justifications for policy decisions.

[1] The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria is also known as the Islamic State, ISIL, ISIS, Daesh, and Daish. In the conduct of research, each term was included in relevant document searches. For simplicity and consistency, the term ISIS is used in throughout the dissertation.

The evidence from the four case studies indicates that U.S. soft power did not factor in the decisions of France or Germany to participate in the military interventions in Kosovo and against ISIS. Foreign policy leaders in those countries did not make public statements indicating any form of attraction to the United States. In fact, leaders in France and Germany seldom referred to the United States when advancing their preferred foreign policies. The findings indicate that U.S. soft power, and possibly soft power attraction in general, was not significant in the decision calculus of French or German policymakers. Although limited to four cases, the finding nonetheless suggests that policymakers should be circumspect regarding policies that rely on the concept of soft power. The case studies also add empirical evidence, albeit negative, that is lacking in the soft power literature. Additionally, the method has external validity. By measuring soft power through the public discourse of target state leaders and their subsequent policy choices this dissertation offers an alternative to studying soft power influence using methods that have been found to be problematic, including correlation with public opinion (as suggested by Nye 2004b, 18; 2011b, 94) or voting in the United Nations (see for example Datta 2009; Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2012; Martinez Machain 2020).

This chapter is organized in six sections. First is the definition of soft power and a summary of the conditions, according to Nye, that make soft power increasingly important in international politics. The second section outlines the policy and scholarly relevance of this examination of soft power. In the third section, relevant scholarly criticisms of soft power are discussed. Section four provides a brief overview of the case study method used to test the claims of soft power, the identification of plausible alternate explanations, and an overview of the case selection. The fifth section provides a summary of the chapters and major findings of the case studies. The final section returns to the relevance of the dissertation.

Soft Power Defined

Nye (1990a, 31–33, 188; 1990b) introduced the concept of soft power thirty years ago as "co-optive power behavior," which relies on what he calls "soft power resources." Soft power is defined as the ability to co-opt others into wanting what you want, rather than resorting to command power that relies on inducements or threats (Nye 1990a, 31). In a later modification, Nye (2011b, 20) describes soft power to include "agenda-setting that is regarded as legitimate by the target, positive attraction, and persuasion." The full definition of soft power, according to Nye (2011b, 21) is "the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes." In contrast, hard or command power is the ability to gain desired outcomes through coercion or payment (Nye 2011a, 16). Hard power is often measured in terms of material resources that a state possesses, such as the size and capabilities of its military, economy, geography, and industrial capacity, while soft power is often intangible, though "intangibility is not a necessary condition for soft power" (Nye 2004b, 6–7; 2010a, 216). Yet, soft power is more than the ability to persuade, as it relies not just on the power of argument, but the ability to attract and gain acquiescence (Nye 2004b, 6).

Nye (2004b, 11) notes three categories that constitute the soft power resources of a state. A state's culture in terms of its attractiveness to others, living up to its political values at home and abroad, and the legitimacy and morality of its foreign policies all play a role in soft power influence. Nye (2004b, 31) further posits four forms of soft power "currency" which include values, culture, policies, and institutions. This categorization aids in the distinction of soft power attraction from hard military power and economic power which expect policies of coercion, war, alliances, economic aid, bribes, and sanctions (Nye 2004b, 31).

Nye (2004b, 15–16) does not eschew the utility of hard power, if and when it is used correctly based on context. Soft power and hard power are potentially complementary and are tied together "because they are both aspects of the ability to achieve one's purpose by affecting the behavior of others" (Nye 2004b, 7). Despite the intangible nature of many soft power resources, means that are typically associated with hard power may produce soft power attraction (Nye 2011b, 21).[2] Resources associated with hard power may at some future time and context create soft power (Nye 2011b, 21). Soft power influence also may be useful in creating hard power through attraction that leads to military or economic cooperation (Nye 2011b, 21). Hard and soft power may complement each other, but they may also negatively impact one another (Nye 2004b, 25; 2011b, 24). Misuse of hard power can reduce a state's soft power influence (Nye 2004a, 256; 2004b, xi, 9). Nye (2004b, 9) further notes that soft power does not rely on hard power – an actor may have significant soft power influence without having significant hard power resources.[3]

Nye (2004b, 15) suggests several conditions under which soft power may be more effective in terms of leading to the outcomes desired by the power wielder, including when the power wielder – referred to here as the applicant – and target states have similar cultures. Additionally, an applicant's soft power "is likely to be more important" in target countries where "power is dispersed rather than concentrated" as in democratic or parliamentary systems (Nye 2004b, 16). In the latter, it is suspected that public opinion has greater influence on elected officials, though it is also posited that it is not impossible for a public to influence the decisions

[2] Ivan Bakalov (2020) proposes a conceptual revision of Nye's soft power which specifies the difference between tangibility and intangibility in order to link that characteristic of power resources to the type of behaviors they produce. However, Nye would likely disagree with this bifurcation. Nye's (1990a, 267, note 11) original conceptualization, which is also reflected in later work, notes that "the distinction between hard and soft power resources is one of degree, both in the nature of the behavior and the tangibility of the resources... [and] the relationship is imperfect."

[3] Nye (2004b, 9) notes the soft power attraction and subsequent influence of The Vatican as an example of an actor with little hard power and significant soft power.

of a dictator (Nye 2004b, 16). An additional factor that may impact whether soft power is more or less effective are the goals for which it is used. Citing Arnold Wolfers (1962), Nye (2004b, 16–17) suggests that soft power is more likely to contribute to the achievement of a country's general or "milieu goals" like promoting democracy and human rights, rather than in instances of specific or "possession goals" in which specific policy choices are desired. However, this does not negate the fact that soft power may still apply to attaining specific policy goals (Nye 2004b, 16).

Effectively combining hard power and soft power is described as "smart power" by Nye (2004b, 32, 147; 2011a, 20). In order to understand how to correctly combine hard and soft power resources to create smart power – a combination that will change from policy event to policy event – requires greater understanding of soft power itself. The resources that may create soft power attraction are varied and numerous (see Nye 2004a chapters 2 and 3). However, it may be possible to increase our understanding of the process and conditions under which soft power may or may not affect target state policy decisions. We can do so by examining the target state's justification for those decisions. Such an investigation can shed light on if and when soft power attraction impacts its decision calculus.

Changes in the International Environment Make Soft Power Important

Nye (2004b; 2008; 2011b; 2014) and others (for example Gallarotti 2011; Chong 2015; Huseynov 2016) posit that changes in the international political environment after the Cold War have increased the relevance of soft power and have complicated the use of hard power. Changes to information-based economies, the threat of nuclear war, and increased transnational interdependence have made traditional forms of hard power – particularly military power – less

transferable and less effective (Nye 1990a, 33, 47–48; Deudney 2014, 212; Huseynov 2016, 72; see also Jervis 2002).

Nye (1990a, 175–76) posits that along with the previously noted changes in the international political environment, an increasing number of issues, and a diffusion of power to more states and non-state actors, have made it more difficult for states to translate power resources into outcomes. Further, he (Nye 1990a, 175–81) suggests that there has been a change in the type of threat states face – shifting from military toward economic and ecological dangers – which cannot be countered with traditional hard power resources. Nye (1990a, 32) suggests that forms of soft power, including the attractiveness of a country's culture and ideology, lead to states achieving foreign policy goals with less cost by influencing what others want. A state's possession of hard or command power resources, such as geography, raw materials, size of population, and military strength, are becoming less important because they are becoming less fungible across an increasingly complex set of contexts based on these changes in the international political environment (Nye 1990a, 188–89; 2004b, 3, 18–25; see also Jervis 2002).[4] These environmental changes have created changes in the types of power resources that are most important and effective today (Nye 1990a, 29; 2011b chapters 5 and 6).

Policy and Scholarly Relevance

Policy Relevance

When Nye coined the term "soft power" in a 1990 book and article, the concept caught on quickly with policymakers, political pundits, and even the United States military (Powell 2001; Kerry 2004; Rice 2006; Bush 2007; Sanger 2009; Snow 2009; Layne 2010; Hallams 2011;

[4] Nye (1990a, 188–89) notes that "power is becoming less fungible, less coercive, and less tangible" based in part on the "fragmented structure of world politics among different issues."

Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2012, 556; Zakaria 2012; Rayman 2014; Shoaib 2018). The policy prescriptions and pronouncements have been strong in U.S. policy circles ever since, despite a lack of "systemic evidence that soft power affects international relations" (Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2012, 556). Perhaps the belief in the universal attractiveness of our own ideas, and the accompanying promise of the achievement of policy objectives with less cost than with the use of traditional coercive measures – hard power – gave Nye's proposition its own natural attraction (Nye 2004b, 6, 11, 19; 2011b, 84). As Nye (1990a; 2004b; 2011b) notes, the ideas that underly soft power have been considered effective by many scholars and policymakers for many years, even if the causal processes are not fully understood.

The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq is commonly cited as a pivotal U.S. foreign policy event. It is viewed as a misuse of U.S. hard power and, by consequence, that it significantly eroded U.S. soft power (Nye 2004b; 2010; Kurlantzick 2005; Pape 2005; Keohane and Katzenstein 2007; Datta 2009; Kearn 2011). This erosion has been measured primarily by the decrease in positive public opinion toward the United States in several countries after the 2003 invasion (Pew Research Center 2019).[5] This erosion of soft power, Nye (2004a, 256; 2004b, 128–34) claims, has reduced not only U.S. effectiveness in achieving foreign policy goals, but also increased the costs of doing so. It has also potentially provided an opening for competitors, such as China and Russia, to increase their own attractiveness as alternatives to the United States (Blanchard and Lu 2012, 580; Tella 2016, 155–56; Walker 2016, 50). Yet, in his 2004 attempt at clarifying the concept of soft power, Nye (2004b, 33–34) lists several sources that indicate a high level of U.S. soft power at that time. Despite the claims of decreased U.S. soft power influence after the

[5] Nye (2004b, 127) specifically ties these types of polls to U.S. foreign policies. Some Pew Research polls have measured foreign public opinion regarding the United States in general, and for specific U.S. policies. The lack of consistency in such polling efforts makes their use in scientific research somewhat questionable.

invasion of Iraq, nearly all of the measures listed by Nye have increased as of 2019.[6] Thus, there remains a need to explore the applicability of soft power given that the purported sources of U.S. soft power as listed by Nye have actually increased over time.

Another source of inspiration for this research came from a combination of a professional experience as a career military officer, and as both an informal and formal student of international politics. As a member of the military, I was exposed to Nye's (1990a) concepts of soft power and smart power more than two decades ago. It was apparent then that the concept of soft power had an allure all its own. The ability to get others to do what you want without having to coerce them has an appeal for military leaders and soldiers alike, who seek effective and efficient ways to achieve military objectives when charged by their civilian leadership.

The notion of soft power and its significance for smart power (Nye 2004b, 32, 147; 2011a, 20) has had notable appeal within the U.S. military. The attractiveness of the idea is found in military publications, including the capstone doctrinal publication for the United States Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0*. This publication outlines the roles, functions, and key tasks for the Marine Corps, and specifically notes the utility of "smart power" – the combination of soft power and hard power – as the recommended method for Marine Corps' power projection (U.S. Marine Corps 2011, 1–16).

Nye (2011b, 22, 47) notes that the United States Navy adopted the idea that increasing the trust and confidence of other countries can be beneficial in the achievement of goals. There are additional references to the U.S. military's subscription to soft power attraction and the related notion of "winning hearts and minds" as part of the U.S. military's approach to operations in Afghanistan, and approaches to counterinsurgency operations generally (Nye 2011b, 37; see also Lennon 2003). Coincidentally, the U.S. and allied commander of the forces

[6] A search of the same sources of U.S. statistics that Nye cites in his 2004 book was conducted to verify this finding.

deployed in one of the cases in this dissertation – the 1999 intervention in Kosovo – U.S. Army General Wesley Clark (2003, 182), has credited soft power as a key to military success, and the misuse of hard power as a path to failure. It has also been argued that U.S. "soft power is the reason smaller powers have not balanced against the [United States]" and that the United States should strive to maintain a benevolent image based on this conception of soft power (Joffe 2000, 6). However, the "intuitive and rhetorical appeal" (Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2012, 556) of soft power to the military and policymakers alike runs against some important criticisms, as discussed below.

The flaws inherent in Nye's conceptualization notwithstanding, the importance of soft power in international relations extends beyond the United States. Soft power has been adopted not only in U.S. policy circles, but also by several other countries, including China, Russia, and Australia (see for example Shambaugh 2015; Byrne 2016; Huseynov 2016; Kalimuddin and Anderson 2018). Tiwei Wang (2008, 267) observed that China's embrace of the concept of soft power through public diplomacy has enabled its "soft rise" as U.S. soft power has declined. Mikail Kalimuddin and David Anderson (2018) observe a similar purposeful incorporation of soft power concepts in China's strategic approach to world politics and security. David Shambaugh (2015, 99, 105–6) also argues that China has recognized the importance of soft power, as evidenced by statements of political leaders, a growing number of Confucius Institutes in over 120 countries, numerous art exhibitions, and China's hosting of major sporting events. Soft power has been described as the "*sine qua non* of what makes a great power" in China's strategy (Huang and Ding 2006, 22). Australia has purposely incorporated soft power approaches to higher education with the goal of improving its standing and influence in the region (Byrne 2016). Russian leadership has also referenced soft power as relevant in fighting terrorism, stating

that it "is mainly a matter of soft power" (Nye 2011b, 37). Because of the popularity of soft power as a concept in other countries, an important payoff for soft power scholarship from this dissertation is that the examination of elite discourse in target states provides a reliable method of examining soft power influence in cases that do not involve the United States.

Finally, based on the lack of evidence that soft power was present in any of the cases, policymakers who find the concept of soft power compelling might take Nye's own warning into account. Nye (2010b, 3) notes that "mistaken beliefs in decline – at home and abroad – can lead to dangerous mistakes in policy." Nye first directed this advice in 1990 to those declinists who were decrying the loss of traditional hard power resources and the apparent closing power gap between the United States and potential competitors (see Nye 1990a). The assertion that U.S. soft power declined after the 2003 invasion of Iraq may or may not also be a mistaken belief in decline given that there is little empirical evidence to support the claim. However, it also underlies the necessity of a closer examination of how soft power translates to other states' policies, rather than basing policy decisions on the supposed decline in soft power resources as measured only through public opinion or voting behaviors in the United Nations.

Scholarly Relevance

Nye has written numerous books and articles since 1990 that have offered revisions and clarifications of his original concept of soft power (Nye 2004b; 2011b) and the importance of soft power, particularly for U.S. foreign policy (Nye 2004a; 2010; 2014).[7] One thing Nye has not done is offer a clear specification of when and how soft power works. Thus, he has not fully developed a theory of soft power to include the operationalization of variables that could be causally significant. It follows that Nye also has conducted no rigorous test to determine the

[7] David Baldwin (2013, 292 note 13) wryly notes that "Nye's (2011: 81) complaint about the 'misuse' of the term 'as a synonym for anything other than military force' suggests that his numerous attempts at clarification over a twenty-year period have not been completely successful."

conditions under which soft power translates into policy success. Nye instead uses multiple examples to support the significance of soft power.

Christopher Layne (2010, 53) and David Kearn (2011, 65) also posit that soft power theory has not been subjected to rigorous empirical testing, leading to its misuse. This dissertation aids soft power theorizing by connecting the potential impact of U.S. soft power with the policy decisions of other states, based on other states' leaders' justification for their policy decisions. This strategy may provide an empirical connection between an influencing state's soft power and resultant target state foreign policy actions. Such a linkage is underexamined in the soft power literature. In addition, testing soft power against competing explanations increases our "understanding of what soft power is, how it works, and the conditions in which it is most likely to be influential" (Kearn 2011, 66). This dissertation examines two foreign policy episodes and explores whether U.S. soft power factored in target states' decisions to support U.S. military interventions. As noted, the cases examined do not indicate that soft power was part of the foreign policy decision calculus of France and Germany. The lack of an apparent link from U.S. soft power to target state policy choices in these cases calls into question scholarship that only offers correlation of attitudes toward the United States and the underdetermined connection to policymakers' decisions.

Scholarly work within the soft power literature typically depends on public opinion in other countries as the measure of the soft power a country possesses. Some scholars note that public opinion translates to policy action, even in non-democratic countries (Russett 1990; Kydd 1997). The circumstances for how and when this link occurs are less clear, and may differ by issue (Ikeda and Tago 2014). However, others have noted that even though the public may factor into some policy decisions that "if elites favor a certain soft power applicant, the overall policy

of the government will probably" favor the applicant regardless of the public's opinion (Patalakh 2016, 95; see also Layne 2010, 56–57). Jean-Marc Blanchard and Fujia Lu (2012, 578) note several factors that may impact the translation of soft power resources into actual policy influence including mixed messages, in-group and out-group affective considerations (see also Köse, Özcan, and Karakoç 2016), and the tenor of a given message and its delivery mechanism. There is also an argument that the average citizen does not view soft and hard power as distinctively as do scholars and policymakers (Noya 2006, 66). Neglecting "the elite dimension of soft power strategies" may lead to "incomplete or erroneous conclusions" (Patalakh 2016, 96; see also Layne 2010, 56).

Several other authors have attempted to measure U.S. soft power influence using target state voting in the United Nations as the dependent variable (see for example Datta 2009; Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2012; Martinez Machain 2020). However, using votes in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) as a measure of alignment with the United States is problematic, as the votes from year to year do not account for changes in the UN agenda (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017). Additionally, UNGA votes are non-binding, and are less likely to reflect strategic voting behavior by states (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017, 436–37). UN voting effects may also derive from factors that are not linked to U.S. soft power, but the changing security conditions since the end of the Cold War that provide weaker states more opportunity to seek their own interests exclusive of the security umbrella they once required from the United States.

Thus, it is important for scholarship to move past analysis that merely correlates decline in public attitudes toward the United States or non-alignment with the United States in the UNGA to an erosion of U.S. soft power influence. Making conclusions about an applicant's soft

power based primarily upon the correlation with public opinion or UN voting is problematic, and discounts the achievement of U.S. policy objectives that may have benefited from soft power influence through other paths, or mistakes soft power influence with other causal factors.

In sum, this dissertation examines U.S. soft power and its effect on target states' policy choices toward third parties, moving a step beyond the examination of soft power in terms of the public opinion toward the United States in other countries. This examination of whether attraction to the United States in any form is used by foreign policymakers as justification for policy decisions provides insight into whether or not soft power is relevant for gaining international support for U.S. policies. As another author has noted, it is not possible to use soft power to attract others unless we know how it works (Mattern 2005, 591). Nye (2011b, 23) agrees with this sentiment, noting that in order to derive and apply smart power and "effective power-conversion strategies" we must gain a better understanding of the range of power resources and how to combine them effectively in different contexts. In order to do so, it is necessary to examine the motivations of targets of soft power.

Critiques of Soft Power

Criticisms of Nye's conception of soft power fall into two broad categories. First, there are those that criticize soft power in terms of the underdevelopment of its logic and causal mechanisms, and the difficulty in operationalizing and testing the concept. Others may accept many of the assumptions of soft power, but argue that it is of little import in international politics. Some highlights of these critiques are necessary to frame the method of this dissertation which is designed to test Nye's theory despite the identified shortcomings in his conceptualization of soft power.

Scholars argue that Nye's conception of soft power is underdeveloped, lacks rigor, and is not falsifiable (Layne 2010; Zahran and Ramos 2010; Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Matush 2020). The empirical implications, and the relative importance in any case of each of the potential sources of soft power are not specified in Nye's theory (Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2012, 558). Nye provides no causal mechanism that states may use to convert potential soft power resources into realized power (Huang and Ding 2006, 25). Scholars (Kearn 2011, 66; Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2012, 558) have noted the vague theory behind soft power which makes operationalizing and testing soft power difficult. Colin Gray (2011, 28) notes that soft power is a "heroically imprecise concept... save only with respect to what it is not – hard power." This is not an unusual criticism, as it captures the essence of the debate about the concept of power itself, as discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. That concept is noted as having "no agreement about how to define it, how to conceive it, how to study it, and if it can be measured, how to measure it" (Lukes 2005a, 61).[8] Even though Nye (2004b, 6, 34) holds that the effects of soft power attraction on foreign policy decisions must be judged on a case-by-case basis, he does not offer a method for making this judgment (Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2012, 558).

This dissertation offers a test of U.S. soft power influence in four cases, and operationalizes soft power variables in a manner that allows data from the public discourse of target state policymakers to be used as evidence for the motivations of target state policy decisions. The cases do not support the notion that U.S. soft power was influential in German or French decision making. This calls into question soft power studies that rely on correlation to public opinion or voting in the United Nations. Additionally, this operationalization of soft power and method of examining soft power through target state policymakers' public discourse

[8] The debates within the power literature, and the placement of soft power within those debates, are discussed in Chapter 2.

offers an approach to test for the influence of soft power from countries or non-state actors other than the United States and in issue areas that do not involve military intervention.

Others have debated the value of the concept of soft power to scholars and policymakers (Mattern 2005; Ferguson 2009; Layne 2010; Gray 2011; Nakamura and Eilperin 2016). The most cutting critiques discount soft power entirely and are not based on the limitations of the theory, but rather on the notion that even if such a form of power exists, it is of little significance in international relations. Those making this argument point out that "soft power cannot sensibly be considered a substantial alternative to" hard or military power, particularly because it "depends upon the uncoerced choices of others" and is therefore useless as a state policy tool (Gray 2011, viii). Partly because soft power can be "too easily mischaracterized" (Gray 2011, 29) and relies on foreigners' interpretations and perceptions, it may lead to "faulty inferences that the careless or unwary observers draw from it" (Gray 2011, 31). "When national interests clash, soft power is an early victim" (Gray 2011, 45), and is a "weak reed upon which to base U.S. foreign policy" (Layne 2010, 71). Adding a third party to the policy scenario helps to overcome the potential for a clash of interests between an influencer and target creating a default negative test of soft power.

The strategy taken in this dissertation, rather than relying on a test of soft power that requires the soft power of *A* to gain the acquiescence from *B* in a dyadic relationship, is to add actor *C*. The addition of C as the actor against which the military intervention is directed and for which *B's* support is desired tempers the possible significance of a clash between the policy preferences of *A* and *B*. The cases negate the possibility of the use of military power by the influencer toward the target to gain acquiescence, though the potential for the use of other forms of coercive power remains. Testing for soft power influence on target countries in cases of

military interventions against third parties helps to balance the potential difference in preferred policies required to have an influence attempt between the influencer and the target, while reducing the likelihood of a serious clash between the applicant and target. By selecting cases for the use of force against a third party, the potential remains for an applicant's soft power to factor in the target state's decision calculus.

Another critique is that Nye downplays the role of the target within a power relationship, when it is an attraction from the perspective of the target that is the key factor in the efficacy of soft power in that relationship (Lock 2010, 36). Nye (1990a; 2004b; 2011b) places much focus on the soft power resources of the United States without providing "a reliable way to measure attractiveness directly" (H. Wang and Lu 2008, 446) or evidence regarding which U.S. soft power resources were translated to target state actions. While Nye (2004b, 16) recognizes the significance of the target, even when the focus is not on the United States, much of his writing focuses on the resources of the wielder of power (see for example Nye 1990a, Chapters 4 and 5; 2004b, Chapter 3), and how the state can wield soft power (Nye 2004b, Chapter 4). A related critique is the state may not control its soft power resources, making it difficult for the state to wield in a purposive manner (Zahran and Ramos 2010, 20).[9] James Murphy (2011, 100) also notes that most cultural resources are not controlled by governments, and that once soft power is "perceived [by the target] as an instrument of politics, it loses its persuasive force" and thus it is no longer soft power – an attractive or alluring force as Nye (2011b, 92) suggests it must be. Thus, "soft power cannot be wielded to serve any specific [state policy] goal" (Murphy 2011, 100). Even if the state can increase its soft power resources and use them purposely, the very notion that it does so makes it coercive rather than soft (Mattern 2005). To overcome these criticisms, this dissertation focuses on policy choices of the target of soft power in order to

[9] Nye (2004b, 17) also recognizes this limitation.

determine the presence of soft power attraction from the target's perspective. This provides a direct path for testing soft power rather than indirectly through proxy variables or attempting to measure the power resources of the power wielder. This method also enables a test of soft power that does not rely on whether or not an applicant controls its soft power resources in any case.

Layne (2010, 53) points out that Nye's use of analogies to personal persuasion, attraction, or seduction do not relate to states because "individual decision makers are people but states are not." Layne (2010, 53) argues that using the same mechanisms by which individuals can be attracted to someone or something is not a compelling argument for states and the possible mechanisms of soft power. Because Nye does not provide a theory of domestic institutions or processes, and these are central to foreign policy decision making, the notion that a state leader might make decisions based on their attraction or fondness of another is weak (Layne 2010, 53). This dissertation is designed to test for the presence of soft power through the examination of elite foreign policymakers – specific individuals – in target states. If target state policymakers are attracted to the United States, and they invoke that attraction to advance their state's policy preferences, then that would be evidence of soft power at work.

Furthermore, Nye's 1990 book in which the term "soft power" was coined, was written as a response to those who worried about the decline of the United States in terms of traditional hard power resources. Without clarity regarding whether or not other states respond to U.S. soft power influence in terms of supporting U.S. policies, policymakers may fall into some of the same traps Nye described thirty years ago. Specifically, making policy choices based on anecdotal evidence, or treating correlation as causation. Additionally, as Nye noted in 1990, perhaps policymakers and scholars view past eras with rose-colored glasses and perceive U.S. decline relative to a level that never actually existed (Nye 1990a, 87). The same may be said for

those who posit a loss of U.S. soft power without providing evidence outside of public opinion.

Despite these criticisms and shortcomings, the concept of soft power, as noted above, has been influential among policymakers, scholars, and political pundits. Based on Nye's (1990a; 2004b) theory of soft power and the assumed U.S. loss of soft power over the last decade and a half, this dissertation examines the question of what accounts for the policy support from France and Germany for U.S.-led use of military force against third parties in Kosovo in 1999 and ISIS in 2014. The evidence does not support a conclusion that U.S. soft power mattered across time in these cases, and offers important cautionary information for policymakers regarding the purposeful use of soft power and the reliance on attraction to gain support for foreign policies. The evidence also calls into question the wisdom of Nye's (2004b, 123) suggestion to expend additional national wealth to accrue the soft power resources that are posited to be attractive to others.

Overview of Methodology and Case Selection

To test the claims of soft power, this dissertation examines the public discourse of key foreign policymakers in France and Germany in four case studies, using within-case congruence and process-tracing. This test does not rely on public opinion or state voting behavior in international organizations. The justifications invoked by the foreign policymakers in these two target states in advancing their preferred policies provide evidence of whether or not some form of attraction to the United States in terms of its culture, values, or policies factored in the target state's decision to support the military intervention in each case.

Summary of Alternative Explanations: Balancing and State Identity

Nye (2004b) does not place his work in a specific paradigm, but given his theoretical assumptions, soft power theory aligns better with the liberal tradition in international relations. In keeping with "the liberal conception of power," soft power hinges on the notion "that the willingness of states to expend resources or make concessions is itself primarily a function of preferences, not capabilities" (Moravcsik 1997, 523). In other words, "what states want is the primary determinant of what they do" (Moravcsik 1997, 521). Soft power, according to Nye (2004b, 5) "rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others." Additionally, military power is no longer thought to be the most effective form of power because of increased levels of nationalism, modern states' focus on welfare, and a globalized economy (Nye 2004b, 18–20). The prevalence of "transnational issues such as climate change... infectious diseases, international crime, and terrorism" reduce the efficacy of military force (Nye 2004b, 137). The benefits of cooperation and multilateralism for the management of economic and ecological global issues are also predominant in Nye's works (1990a; 2004a; 2004b). This aligns with the liberal paradigm which posits that states may prioritize non-security problems and have an array of preferences, rather than the primacy of security and survival interests found in neorealist theories. Thus, in seeking alternate explanations for state policy choices, the most likely rival theories derive from neorealism and constructivism.

Because the four case studies examine the decision for the use of military force, the literature would expect a neorealist explanation to offer a plausible alternative. The first alternate explanation is based on balance-of-power theory. This explanation suggests that states make foreign policy decisions out of fear of a greater power or threat, rather than soft power attraction to the United States (Waltz 1979, 127).

Some (Warren 2014, 115–16) argue that Nye's (2004b) soft power theory falls somewhere between the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness concepts in international relations scholarship, thus placing soft power within a constructivist paradigm. This dissertation does not place soft power in the constructivist paradigm. "Constructivism assumes that identities are potentially part of the constitutive practices of the state, and so, productive of its actions at home and abroad" (Hopf 1998, 193). Thus, a test of soft power against a constructivist identity-based explanation for state policy choices is also plausible in the selected cases. Policymakers in France and Germany select policies that are legitimate based on existing standards of appropriateness associated with each state's distinct identity. The theoretical basis and observable implications for the two alternate explanations are further delineated in Chapter 3.

Case Selection Overview

This dissertation explores two U.S.-led military interventions that were conducted without UN authorization for the use of force, separated by fifteen years. The 1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in Kosovo offers a test of U.S. soft power prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, while the 2014 intervention against ISIS in Iraq and Syria offers a test of soft power after the U.S. war in Iraq ended. Additionally, both cases of the military intervention are historically relevant and applicable to current policy debates regarding the use of force and the question of whether U.S. soft power is meaningful in international relations.

In 1999, after years of violence in the Balkans, NATO determined that military intervention to end Serb violence against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo was necessary. After months of failed negotiations with the FRY, NATO decided to conduct an aerial bombing

campaign intended to force FRY President Slobodan Milošević to accept a peace settlement. Nye (2004b, 145) cites the Kosovo War as an example of U.S. soft power attracting allies, but he does not offer any empirical evidence that U.S. soft power was the reason for allies' participation. This dissertation, through an examination of the discourse of French and German foreign policymakers, attempts to answer whether or not U.S. soft power factored in their decisions to participate in the intervention.

In 2014, ISIS conducted a large military offensive in parts of Iraq and Syria in which the organization captured significant territory, as well as military equipment and vast sums of money to continue its terror campaign. The brutal actions of ISIS against religious minorities, and its ability to recruit fighters from all over the world, especially Europe, placed the terrorist group high on the domestic and foreign policy agenda of several countries. The military intervention against ISIS was conducted by a large coalition of countries, but outside of NATO, the United Nations, or any other international organization. Because the 2003 invasion of Iraq was criticized by many in the international community, including France and Germany, this case of a later intervention in Iraq offers an interesting and relevant test of foreign policy decision making.

France and Germany offer characteristics that Nye and Kearn suggest make for a good test of soft power and the alternate explanations. These characteristics balance the potential that U.S. soft power would likely be present with the need to have different preferences which make an influence attempt necessary. The characteristics posited to be conducive to soft power influence include states sharing similar cultures, the dispersion of political power within a democratic or parliamentary system in the target state, cultural closeness or historical affinity between states, and interstate relationships within a system of complex interdependence formed over a long period of time (Nye 2004b, 15–16; 2007, 164–65; Kearn 2011, 71).

Overview of Chapters and Major Findings

Chapter 2 places Nye's soft power concept within the larger debate about power in international relations and reviews relevant literature that justifies the approach taken in this dissertation, including the focus on elite decision makers and foreign policy events. Additionally, the observable implications expected if soft power explains target state policy decisions are delineated. Were U.S. soft power influential in their decision making, key policymakers in France and Germany should invoke the language of attraction outlined by Nye (1990a; 2004b) and Alexander Vuving (2009). These invocations include the allure of U.S. culture, values, or legitimacy of foreign policies as suggested by Nye (2004b, 11), and language associated with U.S. "beauty, brilliance and benignity" according to Vuving (2009, 8).

Chapter 3 delineates the methodology of the dissertation, including the specification of the dependent variable of target states' support or non-support of an applicant's foreign policy. The chapter also outlines the use of the case study method – including within-case congruence and process-tracing – as appropriate for the test of soft power and alternate explanations. The theoretical underpinnings and observable implications of the two alternative explanations – balancing and state identity – are then provided. Next, the chapter discusses the selection of cases regarding target state characteristics, and the rationale for the time period and events selected for the test. Finally, the relevant target state foreign policymakers for each case are identified.

Chapters 4 through 7 provide the empirical evidence and analysis in terms of congruence with the three theoretical explanations, beginning with the events in Kosovo in 1999 followed by the intervention against ISIS beginning in 2014. None of the four case studies provide evidence

that U.S. soft power was a factor in the French or German decision calculus to participate in the military intervention.

In Chapter 4, France's decision to participate in the U.S.-led NATO intervention in Kosovo is examined. The empirical record provides evidence that supports the state identity explanation as most congruent with the invocations of French foreign policy decision makers. Elements of French identity outlined in Chapter 3, including a responsibility to protect human rights and to aid minority groups, both of which reflect the Gaullist belief in the historical role of France, are consistent across key actors. Also present in some of the procedural stages of the NATO policy process are other elements of French identity, including the importance it places on multinational institutions, particularly its unique role in NATO, as paths to enhance its own prestige. Because France's participation in the military intervention occurred during a period of cohabitation government in France it makes a strong case for an identity explanation.

Chapter 5 comprises the case study of Germany's decision to participate in the Kosovo intervention. The evidence from the discourse of key policymakers in this case is most congruent with Germany's supranational European identity outlined in Chapter 3. German leaders invoked the human rights crisis in the Balkans and Germany's history of genocide which resulted in its responsibility to protect others as the justification for its participation. German decision makers also drew on the country's embeddedness into Europe to advance its policy to support the military intervention. Instead of using Germany's history to justify its post-war tradition of limiting the use of state power, key leaders used this identity as justification for the use of force abroad. As expected by the state identity explanation, Germany relied on invocations of its past to promote policies intended to defend its own conceptions of human rights as an appropriate obligation.

Chapter 6 includes the analysis of France's decision to support military intervention against ISIS in 2014. The discourse of key French foreign policy actors provides significant evidence that the balancing explanation best explains the motivations for French participation in this case. Key policymakers consistently invoked the dangers presented to French citizens by ISIS to justify its use of military force against ISIS, first in Iraq, then later in Syria. ISIS posed a threat to others abroad, but the threat posed to France, evidenced by multiple terrorist attacks in France connected with ISIS sympathizers, was the primary factor in the French use of force.

In the last case study, Chapter 7 provides evidence that is congruent with both the balancing and state identity explanations for Germany's participation in the U.S.-led military intervention against ISIS. As with France, Germany recognized a similar threat to its own population from ISIS and participated in the military intervention abroad based on security concerns. However, the discourse shows that balancing alone does not explain Germany's foreign policy choices. Germany's participation was justified by invoking its responsibility to protect others and act as a responsible member of the international community. Despite strong invocations of German responsibility to stop atrocities, the use of military force abroad in this case was limited to a supporting role rather than direct participation in combat operations. This limitation, despite the threat ISIS posed, was also justified through invocations of the appropriateness of limiting the use of force as an element of German identity.

Chapter 8 offers additional analysis of the case studies, and addresses the implications of the findings of the case studies for scholars and policymakers, the limitations of the dissertation, and possible areas of future research on soft power. Because U.S. soft power did not appear to be a factor in any of the cases, it is not possible to make conclusions regarding the loss or gain of U.S. soft power influence after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. However, the fact that states seldom

reference the United States in foreign policy debates, even when Nye might expect soft power to be present to some degree, indicates that U.S influence in foreign policy decisions of target states is less than many might think. The dissertation is limited to two instances of military intervention, and to two target states. It also examined U.S. influence only over policies toward two third-party actors. However, that does not mean that the United States does not have soft power in other situations. It may still be beneficial to examine soft power influence in other ways, in cases in which the United States is not the applicant, or in cases that do not involve the use of military force. Expanding the examination of soft power to other issue areas will also expand the potential pool of relevant target states worthy of study. The method used herein provides a path for doing so.

Conclusion

The concept of soft power deserves additional investigation given that it is presumed by scholars and policymakers to be an important and effective tool in international relations, despite the fact that public opinion cannot be reliably linked to target state foreign policy choices. This dissertation fills an empirical gap concerning the previous tests of soft power measured through public opinion or voting in the United Nations by examining the elite discourse and policy outcomes in terms of support for U.S. foreign policies. The data from the elite discourse in France and Germany reveal that attraction to the United States – U.S. soft power – did not factor in their decisions to participate in military interventions in Iraq and against ISIS. These findings suggest that U.S. policymakers may need to carefully consider underwriting foreign policies with the expectation that others will find the United States or its policies attractive. Furthermore, given the fact that France and Germany are generally aligned with the United States, the lack of

U.S. soft power in these cases portends trouble for the use of soft power in interstate relations intended to gain support from countries that have a more adversarial relationship with the United States. Without a case in which U.S. soft power manifested in a target state's elite discourse, the "problem of linking attractiveness and the ability to influence and persuade others in international relations" remains (H. Wang and Lu 2008, 446). For scholars, this dissertation suggests an alternative method for the examination of soft power that does not depend on problematic opinion polls. Additionally, the method examines the discourse and beliefs surrounding the target state's key decision makers rather than relying on arbitrary measures of the level of soft power resources an influencer may have in a given time period or event. This focus on the discourse of target state policymakers, and the justification they provide for their policy preferences, are a key to understanding the transmission mechanisms for if and when soft power is present in a given case.

Chapter 2

Soft Power: Power Debates, Focus on Target Elites, and Observable Implications

As part of the review of the soft power literature, it is helpful to place Nye's conception of soft power in the larger power literature and debate. As noted in Chapter 1, how soft power itself is measured in terms of resources, use, and outcomes has been an area of contention. A discussion of any form of power in international relations is bound to carry with it some level of controversy, as power itself remains a contested concept within the literature (Gilpin 1981, 13; Guzzini 2005; Lebow 2005; Lukes 2005a; 2005b, 477; Berenskoetter 2007; Murphy 2011, 88; Baldwin 2016). One scholar has even noted that power has been described by some as a meaningless concept, while others have argued that the problem is that power has too many meanings (Baldwin 2013, 281).

This chapter consists of four sections. The first section discusses several topics of debate within the power literature, helping to place Nye's concept of soft power in the literature. The second section provides rationale for the use of target state policymakers' discourse rather than public opinion to test for the presence of U.S. soft power in the case studies. Additionally, the section addresses the rationale for the use of discrete foreign policy events for the soft power test. The third section provides the operationalization of soft power and delineates the observable implications expected if U.S. soft power were applicable to the selected cases. The fourth section provides a summary of the chapter.

Situating Soft Power Within the Power Debate

Power Defined: A Primitive Concept

One hundred years ago, Max Weber defined power as "the opportunity to have one's will prevail within a social relationship, also against resistance, no matter what this opportunity is based on" (Weber 1976 [1921] quoted in Berenskoetter 2007, 3). This definition, thus, contains the notion that power is relational, can be considered as both capability and effect, and that overcoming resistance is not a necessary component of power (Berenskoetter 2007, 3). Further, according to Felix Berenskoetter (2007, 3), Weber's definition gives room for the notion of an actor having the "power to," which implies that a power relationship is not required to be hierarchical, in addition to the widely accepted concept of "power over." Weber also includes different facets of power. One includes "ways of having one's will prevail without using force" (Berenskoetter 2007, 4). This facet is based on legitimacy that derives from "rational cost-benefit calculations, custom or personal affection" (Berenskoetter 2007, 4). Such conceptions of power are similar to Nye's (1990; 2004b) description of soft power. However, this early definition, as Robert Dahl's (1957) definition discussed below, has come under some criticism and fostered additional conceptions of power.

Steven Lukes (2005b) offers three reasons for the continued debate over power. First, power is a "*primitive*" concept and its "meaning cannot be elucidated by reference to other notions whose meaning is less controversial than its own" (Lukes 2005b, 477, emphasis in original). Second, Lukes (2005b, 477, emphasis in original) argues that the concept of power is "*essentially contested*" meaning that the concept cannot be disconnected from the "value assumptions" of the person making judgments about the presence or absence of power, the extent of an agent's power, or "what counts as having or exercising power." Third, this "contestedness"

itself matters because "how we conceive of power makes a difference to how we think and act in general, and especially in political contexts" (2005b, 477). Much depends on the target's interests, which will be difficult to identify with any degree of certainty (Lukes 2005b, 482). Similarly, James Murphy (2011, 94) points out that power is a dispositional concept, that the concept is "in principle unobservable and can be studied only indirectly." Power is a capacity, and "like all dispositional concepts, is a theoretical construct" (Murphy 2011, 94). Nye's conceptualization of soft power is no less susceptible to these problems. As a form of power, it remains a primitive and contested concept. Nye conception of soft power, the numerous possible sources of soft power, and lack of an identifiable causal mechanism force analysts to rely on target value assumptions to determine if and how the target is attracted to the applicant. As noted by Nye (2004b, 18), soft power can only be studied indirectly and he suggests doing so by examining public opinion. Another debate in the power literature concerns the distinction between power and influence.

Power and Influence

Berenskoetter (2007, 5) notes the distinction that Harold Lasswell and Morton Kaplan (1950, 76) made between the concept of power and the concept of influence. To some, the concepts are distinct, while to others power is a subcategory of influence, and to others, influence is a subcategory of power (Berenskoetter 2007, 5). David Baldwin (1979, 162), complaining of "interminable theoretical distinctions," uses both terms, as well as the term "control" interchangeably. Other than a single diagram which appears to draw a distinction between power and influence, Lukes' (2005b, 36) authoritative treatise is silent on this element of the larger power debate.

Dahl (1957, 202, emphasis in original) took the liberty of using terms such as power, control, and influence interchangeably in order to provide a useful definition of power that allowed him "to explicate the primitive notion that seems to lie behind *all* of these concepts." Murphy (2011, 88) notes that "although there is a sharp conceptual distinction between the semantics of power and the semantics of influence, in the practical deliberations of agents, especially of statesmen," policymakers will always be involved in the exercise of both power and influence (Murphy 2011, 88). Even though power and influence are distinct in theory, in practice they are inseparable (Murphy 2011, 88). "The conceptual contrast between power and influence becomes much less salient for an agent who is responsible, though in different ways, for both the effects of his power and of his influence" (Murphy 2011, 88). Nye (2004b, 6) posits that soft power is not the same as influence, as influence may "also rest on the hard power of threats or payments." Because this dissertation is focused on outcomes in terms of policy choices, soft power, if present, is considered synonymous with soft power influence.

Power is Relational and Contextual

As power is relational and contextual, it is important to understand how states respond to power, not just what power resources a state may have. Power must be understood not only in terms of the resources one holds, but also in terms of "power to do what?" (Nagel 1975, 14). It is necessary to understand the scope of a power attempt in terms of who is involved, and the domain, or issues, that are involved (Bachrach and Baratz 1963, 633; Baldwin 1979; Nye 2004b, 6). Understanding power as relational between states – between an applicant and the target of an influence attempt – and the context for a specific power attempt are both viewed as essential for understanding the translation of supposed power resources into desired outcomes (Baldwin 1979; Lebow 2005; Nye 2011a; Quinn and Kitchen 2019). Nye's (1990, 27; 2004b, 2–5; 2011b, 6–7)

conception of soft power recognizes the requirement to understand both the scope and domain in any power attempt whether utilizing hard or soft resources and mechanisms.

The Three Faces of Power Debate: Placing Soft Power

The debate over the definition of power has centered on what are often referred to as the three faces or dimensions of power. The first face or one-dimensional view of power is based on the widely accepted definition of power as the ability of *A* to get *B* to do something that *B* would not otherwise do (Dahl 1957, 202–3; Baldwin 1979, 179). This defines power as causation. This conception is popular in scholarship because it is intuitive, makes tautologies less likely, and allows the use of methods "developed for more general applications" (Dahl 1957; Baldwin 1979, 161–62). It also aligns with the focus of political science – who gets what and why. This definition of power builds on the conceptualizations offered by Weber and of Lasswell and Kaplan who defined power "as the production of intended effects on other persons" (Berenskoetter 2007, 5). Defending Dahl from criticism that his definition did not take into account control over outcomes, Baldwin (1979, 179) further notes that Dahl's "concept of power includes both actors and outcomes as necessary components. Dahl's insistence that statements about power that fail to specify scope verge on meaninglessness underscores the fact that his concept of power concerns the ability of one actor to influence another actor with respect to certain outcomes."

In a critique of Dahl's approach to the study of power, the second face of power was introduced by Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz (1962; 1963), who suggest that any study of power using the first face alone will be incomplete. This second face of power is the power over agenda setting, or "the rules of the game," also described as a "restrictive face of power" and "the mobilization of bias" (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 952; 1963, 641). It is within this

dimension of relational power that *A* has the ability to affect not just the outcomes for *B*, but to determine the scope of choices available to *B* (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 948). This face of power, according to Bachrach and Baratz (1963, 633), like the first face, still depends upon an observable conflict of preferences between the parties involved.

Perceiving a missing aspect of power in the ongoing power debate, Steven Lukes (2005a) expanded the power debate to a third face or dimension of power. It is in this dimension that the power wielder has "the capacity to secure compliance to domination through the shaping of beliefs and desires, by imposing internal constraints under historically changing circumstances" (Lukes 2005b, 143–44). This dimension may at times have a more insidious nature, insofar as the receiver of another's power or influence is not aware of the availability or potential advantage of other options, as the very interests of *B* are constrained by *A* (Lukes 2005a, 146; Berenskoetter 2007, 10). It is within this third dimension that a necessary condition in the first and second dimensions, that of conflicting preferences, no longer adheres – an "absence of conflicting interests does not necessarily indicate the absence of a power relationship" (Berenskoetter 2007, 10).

Nye (1990a, 31; 2004b, 5) initially placed his concept within the second face of power, positing that it "rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others" as well as the "ability to set the political agenda which shapes the preferences that others express." Further, "the target's acquiescence in the legitimacy of the agenda is what makes it co-optive and a part of soft power – the ability to get what you want by the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuasion, and positive attraction" (Nye 2011a, 14). In order to be categorized as soft power, attraction must be positive in nature "in the sense of alluring" (Nye 2011b, 92).

Others (Baldwin 2013, 289; Warren 2014, 115) have placed Nye's conception of soft power closer to Lukes' (2005a) third dimension of power, as it relies on the "ability to secure the compliance of others by shaping their values, preferences, and beliefs" and by doing so impact their understanding of their range of choices (Warren 2014, 115). In a later revision to his theory of soft power, Nye (2011b, 90–94) suggests that soft power fits within all three aspects of power, though little distinction is made between the second face conception of shaping others' preferences in the original theory with that same behavior expected in the third face. Lukes (2005b, 486) takes exception to Nye drawing the similarity. Soft power, as conceptualized by Nye, does not make the distinction between indoctrination "and that ideal form of persuasion that consists in securing conviction through the freely exercised judgment of others" (Lukes 2005b, 490). In two endnotes, Nye (2011b, 241, notes 28 and 29) accepts Lukes' critique, noting that the "concept of soft power is similar but not identical" to Lukes' third dimension of power. However, Nye's (2011b, 90–91) main text provides examples of hard and soft power for each of the three dimensions of power. Nye (2011b, 91) includes the use of force or payment to shape preferences as an example of hard power in the third face, whereas the use of force in the first and second face changes *B's* existing strategies or "truncate *B's* agenda," respectively.[10] Nye (2011b, 241, note 28) goes on to note that soft power "is more concerned with the actions of agents and less concerned about the problematic concept of 'false consciousness' examined in the third dimension."

Baldwin (2013, 276) argues that the debate over the three faces of power is exaggerated in its significance. Lukes (2005, 30) suggests that each of the conceptions of power is an adaptation or interpretation of the same basic premise. That is, "the absolutely basic common core to, or primitive notion lying behind, all talk of power is the notion that *A* in some way

[10] Nye (2011b, 91) likens this use of hard power in the third face to the "Stockholm syndrome."

affects *B*" and "that *A* does so in a non-trivial or significant manner" (Lukes 2005a, 30). This notion that all forms of power consider the effect one actor has on another, according to Baldwin (2013, 276), implies that there is no requirement for a "fundamental reconceptualization of power."

Consequently, while the placement of Nye's concept is perhaps of some relevance to the overall debate within the scholarship on power, it is likely less important to policymakers in a given foreign policy scenario (Nye 2010a, 215). Furthermore, the placement of soft power within any or all of the three dimensions of power does not change the fact that soft power attraction, no matter the source, lies in the eye of the beholder. The perceptions and actions of the target of soft power, or any form of power, are fundamentally at the center of judging the success of a power attempt, insofar as success is measured by *A* getting what it wants from *B*. Nye (2011b, 7–10) suggests as much in calling attention to policy- and behavioral-based conceptions of power, which focus on the wielder of power achieving its preferred outcomes. "In the end... it is outcomes, not resources, that we care about" (Nye 2011b, 10). Following this recommendation, this dissertation is not interested in resources underpinning soft power but rather whether its existence in a given case shapes outcomes in terms of an applicant gaining support for its foreign policy from a target state.

This dissertation examines "overt, actual behavior" of the potential targets of soft power (Lukes 2005a, 25). It is here that we may uncover evidence of the conversion of an applicant's soft power resources into changes in target state behavior during a discrete policy event. U.S. soft power may have longer-term and wider influence in agenda setting and "milieu goals" (Nye 2004b, 17), but based on practical time constraints it is not possible to trace the potential, and likely very difficult to observe, U.S. soft power influence over multiple years or decades and its

impact on the outcome of a single discrete event. “Whether... attraction in turn produces desired policy outcome has to be judged in particular cases” (Nye 2004b, 6). Taking up Nye’s recommendation, I examine concrete behavior in particular cases to assess the existence of soft power influence on target states’ policy choices.

Soft Power, Public Opinion, and Target State Foreign Policymakers as Central Actors

Nye (2004b, 18) notes the utility of public opinion polls as “essential but imperfect” measures for studying soft power. Gauging favorable or unfavorable levels of public opinion in the target state toward the applicant state provide “a good first approximation” of the latter’s attractiveness (Nye 2004b, 18). Nye does not suggest other methods of measuring soft power outcomes. Thus, much of the soft power literature uses various public opinion polls and surveys to measure soft power influence a state might have on another. One of Nye’s (2004b, 16) assumptions is that public opinion matters, especially in the policy processes of democracies, but that even “a dictator cannot be totally indifferent to the view of the people in his country.”

There is much debate on the significance of public opinion in foreign policy. The larger debate over the significance of public opinion in foreign policy includes the question of whether public opinion leads or follows policymakers and the adequacy of survey measurement tools. Regarding the latter, Jean-Marc Blanchard and Fujia Lu (2012, 576) note that the prevalent use of public opinion polls in the scholarship on soft power is problematic. Such polls cannot provide insight into the message that the target audience has received, do not allow a deeper analysis of a specific policy event or soft power device, and do not account for attitude intensity. Others have noted that public opinion surveys may not use nationwide sampling, use inconsistent survey modes and, thus, may not accurately represent “global” public opinion (Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and

Inoguchi 2005, 412). Further, surveys conducted during international crises may show "unique or idiosyncratic features" and impact any findings of soft power studies (Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Inoguchi 2005, 412).

The assumption that public opinion leads policymakers is supported in some scholarly work, though the evidence for if, when, or how public opinion influences policymaking is mixed, and likely varies by issue area and issue salience to the public (Miller and Stokes 1963; Page and Shapiro 1983; Russett 1990; Risse-Kappen 1991; Aldrich 1995; Kydd 1997; Hill and Hurley 1999; Katzenstein and Keohane 2007; Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2012; Ikeda and Tago 2014). Specific to public opinion effects on foreign policymaking, the scholarship seems even more uncertain (see Jacobs and Shapiro 1994). Regarding the question of whether public opinion leads policymakers in foreign policy decisions, Christopher Layne (2010, 57) argues that public opinion may not only have little effect on policymaking, even in democracies, but also that states may actually manipulate public opinion and this "fact... in the realm of foreign policy... undermines the causal logic of soft power." Part of John Owen's (1994, 100–101) explanation for the democratic peace advances the notion that the public has little say in day-to-day foreign policy, but in instances of war, even though the public may be more involved, the public-elite connection can run either way, depending on circumstances.

Even if a correlation between public opinion and foreign policymaking can be made, it has been suggested that the degree of responsiveness of policymakers in foreign policy decisions is not clear because "public preferences rarely exist at a high level of specificity" (Jacobs and Shapiro 1994, 11). Public opinion is more "amorphous and diffuse" than that of interest groups and, thus, may exert less direct pressure on policymakers (Jacobs and Shapiro 1994, 12). Many studies treat the effects of public opinion on policy as unidirectional (Jacobs and Shapiro 1994,

12). Studies of soft power using public opinion rely on this notion, yet, the literature does not substantiate the assumption. Actors perceived by the public as experts in an issue area, the popularity of state leaders, and the influence of interest groups on public opinion may all factor in the formation of mass public opinion (Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987, 35–37). Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro (1994, 12–13) argue that "mass opinion and behavior should not be studied in isolation from elite politics." Further, any "responsiveness [from elected officials]... may coexist with attempts by politicians or the media to lead or direct public opinion" (Jacobs and Shapiro 1994, 12).

Blanchard and Lu (2012, 566–68) have identified the need to conceptualize soft power in terms of a form, a target, and a context, arguing that "soft power should not be predefined in terms of tools." Blanchard and Lu (2012, 569) suggest that studying soft power from the perspective of the receiver of an influence attempt is more appropriate. Because "attraction is not a static phenomenon" and that "attraction is related to context," soft power should not be conceptualized separately from the target of soft power influence, including taking into account the differences between elite and mass public audiences (Blanchard and Lu 2012, 569). The approach taken here is based on the notion that soft power may be at work only when attractiveness translates to policy changes (Blanchard and Lu 2012, 582), with key foreign policy decision makers being central to policy decisions.

Artem Patalakh (2016, 92), like Nye (Nye 2011b, 95), theorizes two paths to examine soft power attempts. The first path is an influence attempt directly on a nation's elites. The second is through publics then to elites. The latter thus incorporates policy salience to the public, which is theorized to matter only in cases of extreme unpopularity, crisis situations, and policy decisions of extraordinary importance (Patalakh 2016, 92). However, measuring salience of

foreign policy to mass publics, measured with opinion polls is as problematic as other soft power studies that rely on public opinion. Perhaps even more problematic is that the salience of the policy, in terms of general awareness of an individual being polled, could be affected by the conduct of the poll (Zaller and Feldman 1992, 582–83). Figure 1 depicts the two transmission pathways posited to affect elite foreign policy decisions.

Figure 1. Direct and Indirect Models of Soft Power Effect on State Behavior

Model 1: Direct Effects
Applicant soft power resources → target government elites → attraction to applicant → target elite decision

Model 2: Indirect Effects
Applicant soft power resources → target public opinion → target public attraction → target environment enabling or disabling elite decisions → target elite decision

Notes. Adapted from Nye (2011b, 95, Figure 4.1). As noted, Nye (2011b, 94) asserts that the indirect model is more common, though he does not provide evidence supporting that claim. According to Nye (2011b, 94), an "enabling environment" is one in which the target public or third parties are positively influenced by the applicant's soft power, and a "disabling environment" is one in which an applicant "is received as repulsive." This dissertation tests only Model 1: Direct Effects for reasons noted in the main text.

Thus, this dissertation rests on Layne's (2010, 56) assertion that "public opinion does not make foreign policy, the state's central decision makers do." In some cases, policymakers may be able to ignore or manipulate public opinion (Patalakh 2016, 93–94). For example, a soft power study of trends in European public opinion toward the United States and European states' preferences for either NATO- or European Union (EU)-led policymaking supports a conclusion that European elites lead public preferences (Ray and Johnston 2007). This notion is supported by Javier Noya (2006, 64), who previously provided evidence that that higher socio-economic status individuals grant more weight to soft power attributes of other states. Even though the public may factor into some policy decisions, "if elites favor a certain soft power applicant, the overall policy of the government will probably" favor the applicant over the public (Patalakh

2016, 95). Thus, it is important to "take into account the applicant's ability to attract *the elite* even in the cases where it is the *public* who plays a decisive role" (Patalakh 2016, 95, emphasis in original).[11] Neglecting "the elite dimension of soft power strategies" may lead to "incomplete or erroneous conclusions" (Patalakh 2016, 96). As suggested by Patalakh (2016), the focus here is on the elite policymakers in target states and their public discourse as the source of evidence that an applicant's soft power affected target state foreign policy choices.

Rationale for Examining Discrete Foreign Policy Events

It is also likely beneficial to examine the potential presence of soft power in foreign policy events. William Rugh (2006) finds that foreign publics may have favorable attitudes toward U.S. science, technology, economic advancements, culture and society, but still view U.S. foreign policy negatively in a specific instance. Yet, as with other studies, Rugh (2006) does not provide a link from public opinion to state policy choices. However, Rugh's (2006) findings do support Nye's (2004b, 35) claim that the "reactions to [foreign] policies are more volatile than underlying reactions to culture and values." The potential for greater variability in reactions to an applicant's foreign policies makes an examination of soft power in foreign policy cases more likely to reveal whether or not soft power was influential in a target state's decision in a particular case. Attraction to culture and values over time may be consistent, whereas any attraction to a particular foreign policy, if present, will likely be specific to a given case. Examining specific foreign policy events may also result in findings that have greater scholarly and policy relevance by revealing if soft power was present in any of the foreign policy cases.

[11] Nye (2011b, 94) argues that the "two-step" model from a soft power applicant to foreign publics then to decisionmakers is more prevalent. However, he does not provide any evidence that this is the case.

Observable Implications of a Soft Power Explanation for Target State Policies

Nye's (2004b, 12) theory expects it is the various resources a state or society possesses that create soft power influence; the catch is that it is the target state's policy response – the outcome – that matters most. Nye's theory does not include a theory of domestic politics and cannot explain who or what matters in the transmission process. There are likely to be multiple possible paths to the desired outcome if soft power were at work in a particular foreign policy event. Nye cannot go beyond covariation because he does not posit a causal path for knowing how soft power is the source of policy choices of a target state. Thus, Nye's conception of soft power is underdetermined and difficult to falsify.

To overcome the deficiencies of Nye's theory and the use of public opinion polls, the focus of this dissertation is on target state foreign policymakers and the justifications they use to advance their preferred policies. These justifications serve as the source of observable implications used to test for the presence of soft power. "The objective measure of soft power has to be attractive in the eyes of specific audiences, and that attraction must influence policy outcomes" (Nye 2004b, 34).[12] Blanchard and Lu (2012, 576) suggest assessing soft power attraction through the public statements of decision makers, and reviewing government or program documents. Thus, the observable implications of soft power influence in the cases examined herein are captured through analysis of the public discourse of key state policymakers in the target state during each of the military interventions.[13] In the broadest sense, the primary observable implication is that target state leaders declare that the applicant is attractive in one of several ways. If soft power were present in any case as an explanation for French or German

[12] Nye (2004a, 258) suggests that states often cooperate out of self-interest, but that soft power influences the degree of that cooperation. This dissertation does not parse the degree of soft power influence on state policymakers; instead, it is interested in identifying whether or not that influence exists in the empirical record outside of public opinion.

[13] The definition and identification of who constitutes "target state policy leaders" are delineated in Chapter 3.

policy decisions, foreign policy leaders in France and Germany should cite an attraction to the culture, values, or foreign policies of the United States when justifying their foreign policy choices (Nye 2004b, 11).

It may be argued that key policymakers in the target state use soft power attraction as cover for their own policy preferences, or as domestic or international political leverage. In the case of soft power creating support for the applicant's policy in the target state, the public statements of the target's policymakers will need to be judged at face value. Key policymakers' statements have "illocutionary force" which reflects that policymakers' words are as deeds which carry actual policy weight in terms of foreign policy desires and intentions (Banchoff 1999, 276). Additionally, when the justifications used to advance preferred policies are consistent over time and accepted across political parties, it is evidence that key leaders' discourse is a reliable source of true motivations for foreign policy choices.

Additionally, Blanchard and Lu (2012, 576) suggest that specification of the attraction itself – whether it is to culture, values, or the legitimacy of foreign policy as suggested by Nye's original theory – is a key component of soft power analysis. Thus, an observable implication is the specification of the attraction by French and German policymakers. As noted, we may observe French and German leaders making public statements that their motivation for support of the U.S. policy in a given case was based on a general attraction to the United States. However, invocations that specify a particular trait of the United States as attractive provide stronger evidence of U.S. soft power influence. Specific references to U.S. values, elements of U.S. culture, or U.S. foreign policy legitimacy are the basis of Nye's theory and form the basis for observable implications in the case studies. Statements that regard the United States as a

leader in terms of culture, democratic values, or legitimate foreign policies would be support for a soft power explanation for target policy choices.

Testing the legitimacy aspect of soft power will rely on the perceptions of target state leaders. To be considered legitimate in terms of soft power influence, the U.S. foreign policy is required to be aligned with U.S. values in the eyes of French or German policymakers (Nye 2004b, 11). Statements from the target state's key policymakers regarding the morality or justness of the U.S. foreign policy, based on U.S. values, are relevant. Additionally, because the applicant in all cases herein is the United States, references to "universal values" (Nye 2004b, 11) such as human rights, democracy, self-determination, and religious freedom are relevant (Nye 2004b, 62). However, there is a distinction made in the discourse analysis regarding how French and German leaders refer to these universal values. If French or German leaders cite these universal values either generally or as their own it does not constitute evidence of U.S. soft power influence. The observable implication of U.S. soft power is if French or German leaders name the United States as the source of the aforementioned concepts, or otherwise cite the U.S. as a leader and that the U.S. foreign policy in each case advances those values.

This test for the presence of U.S. soft power also incorporates Alexander Vuving's (2009) suggested method. Vuving (2009, 5) has refined Nye's operationalization of soft power by separating soft power resources from what he calls soft power currencies of benignity, brilliance, and beauty.[14] This refinement enables scholars to better identify observable implications associated with soft power from the target's perspective as suggested by Blanchard and Lu (2012). Within these soft power currencies, we may find additional verbiage used by

[14] Nye (2011b, 92) acknowledges the contribution Vuving makes with the addition of these "clusters of qualities... that are central to attraction."

target state policymakers that may be found in the empirical record to indicate that soft power was influential in decisions to support the applicant's foreign policy.[15]

Referencing benignity, leaders may speak of some form of gratitude to, or sympathy for the applicant (Vuving 2009, 8). The target's leadership's references to the applicant recognizing the "rights, interests, or self-esteem" of the target state, or otherwise showing unselfishness, indicates soft power attraction (Vuving 2009, 9). In regard to benignity, one observable implication in the case studies might include French or German policymakers recognizing the United States as generous or worthy of their gratitude, obliging the target to support U.S. foreign policy. Another may be invocations that the U.S. policy takes into account French and German interests and is not centered solely on U.S. interests, making the U.S. policy attractive. If the U.S. policy is cited by French and German leaders as unselfish in terms of what the United States stands to lose or gain by the intervention it may also be taken as evidence of U.S. soft power influence.

If the attraction is to the brilliance of the applicant, target leaders should invoke language that indicates appreciation for the high performance of the United States in solving international problems (Vuving 2009, 8). Thus, French and German leaders may invoke previous U.S. successes in solving similar problems. Brilliance also includes a target's admiration for, or general success of the applicant (Vuving 2009, 8). These sentiments may foster imitation or emulation, which results in acquiescence (Vuving 2009, 10–11). Observable implications that derive from brilliance include French or German invocations not only of U.S. capabilities, but that those capabilities are admired, worthy of emulation, and the deserve the support of the target country.

[15] Vuving (2009) does not offer testable hypotheses.

An applicant's "strong conviction, compelling articulation, unselfish devotion and unmoved perseverance for an ideal, value, cause, or vision may inspire that very ideal, value, cause, or vision in others and that is a first step toward making [the applicant] the representative or personification of that ideal, value, cause, or vision" (Vuving 2009, 11). If target state policymakers use the language of ideals, values, causes, visions, morality, hope, or inspiration drawn from the applicant, this may signal Vuving's (2009, 9) conception of beauty. Here, target state leaders would be expected to reference shared values and causes, specifically in terms of these forming their attraction to the applicant (Vuving 2009, 11). One observable implication of soft power influence resulting from beauty are statements of target leaders indicating that they consider the United States as a champion of a value or cause, having moral authority, or its credibility as a representative of a value (Vuving 2009, 11). Another observable implication in the case studies may include French or German invocations of U.S. values, as indicated by Nye's original conceptualization. This captures much of the language expected regarding "universal values" and the potential that French and German leaders would attribute them to the United States. Additionally, invocations that French or German policymakers trust the United States, that the United States sets the example with its foreign policy, or that they look to the United States "for guidance, example, encouragement, and inspiration" (Vuving 2009, 12) also offer observable implications to test for the presence of U.S. soft power.

Additionally, Nye (2004b, 27) posits that when support for a potential soft power applicant becomes a serious vote loser, "even friendly leaders are less likely to accede" to requests for support of foreign policies toward third parties. Thus, an additional, though weak, observable implication in a soft power explanation may include a consequentialist calculus by target state policymakers. Policymakers' references to their own publics' attitudes toward an

applicant may provide evidence of the effects of soft power. If statements from French or German leaders indicate that they have considered their own public's attitude toward the United States or to U.S. foreign policy when justifying their policy choices, then this may be evidence of soft power. When leaders make foreign policy decisions based on their perceptions of public attitudes toward the United States, then the link from soft power to public opinion, then to policy, may be made.[16] The evidence of this observable implication from key leader discourse is independent from public opinion polling. French or German foreign policymakers may or may not reference opinion polls or surveys, but would be expected to invoke public sentiment regarding the United States to advance their preferred policy if a consequentialist element of a soft power explanation were present.

According to Nye (2004b, 14, 127–29), non-support of an applicant's policy may result from a lack of soft power. If said foreign policies were not supported due to lack of soft power attraction, it is expected that target leaders' statements would so indicate that they view the U.S. foreign policy as exceptional in a given case. The applicant's foreign policy legitimacy, in terms of its non-alignment with the applicant's own values, could be used by target leaders to justify their non-support and to demonstrate that the applicant's foreign policy actions and purported values are not aligned. In this regard, soft power attraction to U.S. values would be in effect, but work against the United States in terms of a target's support for its foreign policy. Statements from French or German leaders that reference U.S. foreign policy as "hypocritical, arrogant, indifferent to the opinion of others, or based on a narrow approach to national interests" may be taken as evidence that soft power is negatively correlated with the policy choices of target states (Nye 2004b, 14). In other words, French and German foreign policy leaders would be expected

[16] This dissertation does not attempt to determine if target state foreign policy leaders accurately perceive their public's opinion toward the United States or on a specific policy.

to invoke the illegitimacy of U.S. foreign policy and do so by using the very values purportedly held by the United States against it.

Conclusion

Because soft power "originates in the emotional content of diverse political messages, the operations of soft power are inherently difficult to observe and quantify" (Warren 2014, 117). As important as the concept of soft power has been to U.S. policymakers and scholars, it has proven difficult to operationalize and test. Most studies of soft power include measuring the resources states purportedly have at their disposal, and a target state's public's attitude toward the applicant or its policies. Because the evidence linking public opinion to foreign policy outcomes is mixed, and foreign policy outcomes are of primary importance, using the discourse of key foreign policymakers provides an alternate path for examining soft power effects.

Thus, in order to test soft power effects, rather than its possible sources or currencies, it is necessary to examine the empirical record for target state policymakers' justification of policy choices, and determine if soft power influence was a significant factor. Repeated and unchallenged invocations of soft power attraction to the applicant will be evidence of the applicant's soft power at work in influencing target state policymakers' foreign policy decisions. The test for the presence of U.S. soft power influence seeks evidence from the public discourse of key foreign policy leaders in France and Germany that some form of attraction to the United States was present in the argument they used to advance their preferred policies. The central claim tested in the soft power explanation is that invocations from target state leaders indicating that U.S. culture, values, foreign policy legitimacy, or its brilliance, benignity, or beauty factored into French or Germany policymakers' policy preferences and, thus, signal the presence of U.S.

soft power influence. This approach provides a direct path for testing for the presence of soft power effects, rather than relying on proxy variables, and may aid in uncovering mechanisms through which an influencer's soft power affects a target's policy choices.

Chapter 3

Dependent Variable, Alternate Explanations, and Case Selection

The goal of this chapter is to delineate the outcome variable and two plausible alternative explanations for state policy decisions against which soft power will be tested using within-case congruence methods. The chapter is presented in seven sections. In the first section, the dependent variable – the target state's foreign policy decisions vis-à-vis the applicant state's policy – is delineated. The second section provides an overview of the rationale for the two explanations against which soft power is tested. The third section provides the theoretical underpinnings for the balancing explanation, and delineates the expectations congruent with a balancing explanation for target state policy choices. In the fourth section, the state identity explanation is outlined, including the delineation of French and Germany identities that are plausible in the case studies and which offer observable implications for the test. The fifth section justifies the use of the case study methodology, within-case congruence, and process-tracing as appropriate for testing the three potential explanations for French and German policy decisions. The sixth section provides case selection rationale and the identification of key policy actors in each case. The seventh section summarizes the chapter.

The Dependent Variable: Target State Policies

As Nye (2004b, 10) expects that soft power will lead to less resistance to the policies of an applicant, the dependent variable is the foreign policy of the target state. The dependent variable varies in terms of whether those countries adopt policies that support or do not support the applicant's policy toward the third party.

Support of an applicant's policy in this dissertation is the target state's participation in the U.S.-led military intervention examined in each of the four cases. The cases include French and German decisions to support two U.S.-led military interventions in Kosovo and against ISIS. Additionally, the target may elect to voice support without actively participating, or abstain from taking a position on the applicant's policy altogether. The outcome does not vary across the cases, which is a limitation of the dissertation. In each of the included cases, France and Germany supported the military intervention. The basic characteristics of non-support are identified here in the interest of falsifiability, but that outcome is not explained in the cases selected. However, the cases provide four distinct tests for the presence of U.S. soft power influence since France and Germany supported the U.S.-led intervention in each event. Because this dissertation does not focus on the outcome, but the process, the variance is not whether or not Germany or France participated, but the process by which they decided to participate. Because they did participate, it sets up four tests of soft power. Another possible variance is the amount of soft power the United States may have had in either case, as they represent pre- and post-Iraq invasion events. The variance of the dependent variable will be coded as supportive or non-supportive, with the following criteria and measures.

Non-supportive

If the target state decides not to participate in the military intervention led by the applicant, it is considered non-supportive behavior when coupled with expressions by target state leaders that they are against the intervention. Additionally, Alexander Thompson (2009, 19) posits that a state seeking to coerce another may "suffer in other issue areas as a political statement or as direct retaliation." The significance of the potential influence of the United Nations (UN), and particularly the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), as a factor in state

decision making and ability to support or thwart U.S. policies will be relevant (Thompson 2009). Thus, a state's attempt to counter or thwart the applicant's policies can be measured through target state leaders' statements made in international institutions, or other attempts at countering the applicant's policy actions toward third parties by bringing procedural actions or making statements that are clearly against the applicant state in the United Nations.

Additionally, target countries may decide to place limitations on access to airspace, basing, or other resources necessary for the applicant state to carry out the military intervention. These countries may also leverage their own military, diplomatic, or economic ties to other states in order to persuade others into denying access for military operations by the applicant state. Whether such efforts are successful or not is irrelevant. The effort alone is evidence of non-supportive action.

Supportive

Supportive actions will be measured in terms of the target state in question providing support to military interventions led by the applicant state, whether it is with equipment, personnel, logistics, information and intelligence, or financing. Another option for target states could be to take no action. Soft power is conceptualized as co-option through attraction, which leads to acquiescence (Nye 2004b, 6). If these states take no actions and make no public statements to counter the applicant state's intervention it will be included as evidence of supportive behavior.

In the four cases included in this dissertation, France and Germany participated in the U.S.-led military interventions against the FRY and ISIS. The rationale invoked by key foreign policymakers provides insight into the motivations for state policy choices, and aids in the test of U.S. soft power against two alternate explanations, balancing and state identity.

Overview of Alternate Explanations: Balancing and State Identity

Because Nye's conceptualization of soft power rests on logic that comports closely, but not exclusively with the liberal tradition, the alternative explanations derive from neorealist and constructivist paradigms of international relations. Nye (2004b) does not place his work in a specific paradigm, but given his theoretical assumptions, soft power theory is aligned better with the liberal tradition. In Nye's understanding of soft power, target state decisions are based on value attraction and not relative power and position. Additionally, realists view public opinion as a "relatively ineffectual variable in" predicting state behavior (Datta 2009, 266). Thus, in seeking explanations for state policy choices, a plausible rival explanation to soft power derives from neorealism.

The balancing alternate explanation is derived from the structural realist paradigm of international relations scholarship, specifically, balance-of-power theory. This explanation draws primarily from Kenneth Waltz's (1979) theory of defensive realism and John Mearsheimer's (2001) theory of offensive realism to ascertain observable implications that can help identify evidence supporting state balancing behavior as the motive for policy choices.

A constructivist explanation, based on a target state's conception of appropriate behavior vis-à-vis other relevant actors in a case, provides another plausible explanation of target states' policy choice whether or not to support an applicant's military intervention. It is possible that in all four cases a target's feeling of obligation to the applicant or another actor, or that elements of its own well-developed identity form obligations to principles or institutions that motivate foreign policy choices.

The line between soft power attraction – the "power of seduction" (Nye 2004b, 8) – and that which motivates states' conceptions of appropriateness under constructivism may be blurry.

However, the factors upon which states may draw to justify state policy decisions differ in the ways outlined below. The notion that intersubjective meaning, and the existence of state identities as motivations for foreign policy choices, is significant in the international relations literature (Wendt 1992; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 892), and forms the basis for a plausible and distinct rival explanation to soft power and balancing.

Each of the three theoretically-based causal claims, soft power, balancing, and state identity form the basis for the potential causal processes that are examined in this dissertation. The claims and expectations of a soft power explanation were delineated in the previous chapter. Accordingly, in the next two sections, the foundational theory and expectations related to the two alternate explanations for state policy choices are outlined in detail.

Alternate Explanation: Balancing

Incentives to Balance: The International System and What States Balance Against

Balancing behavior is said to be the result of the fear states have that derives from anarchy and the need it places on states to secure their survival (Waltz 1979, 121). In his theory of offensive realism, Mearsheimer (2001, 3) points to three factors that drive the quest for power, including anarchy, the fact that all states have some level of offensive capability, and uncertainty about other states' intentions.[17] The end result is that a state's primary interest is survival (Waltz 1979, 134). Such interests are commonly referred to under the umbrella term "[national] security" which "covers a range of goals so wide that highly divergent policies can be interpreted

[17] Waltz and Mearsheimer disagree regarding the amount of power states pursue. The former notes that states wish to maintain their position in the system (Waltz 1979, 126), while the latter posits that states attempt to maximize power and dominate the system (Mearsheimer 2001, 21). This may factor in the intensity of power competition, but balancing behaviors, based on relative power concerns, remain relevant to both theories.

as policies of security" (Wolfers 1952, 484).[18] Thus, the security dilemma drives states' desire for national security (Waltz 1979, 186–87; Mearsheimer 2001, 35–36).

It has been suggested that the distribution of power since the end of the Cold War is unipolar. Some posit that states are unable to balance against a unipolar power and do not try (Wohlforth 1999). Others posit that they may resort to soft balancing behaviors in order to otherwise check a unipole's power (Pape 2005; Paul 2005), "undercut or deprive others of soft power or to balance their soft power" (Nye 2007, 170), or to "hamstring the unipole's ability to exercise influence" (Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 2009, 16). Nye (2004b, 25–26) notes the potential that hard power has to attract, resulting in bandwagoning behavior, though this is an outcome less expected in the literature (Walt 1985, 15).

Mearsheimer (2001, 147) states that even if controversial, war remains a possible strategy for states to "increase their share of world power." There also may be reasons for lesser states to challenge the unipole and change the structure which do not depend on the superpower directly threatening their survival. Waltz (2000, 28–29) notes that any unbalanced power leads to fear, and gives weaker states "reason to strengthen their positions." Thus, balancing against a unipolar power remains a potential explanation for state policy choices. Balance of power theory posits that states will ally against – hence balance against – the state that is the most threatening to them, and that this will be the state in the system with the most power (Waltz 1979, 127; Mearsheimer 2001, 44). "Power is the best means for survival" (Mearsheimer 2001, 19). The intensity of power competition between great powers "waxes and wanes," but "great powers fear each other and always compete with each other for power" (Mearsheimer 2001, 2). States will

[18] "Security points to some degree of protection of values previously acquired. In Walter Lippmann's words, a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war. What this definition implies is that security rises and falls with the ability of a nation to deter an attack, or to defeat it. This is in accord with common usage of the term" (Wolfers 1952, 484).

defend the current balance of power if a change is thought to benefit another state, but will seize opportunities to "alter the distribution of world power in their favor" and look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of other states (Mearsheimer 2001, 3, 5). If opportunities arise that allow a weaker state to "revise the balance of power in their own favor they will take it" (Mearsheimer 2001, 37). Since it is hypothesized that states in anarchy have incentives to withhold information (Waltz 1979) and that intentions cannot be known, causing uncertainty about others' future actions (Mearsheimer 2001, 3), states balance against capabilities, not the intentions of other states (Mearsheimer 2001, 45).

Stephen Walt (1985) argues that states do not always identify the source of danger to their national security as the state in the system with the most power in terms of capabilities. He notes that the factors of aggregate strength, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and offensive intentions combine in some fashion that allows states to calculate which others pose the greatest threat. Balancing behavior remains the relevant result. "For the states that matter, balancing is the rule" (Walt 1985, 18). The focus on capabilities, rather than the threat posed by the intentions of another leads Mearsheimer (2001, 55) to argue that the capabilities a state possesses, rather than the outcomes it achieves, are what dictate the behavior of states under realist theory, and particularly the balance of power. Thus, no matter the composition of the international system, the presence of a state with greater capabilities will incentivize balancing behavior by other states in order to ensure national security.

Further, it is theorized that states do not cooperate to promote a secure world order, but may cooperate if doing so aids in maximizing their own share of power (Mearsheimer 2001, 49). "States that stand to lose power will work to deter aggression and preserve the existing order"

but also insure themselves against the potential failure of such balancing coalitions (Mearsheimer 2001, 50–51). Therefore, some instances of cooperation may indicate balancing behavior.

Whatever the distribution of power, since intentions of states cannot be known with certainty, even in situations in which the dominant power acts benignly, its actions may still frighten others in terms of threatening a target's national security (Waltz 2000, 28). Under anarchy and the fear of future actions, weaker states worry about more powerful states (Waltz 2000, 28). Thus, even though the international system in 1999 and 2014 in which the case studies are situated may be considered unipolar, the system is still characterized by anarchy, which drives fear about the future and competition among states. Balancing behavior, both internal and external, remains an expected outcome because of anarchy, the asymmetric distribution of power in the international system, resultant uncertainty and fear, and the desire for survival (Waltz 1979, 168; Mearsheimer 2001, 155–56).

How States Balance: External and Internal Balancing

External balancing relies on the formation of coalitions or alliances that increase total capabilities relative to the threatening state in order to provide for increased security against a threat (Waltz 1979, 168). It is theorized that such an alliance would allow coalitions of lesser states to prevail in war against the greater power, but also that it increases the possibilities of deterring the dominant state in the first place (Mearsheimer 2001, 156), thus, "check[ing] the progress of others" (Waltz 1979, 125).[19] The strongest evidence of external balancing behavior is found when states ally together "even when they have strong reasons not to cooperate with one another" (Waltz 1979, 125).

[19] Similarly, manipulation of trading terms or "intentional noncompliance with shared regimes" are other possible balancing behaviors (Thompson 2009, 19). These may include actions such as trade embargoes or tariffs. However, within the context of the four cases examined in this dissertation, these behaviors are not expected.

In contrast, internal balancing behavior "is self-help in the purest sense of the term" (Mearsheimer 2001, 157). Internal balancing relies on the mobilization of a state's own resources, and consists of behavior in which states are engaged "all the time" to increase military, economic, and political capabilities to ensure national security (Mearsheimer 2001, 157). It is assumed to be the most reliable form of balancing, as it does not require "slow and inefficient" and potentially unreliable alliances with other states who also seek to advance their own relative power in the global system (Waltz 1979, 168; Mearsheimer 2001, 156).

Driven by the desire for survival, competition between states results in "socialization to the system" which demands that for survival's sake, states conform "to common international practices even though for internal reasons they would prefer not to" (Waltz 1979, 127). States will emulate those that are successful, or risk their own survival (Waltz 1979, 118). Mearsheimer (2001, 167) goes a step further, and suggests not only emulation, but also innovation and the "pursuit of novel strategies" and the possibility of deviation "from accepted practice" as well as conformation with it. Thus, competition can include innovations in weapons technology, military doctrines, or the development of clever strategies (Mearsheimer 2001, 166). These conceptions of internal balancing behavior contain many types of behavior making internal balancing difficult to falsify. Relying on the public discourse of key policymakers aids in helping to explain the motivations of the state and, thus, whether or not they sought to balance.

Statements to domestic audiences, intended to gain domestic political support for changes to military spending, security measures, technologies, doctrines, or strategies may be found in the discourse of key political leaders. Additionally, measures to increase economic and political capabilities in the face of a threat, counter a greater power, or increase a state's relative power are relevant. Such statements may include language similar to that used for external balancing,

including noting concern about the threat, power, or status that another actor poses, and the necessity to make internal efforts to counter that threat or otherwise gain relative power and ensure national security. The evidence found in public discourse reflecting internal balancing should also be observed in domestic policy actions in order to provide empirical evidence of internal balancing behaviors.

Balancing that Manifests as Support for the Applicant

If balance-of-power theory explains the target's support of an applicant's policy toward a third party, it may manifest in either or both aspects of a two-track explanation based on the target state's concern for relative power and position, and security. Each track leads to several observable implications. Both tracks indicate the desire of the target state to maximize its own share of power and ensure its own national security. An observable implication for either track includes target state leaders invoking the need to cooperate with others out of interest for survival and security, especially when that cooperation would not otherwise be expected.

In the first track, the target state's concerns over its immediate state security interests being threatened by events or actors in the third party offer the most straightforward explanation for supporting an applicant's intervention against a third party. Thus, an observable implication is discourse that indicates that the target is motivated to participate in the applicant-led military intervention because of the threat posed by the events or actors involving the third party. The most direct evidence of such balancing is repeated invocations by target state leaders of threats the situation poses to the target state and its interests. Target state leaders' may claim dangers of regional or domestic instability and its impact on their own interests, including mass migration, and disruptions in production or trade. Additionally, references to the potential dangers posed by the third party, or associated actors and actions, to citizens in the target state are evidence of the

desire to engage in balancing. Domestic threats may exist in the form of diasporas in the target state which may increase the domestic security threat. Leaders' statements that reference any of the above are evidence to confirm the balancing explanation for support.

In the second track, the target state may go along with the applicant's policy in order to claim or reclaim a role as the dominant actor in an issue area or geographic region. The desire to prevent or balance against the applicant's dominance in the region may result in balancing behavior that appears at first to be bandwagoning. Knowing that it cannot balance directly against the more powerful applicant, a target state may join the applicant and support an intervention against a third party because it is the best path to having a say in the policy actions of the applicant, issue area, or region. The target state participates in an intervention in order to increase its own influence in the region, whereas – if it did not – that influence would be eroded. This participation may also be used to bolster the target state's prominence within an existing international organization, which may be dominated by the applicant. Participation by the target state may also provide it with the ability to limit the influence of another state that it considers to be an outsider in a region or issue area in which the target desires to assert or reassert itself as a dominant power. The target state must support the intervention to protect its own standing and security in the area.

For this second track, similar invocations by policymakers that the target state's interests and relative influence are under greater threat from other parties, not including the threat to national security noted above from the third party or the applicant, are evidence of balancing resulting in the decision to join with the applicant. Threats from other states in the region that are perceived by the target as more immediate than any posed by the applicant may make it beneficial to the target state to participate in the military action led by the applicant state. The

calculus may have nothing to do with the applicant or the third party, but the desire to balance others in the region or issue area.

In sum, repeated invocations of threats to the target state, its survival, security, or position as justification for its participation in the military intervention are evidence of balancing. The actor toward which such statements are directed help to indicate whether the intent is to balance against the applicant or a third party as the greatest or immediate threat. Invocations of the need for the target to ally with others to ensure its own security also serve as an important observable implication.

Alternate Explanation: State Identity

State identity "encompasses intersubjectively shared meanings, norms, and narratives" which shape "the content of state interests and the course of state action" (Banchoff 1999, 262). The identity formed through interactions with other actors may drive state foreign policy decisions (Wendt 1992; Banchoff 1999). Since "identities are the basis of interests" (Wendt 1992, 398; see also Hopf 1998, 176) and identities are thought by constructivists to drive world politics (Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994; Banchoff 1999), states will likely make foreign policy decisions based on their understanding of what is appropriate behavior based on a given identity in a particular situation. If state identity explains target state policy choices in these cases, the state will consider its support for an applicant's policies toward third parties in terms of its identity and the standards of behavior that accord with it.[20]

Appropriateness involves "maintaining consistency between behavior and a conception of self in a social role" and "fulfilling the obligations of a role in a situation" (March and Olsen

[20] This dissertation does not investigate the origins of the countries' identities or seek to offer a new conceptualization of those identities. Instead, the dissertation draws on others' work and applies extant understandings of French and German identity.

1989, 160–61). Using state identity as a justification for policy choices should result in leaders using language explaining their action in that policy situation based on "who they are," their particular "role" in the issue area, or their position in a hierarchical relationship (Wendt 1994, 385; Schoppa 1999, 308, 313; Barnett and Duvall 2005), or their position in the international community in general (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 54).

Alexander Wendt (1992, 411) notes that "for both systemic and 'psychological' reasons, then, intersubjective understandings and expectations may have a self-perpetuating quality, constituting path-dependencies that new ideas about self and other must transcend." Given that state identities are changeable but "relatively stable" (Wendt 1992, 397), and must "show some form of permanence or rootedness" to be meaningful (Banchoff 1999, 271), it is expected that in a given foreign policy scenario, a state will adhere to its existing understanding of its own identity vis-à-vis the other states involved in the case. Interests that derive from identity should show stability over time.

"Actors do not have a 'portfolio' of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situations" (Wendt 1992, 398). This definition of interests includes the state's identity vis-à-vis the applicant, the third party, and other relevant actors insofar as identities of target states may differ across all of these actors. Which state identity may factor in any situation cannot be determined *a priori* and, thus, identifying all identities is a complex undertaking. As James March and Johan Olsen (2004, 8) note, "actors have problems in resolving ambiguities and conflicts among alternative concepts of the self, accounts of a situation, and prescriptions of appropriateness. They struggle with how to classify themselves and others – who they are, and what they are and what these classifications imply in a specific situation." Therefore, an identity-based justification for policy choices may

explain support of the policies of the applicant, yet, identity may provide only the reason for state action, but cannot specify which particular action will follow in any situation.

This test of state identity as an explanation for French and German participation in U.S.-led military interventions takes the approach suggested by Thomas Banchoff (1999) regarding the forms of evidence which indicate that state identities are a factor in policy decisions. These include statements from policymakers regarding which norms are "salient and binding" in a situation, the identification of friends and foes, and "particular collective memories as backdrops for present policies" (Banchoff 1999, 269).[21] Such invocations by target state policymakers of appropriateness concerns to justify policy decisions is evidence that supports an identity explanation.

Additionally, if state identity explains target state foreign policy choices, the state identity indicated by major party leaders' statements will "be shared within and across the parties vying for state power" (Banchoff 1999, 269). If target state leaders justify actions based on identity and domestic critics do not challenge the policy for violating that identity, then "the case for the political effects of state identity is the strongest" (Banchoff 1999, 2778). If state policy behavior contradicts state identity and domestic critics do not challenge the violation, then identity likely holds little value in explaining target state choices (Banchoff 1999, 278–79). However, if criticism of a policy notes the violation of state identity and causes "a return to congruent policies" then this is also evidence that state identity "shapes the direction of state behavior" (Banchoff 1999, 279).

[21] The forms of evidence that may indicate the identity explanation as a factor in state policy decisions will likely overlap. Notions of which norms are binding are included here as part of a norm-based identity explanation. However, identification and categorization of which states are friends or enemies, and references to "collective memories" may all intertwine (Banchoff 1999, 269).

This test of state identity takes up another suggestion from Banchoff and other scholars by using parliamentary records as a source of target state foreign policymakers' discourse. Some of the most reliable indicators of identities to which policymakers may make reference in the state identity explanation may be found in parliamentary debates (Banchoff 1999, 270; Boekle, Rittberger, and Wagner 2001, 129), with the views of major party leaders being the most decisive (Banchoff 1999, 270). Here, it is expected that party leaders will invoke long-standing traditions, customs, practices, and values to justify and gain support for policy stances. Banchoff (1999, 269) posits that elite political actors' conceptions of state identity, if not identical to that of the mass public, are "broadly similar – especially in democracies." National political leaders "articulate the conceptions of state identity with the greatest political salience" (Banchoff 1999, 269). Speeches by representatives of the majority party may be considered "as the expression of societally shared, value-based expectations of appropriate foreign policy behavior" (Boekle, Rittberger, and Wagner 2001, 130–31). It is "through the definition and justification of their foreign policy stances in an open and adversarial forum that government and opposition leaders situate the state with respect to a given international constellation" (Banchoff 1999, 270).

The observable implications of state identity in such debates may include invocations by policymakers that delineate enemies and allies, relevant institutional norms, and situate the state within a constellation of other states and institutions (Banchoff 1999, 270). State identity may also manifest in statements that define the current situation by relating the origins of relationships with other states and institutions and subsequent influence on the current situation by defining "who we are" based upon "where we have been" (Banchoff 1999, 270).

Other constructivist accounts of power relationships in international relations are also helpful in identifying how to recognize that state identity may be driving policy decisions. The

concept of institutional power allows a power attempt to occur through "the rules and procedures that define" institutions which "constrains the actions (or nonactions)... of others" (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 51). This power is reflected in "long-standing institutions [which] represent frozen configurations of privilege and bias that can continue to shape the future choices of actors" (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 52). These same authors (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 53) also note a structural aspect of power which indicates that "the interests of actors are directly shaped by the social positions that they occupy." This structure results in unequal social privileges and leaves states "willing to 'accept their role in the existing order of things'" (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 53). Rules may be associated with the development of roles which aid the production of identities and interests, and state behaviors (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 54). Thus, identities constrain the choice range of actors (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 54).

Support for a state identity-based explanation may come through the examination of the discourse of key foreign policymakers in target states to determine the source of the motivations for foreign policy decisions. When key leaders invoke decision criteria that are based on appropriateness, as opposed to references to the attractiveness of another state's values and policies, or the power or threat another actor poses, then it is evidence of an identity explanation. If state identity explains target state support for an applicant's policy toward a third party the target state will justify its position based on the appropriateness of the policy and its accordance with that identity. The next two sections identify the contours of German and French identity as they manifest during the time periods explored in the two policy decisions examined here. The focus of each section is a delineation of the core elements of the understanding attached to the state identity and the politics that others have associated with that state identity.

German State Identity

Banchoff (1999) presents evidence of the existence of a supranational European state identity that drives German foreign policy decisions. Because the events examined in this dissertation did not constitute an existential threat to Germany as a state, Banchoff's (1999) representation of German state identity as a state that frames foreign policy choices with an eye toward deeper integration into Europe is relevant to the cases.[22]

Germany's "supranational European identity" includes an attitude of "self-binding" in which Germany is guided to limit its execution of state power to the confines of European institutions with the intent to "reassure neighbors and signal that 'Germany would remain loyal to the community'" (Banchoff 1999, 260, 268). This identity is founded upon both negative and positive narratives of disastrous German history of the Third Reich through the end of World War II, and the success of European institutions in the decades that followed, which drives Germany away from traditional conceptions of state sovereignty (Banchoff 1999, 268). This "constellation" of factors drives a European identity that sees Germany as "irrevocably bound" within the European community and as a partner in that union, requiring both economic and political cooperation, and shared sovereignty (Banchoff 1999, 272–73). German identity, as part of deeper European integration, has included a gradually "less restrictive stance toward multilateral military operations" (Banchoff 1999, 263; Baumann 2001, 174).

This delineation of German identity leads to several observable implications for a German identity explanation for participation in the U.S.-led interventions. When drawing on this European identity to justify German foreign policy decisions, German leaders will make statements that link the current policy debate to the "catastrophe of dictatorship, war, genocide,

[22] The alternative German state identity that Banchoff (1999, 269) recognizes is a multilateral security identity that inhered during the Cold War.

and the irreversibility of German integration into a larger Europe" (Banchoff 1999, 273). Because Germany's deep integration into Europe is founded on the "will to prevent the horrors of the past from ever being repeated" (Banchoff 1999, 275) statements that link current policies to such horrors provides strong evidence of state identity.

Germany's European identity relies on the appropriateness of multilateral cooperation to ensure peace, freedom, and social stability for Europe (Banchoff 1999, 279). Leaders may invoke the appropriateness of multilateral cooperation for those purposes as a German obligation. Leaders may also invoke the founders of Germany's integration into Europe – Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer – and a rejection of nationalism, and Germany's embeddedness in the EU (Banchoff 1999, 273). German leaders may also refer to the EU's record of success in postwar Europe as the model for German foreign policy, and the construction of a German foreign policy that is empathetic toward its partners in Europe, and that "trust and goodwill" should be "maintained under all circumstances" (Banchoff 1999, 273–74). Codification of this European identity, and desire for integration into Europe, also exists in Germany's Basic Law which dictates that Germany "serve peace in a united Europe" and "cooperate in the realization of a united Europe through the development of the [EU]" (Banchoff 1999, 280). Thus, German policymakers' references to German Basic Law offer additional observable implications of state identity.

French State Identity

"France has never given up its desire for global influence in the name of its universal values" – *liberté*, *égalité*, *fraternité*, and *laïcité* (Gordon and Meunier 2001, 23; Laborde 2001, 718). French state identity has been formed by its historical narrative. Charles de Gaulle noted

that “France will not be France without greatness,” indicating that foundational to France’s state identity is the notion that the unique greatness of France among states demands a leadership role in world affairs (Kolodziej 1974, 27–28; Kuisel 1996, 46; Gordon and Meunier 2001, 23; Tardy 2003, 106).

French foreign policy is said to be guided more by principle than pragmatism (Bratberg 2011, 335). These principles are informed by the Gaullist tradition, and include foreign policy independence, French grandeur, and France’s unique place in world affairs (Kolodziej 1974). The role of France’s revolutionary history, the experiences of multiple military defeats, rivalries with Britain and especially Germany over control of Europe, and its history and ultimate failure as an imperial power all help shape elements of France’s identity (Meunier 2000, 106; Kumar 2006, 414–16). Chief among these elements is the notion of foreign policy independence (Cerny 1983, 3). France has long been determined to remain free of external constraints in its foreign policy decisions with the intent of maximizing French influence and prestige (Kolodziej 1974, 13; Toinet 1988, 140).

Despite France’s problematic imperial history and failures in major wars in the modern era, the traditional French state identity is characterized as that of a great power “embodied in the French Army and the empire” and French culture (Kuisel 1996, 46). Since World War II, France has tried to reassert its role as a leader in world affairs, often in reaction to the United States (Meunier 2000, 106; Gordon and Meunier 2001, 23). French state identity prompts France to take advantage of opportunities to “enhance its stature” and “exert more influence” (Kolodziej 1974, 47). This Gaullist identity-driven foreign policy thread has remained consistent during and after the Cold War, and through several administrations, including, perhaps surprisingly, that of François Mitterrand, the first Socialist Party president of France (Cerny 1983, 5; see also Tiersky

1995). Even France's reintegration into the NATO military structure by Nicolas Sarkozy, and subsequent decision to maintain that integration by François Hollande can be understood in Gaullist terms as it was the best option for French security and foreign policy given the lack of a European security structure (Brown 2013). It remains that "the Gaullist legacy is still one of the strongest trump cards in the hands of French foreign policymakers because of its very inclusiveness and ambiguity" (Cerny 1983, 7).

France's concern for a significant role in international organizations demonstrates its identity as an important power, as well as its desire for an independent foreign policy. France's history with NATO, remaining part of the North Atlantic Council while withdrawing its military forces from the NATO integrated military command structure, is, in part, a bid for policy independence from the United States (Kolodziej 1974, 51; NATO 2020). However, France's relationship with NATO coupled with its development of nuclear arms, is not simply due to anti-Americanism, but part of its claim to greatness (Kolodziej 1974, 45). The United Nations and European Union are also paths for asserting French leadership and independence, and to counter U.S. power, long seen as the way to maintain France's independence in foreign affairs (Bratberg 2011, 334). This French state identity, like Germany's, seeks a stronger European Union, not merely for the sake of integration, but to exert French leadership based on French exceptionalism (Meunier 2000, 106, 115; Gordon and Meunier 2001, 23; Curley 2009, 659; Bratberg 2011, 334).

In terms of universal principles, France considers itself the "spearhead of human rights" which results in a commitment "to a vigorous presence abroad" which furthers France's desires for an autonomous foreign policy (Bratberg 2011, 335; see also Curley 2009, 658), and, perhaps paradoxically, supports the Gaullist conception of national self-determination for others (Kolodziej 1974, 9). Promoting human rights and democracy, support for multinational

institutions, and advancing French interests simultaneously are not viewed as contradictory in terms of France's identity and resulting foreign policies (Bratberg 2011, 336). France's greatness is also linked with France's duty to others and its need for a global reach, making relationships with former colonies and underdeveloped states an important aspect of French foreign policy (Kolodziej 1974, 37; Bratberg 2011, 335).

Observable implications to support state identity as the explanation for French policymaking in the cases of the military interventions in Kosovo or ISIS will include repeated invocations from French leaders of the desire to remain independent in its foreign policy choices. Additionally, French leaders should state a desire to attain or maintain an esteemed position in the international community, or live up to its responsibilities based on its status as a great state. Invocations from French national leaders during policy debates indicating France's unique historic role in global affairs, its republican values, and its leadership and exceptionalism, in Europe or globally, are all indications of state identity being at work in foreign policy decisions to support U.S.-led interventions. Invocations of French grandeur, in terms of its national prestige and influence are relevant. Additionally, invocations of a sense of duty to aid the poor or minority groups in other regions through military action, deriving from an extension of enduring French universal values, provide observable implications that French identity shapes foreign policy choices.

In sum, it is expected that if German state identity explains Germany's support of the military interventions, the elements of its identity most likely to be invoked by policy leaders are Germany's history of atrocities and genocide, and its obligation to prevent them from reoccurring. If French state identity explains France's participation in the military interventions, French leaders are likely to make invocations of France's founding of and dedication to human

rights. It is also expected that France will justify its policy choices based on perceptions of its rightful place among great powers in terms of leadership in world, and especially European, affairs.

Methodology

As noted in Chapter 2, scholarly work on soft power typically depends on public opinion toward an applicant in target countries as the measure of soft power influence on state policy actions. Making conclusions about soft power based upon the correlation of an applicant's soft power and public opinion is problematic. This practice discounts the achievement of policy objectives that may have benefited from soft power influence through paths other than public opinion, or the possibility that soft power does not inhere in many cases. Thus, it is important for scholarship to move past analysis that merely correlates decline in public attitudes toward a powerful state to an erosion of its soft power influence on other states' policies.

Because public opinion polls may not be reliable as an outcome measure of soft power influence, this dissertation focuses on the elite dimension of potential soft power influence. Additionally, rather than using quantitative measures of public perceptions, this dissertation relies on an in-depth examination of cases to aid in uncovering the existence of a causal mechanism for soft power influence, which is as noted in Chapter 2 underspecified in Nye's (1990a; 2004b) theory (Johnson, Reynolds, and Mycoff 2008, 154).

Case Study Method, Within-Case Congruence, and Process-Tracing

Given my goal to determine whether there is a causal link between one state's purported soft power and other states' policy decisions, the case study method is most appropriate for this dissertation. Using the case study method, I have sought to select important cases and undertake detailed process-tracing. This method allows for the specification and deeper analysis of the

possible characteristics of soft power attraction if and when it is present, as part of the soft power explanation for target state foreign policy decisions. The four cases involving state decisions for military intervention fit these criteria. The case study method, through an examination of elite discourse, also allows for testing soft power theory and competing explanations based on actors speaking and "acting in a manner fitting the theory's logic" (Van Evera 1997, 29), and may aid in answering "how?" and "why?" questions (Yin 2014, 11). In these cases, by drawing on the discourse of key foreign policymakers, if soft power were present, actors should speak and act in a manner expected in terms of voicing attraction to the applicant. The policies advanced by foreign policy leaders in France and Germany leading to their participation in the interventions generated significant debate. Therefore, the cases of French and German participation in the U.S.-led military interventions in Kosovo in 1999 and ISIS in 2014, offer rich sources of elite discourse from each country through which to test for the presence of U.S. soft power and the competing explanations.

The use of the case study method includes within-case congruence and process-tracing to illuminate potential soft power effects on state decisions. Because soft power theory is unable to "make specific predictions" and is difficult to test "in any rigorous way," within-case congruence may aid in determining if soft power is more or less at play in influencing state policy decisions (George and Bennett 2005, 136). Congruence is useful in testing "theories of macro-political processes" such as the concept of soft power that set aside internal decision-making processes (George and Bennett 2005, 149).

Because any number of causal variables might be present and result in behaviors congruent with each theory, a close examination of the processes "by which nations arrive at" their decisions "might allow one to choose which of these different causal mechanisms is most

plausibly at work" (G. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 227). This dissertation does so by tracing the discourse of key policymakers over the course of a foreign policy event. Process-tracing aids in shedding light on how differing theories, such as the three examined in this dissertation, may "compete in logic" but still result in the same predicted outcome for state decisions by identifying different causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005, 139). Additionally, when utilizing the congruence method the theory being tested must also be validated against competing theories; process-tracing can help achieve that goal since it requires one to collect evidence delineating the process causing the outcome under investigation (George and Bennett 2005, 137). Thus, together, within-case congruence and process-tracing of the elite discourse allows testing of the three theoretical explanations previously outlined.

Case Selection: Countries, Time Period, Events, Data Sources, and Relevant Actors

France and Germany were selected because they make for a comparatively good investigation of the potential role of U.S. soft power. These states have certain characteristics that foster a good test; whereas other countries with which the United States may have soft power influence, including the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Japan, are problematic for various reasons outlined below.

France and Germany strike a balance across several features in which power in general, and soft power in particular, may manifest. For power of any form to factor into state relationships, some difference in preferences must exist that set the conditions for an influence attempt (Dahl 1957, 202–3; Baldwin 1979, 162–63). However, Nye (2007, 164–65) suggests that cultural closeness or historical affinity may play a role in the efficacy of soft power. Nye (2004b, 15–16) posits several conditions under which attraction is more likely to result in desired

outcomes, including when states have similar cultures, and when power is dispersed in a target country – as in a democracy or parliamentary system. It is with these types of states we might expect U.S. soft power to be most relevant. David Kearn (2011, 71) suggests that soft power is likely to play a strong role within systems characterized by complex interdependence that have formed over a long period of time. Thus, it is expected that the United States may have significant soft power influence with countries like France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, or Australia, all of which have relationships with the United States that may be characterized as complex interdependence. With the exception of Japan, these states share many elements of Western culture. All have some form of parliamentary government, and share many of the "universal values" cited by Nye (2004b, 11) as being a significant aspect of U.S. soft power influence.

France and Germany may share common modern threats with the United States such as terrorism or cybercrimes, however, those threats are not likely existential requiring reliance on U.S. military capabilities as was the case during the Cold War. These two countries also share some historical affinity with the United States since World War II.

Yet, as liberal democracies, these states likely have a constrained view on the use of military force (Nye 1990a; Jervis 2002). Power itself may not be applicable if there is no conflict of interest between the United States and France or Germany. Kosovo and the conflict with ISIS were both characterized by the use of military force as the applicant's policy tool. This is an important distinction as modern liberal theorists note that military force is less accepted and less useful in the modern international environment (Nye 1990a; 2004b; 2011b; Brooks 1999; Jervis 2002). The use of military force for humanitarian intervention may be more acceptable in cases

framed by the United Nations as a "responsibility to protect" (United Nations 2005), yet neither of these military interventions occurred under UN auspices.

The constraint on the use of military force is posited to be stronger for European countries than for the United States (Nye 2004b, 18). Germany and France, though often aligned with the United States in a general sense, also have potential differences in the character of their relationship with the United States. U.S.-Franco relations have been characterized by both cooperation and discord over the decades since the end of the Cold War (Kuisel 2013). Germany has been characterized as having multiple traditions of international relations, classified as regionalism, pacifism, realism, and hegemonism, which may at times, in conjunction with a permanent U.S. military presence, constrain German foreign policy (Gaskarth and Oppermann 2019). These countries, as part of the western liberal order, may provide difficult tests for supporting U.S. policies for the use of military force while simultaneously being among a group of states that find the United States consistently attractive over a long period of time. Thus, these two countries suggest an easy test for the soft power influence of the United States, while preserving the potential for a conflict of preferences necessary for a power attempt by the United States to influence their policy choices in the events selected for study.

Additionally, as Nye (2004b, 28) notes, some of the key divisions over the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 were among democracies, thus, "morality can be a power reality." This policy "dissipated European goodwill that followed" the terror attacks on the United States in 2001 and eroded U.S. soft power (Nye 2004b, 29). France and Germany were particularly strong in their stance against the invasion. Some (Thompson 2009, 2) have posited that Germany will not intervene without a mandate from an international organization. Thus, Germany and France offer suitable countries against which to test soft power and alternate explanations in the two military

interventions. As noted, other states with which the United States might expect to have soft power influence were not selected for a number of reasons.

The United Kingdom has long been considered as having a "special relationship" with the United States and is considered by the U.S. Department of State as its closest ally (U.S. Department of State 2019). In this case, it would be difficult to discern U.S. from U.K. values and preferences and determine the presence or absence of U.S. soft power influence on the United Kingdom. Canada shares many of the same characteristics vis-à-vis the United States as the United Kingdom. Additionally, its proximity to the United States and close partnership in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) make separating U.S. soft power influence from realist national security preferences difficult.

The presence of China as a potential competitor and threat increases the complexity of U.S. relations with Pacific nations, making the detection of soft power influence in the cases of Australia and Japan difficult. Additionally, the possibility of an out-of-area military intervention in which either country might participate would likely be rare. Thus, testing soft power and state identity against the balancing explanation as explanations for foreign policy decisions of these countries would be difficult.

This dissertation examines two U.S. policies selected across the fifteen-year period from 1999-2014. The beginning of the time period is 1999 for two reasons. First, it is likely long enough after the end of the Cold War that states allied with the United States against the Soviet threat were likely to feel free to make policy choices that were not as constrained by Cold War threats, and thus, are more independent of U.S. preferences. Second, the terrorist attack on the United States in 2001 likely had an effect on U.S. foreign policy choices, and the subsequent

reactions of the other states examined. Therefore, a case study of the U.S. use of military force and its potential soft power influence prior to 9/11 is important.

Additionally, since many authors, including Nye (2004b; 2010b; Kurlantzick 2005; Pape 2005; Keohane and Katzenstein 2007; Datta 2009; Kearn 2011), claim that U.S. soft power and subsequent influence with other states has declined subsequent to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it is necessary to examine cases before and after the Iraq war; that is, before 2003 and after 2011.[23] The latter case is drawn from a policy event that is distinct from the invasion of Iraq, but not necessarily separated from the repercussions of that event. If the war in Iraq significantly eroded U.S. soft power influence (not just soft power resources), it should be evident in the empirical record regarding other policy events. As Nye (1990a, 35) has noted, "theorists often suffer from writing in the midst of events, rather than viewing them from a distance." This period of time provides an appropriate distance from the events in question.

While viewing these events and writing from a distance, this dissertation focuses on contemporaneous accounts of the events, within the time boundaries proposed for each case – a year prior to the start of the event up to the conclusion of that event. Background data for each event were gathered outside of these time boundaries, but the discourse used as evidence in the cases is limited to the debates specific to French and German policies for each military intervention. For example, while events in Bosnia in 1995 may have shaped the policy debate over Kosovo operations in 1999, not all discourse surrounding the history of the 1990's Balkans crisis is relevant to the immediate decision to participate in the 1999 intervention. Additionally, use of post-event interviews in newspapers and other media may shed light on the debates in question, but may be biased due to the need or desire to justify decisions post-hoc.

[23] The United States officially declared an end to U.S. military operations subsequent to the 2003 invasion of Iraq on December 15, 2011 (History.com 2019).

In the case study method it is desirable to have cases that offer findings that may be relevant to policymakers and future policy decisions (Frieden and Lake 2005, 137; George and Bennett 2005, 200). The quest for policy relevance drives the selection of cases of military interventions, which are decisions of great importance for states. Additionally, the desire for pre- and post-Iraq invasion events, and having two similar events, drove the selection of two policy events that centered around military humanitarian intervention.

Foreign policy actions included in this dissertation are U.S.-led military operations in Kosovo in 1999, and military operations against ISIS from 2014-2017. Nye (2004b, 60–61) suggests that the attractiveness of the United States depends on the way U.S. objectives are framed. When U.S. foreign policies are based on "broadly inclusive and far-sighted definitions of national interest" they may be more attractive to others than policies that "take a narrow... perspective" (Nye 2004b, 61). These types of goals include the promotion of human rights (Nye 2004b, 17). These cases, both military humanitarian interventions, are arguably based on broad rather than narrow definitions of U.S. national interest which makes them an easy test for soft power (Nye 2004b, 60). However, it is likely that in light of prior U.S. actions in Iraq, the ISIS case is a harder test of U.S. soft power.

Determining the cause of U.S. foreign policy success in terms of gaining support for military actions against third parties may be difficult, as much depends on the specific context, the actions of others and a nation's own efforts, if not also some level of luck (Nye 1990a, 96). The cases selected for study are examples of less ambitious, though higher level, U.S. policy efforts in terms of Nye's (2004b, 4–5) "three-dimensional chess game" in which soft power may be more appropriate and effective.[24] The Kosovo and ISIS cases may be considered as first-level

[24] Nye's three-dimensional chess board includes the top level at which global military reach and military power are significant power aspects. The second level is the realm of interstate economic issues. The third level is where issues

issues as they both weigh state sovereignty norms against international law governing the use of force for the protection of human rights. Therefore, the cases in this dissertation are limited to military intervention, but findings may be applicable to answering whether U.S. soft power influences state policy decisions in other issue areas.

One of the underlying purposes of this dissertation is to investigate the posited erosion of U.S. soft power influence subsequent to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Given the strong opposition from France and Germany to that invasion, the latter case of their involvement in Iraq to fight ISIS is of interest. The 2014 military intervention occurred without formal approval from the United Nations, which is significant given evidence of the significance of the UNSC in either legitimizing or otherwise offering incentives to coercing states in their use of military force (Thompson 2009, 6–7). Further, the intervention against ISIS was not conducted under the auspices of NATO as was Kosovo. Though the legal justification for Kosovo has been questioned (Whitney 1999b), at the very least it was legitimized by a formal international organization.[25] The legal underpinnings of the fight against ISIS are potentially more tenuous, even though Iraq initially requested outside assistance (Bannelier-Christakis 2016; Scharf 2016; Gross 2017). The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 has been characterized as a misuse of U.S. hard power (Nye 2004b; 2010; Kurlantzick 2005; Pape 2005; Keohane and Katzenstein 2007; Datta 2009; Kearn 2011). Since it has been posited that the use of coercion or misuse of hard power may reduce future cooperation and increase the cost of attaining other foreign policy objectives (Nye 1990a; 2004b; Thompson 2009), the ISIS cases are highly relevant. The motivations for

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such as transnational terrorism, international crime, climate change, and the spread of infectious diseases lie. Selecting cases at the lower levels should make soft power manifest itself as a factor if it is relevant to the policy choices of states, while soft power may be less relevant at higher levels. The cases included in this dissertation are at higher levels, as they are more "intrinsically important and policy relevant" (Thompson 2009, 4).

[25] Thompson (2009, 6–7) suggests that in order to be credible in terms of constraining or approving use of force, an international organization must be politically independent. Given NATO's makeup, it is arguably not as politically independent as the UNSC, especially in terms of Thompson's criteria of heterogenous members and preferences.

French and German responses to ISIS in 2014, following their determined and years-long resistance to previous operations in Iraq, can help to shed light on the conditions under which the United States may have more or less soft power influence, and the potential to recoup posited losses in soft power influence.

Data Sources and Collection

Data were collected at the level of discourse. Publicly available statements of French and German political leaders were examined for the behaviors and statement types noted above as evidence of the origins of support or non-support of U.S. policies. Statements from political leaders can help to reveal their justification for their choice of policy action and the content of the debate surrounding the policy action. The debates in respective parliaments reveal the underlying preferences and origins of those preferences in terms of which of the explanations above best account for policy decisions to support U.S.-led military operations.

Relevant Actors: Key Target State Policymakers

The dissertation focuses on key state decision makers and decision-making bodies in France and Germany during each of the policy events. Foreign policy leaders are typically recognized as the policymaking elite of a country, which includes the heads of state, heads of government, foreign ministers and immediate deputies "as well as persons intimately connected to all of the preceding by bureaucratic, political, or nationalistic ties" (Chong 2007, 60). Actors who were central to the debate and international policy decisions for each target state were the focus of data collection. This includes actors who may have left office prior to the actual beginning of the military interventions, as their role in the debates leading up to a policy choice may have been consequential. For France, key leaders include the president, minister of Defense, prime minister, and minister of European and Foreign Affairs. German leaders include the chancellor, minister of Defense, and minister of Foreign Affairs. Using the names of key leaders

in archival searches allowed increased precision in records retrieval and attribution to the most influential policymakers. Table 1 identifies the key foreign policy leaders from each country for both of the policy events examined in this dissertation.

Table 1. Relevant French and German Key Foreign Policy Actors

Kosovo 1999			
France		**Germany**	
President	Jacques Chirac	Chancellor	Helmut Kohl Gerhard Schröder
Prime Minister	Lionel Jospin	Minister of Foreign Affairs	Klaus Kinkel Joschka Fischer
Minister of European and Foreign Affairs	Hubert Védrine	Minister of Defense	Volker Rühe Rudolph Scharping
Minister of Defense	Alain Richard		
ISIS 2014			
France		**Germany**	
President	François Hollande	Chancellor	Angela Merkel
Prime Minister	Manuel Valls	Minister of Foreign Affairs	Frank-Walter Steinmeier
Minister of European and Foreign Affairs	Laurent Fabius	Minister of Defense	Ursula von der Leyen
Minister of Defense	Jean-Yves Le Drian		

Conclusion

In sum, using within-case congruence and process-tracing methods, the soft power explanation will be tested against two alternate explanations: balancing and state identity. If balancing behavior explains French or German participation in the military intervention, the expectation is that a neorealist calculus serves to motivate state actions. The primary claim of a balancing explanation is that France or Germany will invoke a threat to the state, its interests, or its citizens, or that it otherwise seeks to balance against another actor in order to ensure its

security or relative position in a given case. The state identity explanation tests the claim that elements of state identity as delineated for France and Germany will manifest as the justification used to advance the case for a state's participation in the military intervention. The selection of Germany and France as target states, and the events involving the use of force balance the characteristics of states with which we might expect the United States to have greater soft power influence, with the potential for differences in preferences between the applicant and target that make an influence attempt necessary.

Chapter 4

France's Decision to Participate in the Military Intervention in Kosovo

The case of France's participation in the U.S.-led military intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1999 provides an opportunity to test for the presence of U.S. soft power influence in the era prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and nearly a decade after the end of the Cold War. By 1999, the conflict in the Balkans had lingered as an agenda item in French foreign policymaking since as far back as 1993. The records of the French National Assembly leading up to the NATO military intervention in 1999 consistently note not only the crisis in the Balkans generally, but also the problem of Kosovo specifically (see for example French National Assembly 1993; 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997b; 1998e).[26] In 1999, after a months-long period of negotiation and broken promises from FRY President Slobodan Milošević, France, as part of a NATO coalition, carried out eleven weeks of air strikes against the FRY from March 24, 1999 through June 10, 1999 (Roberts 1999, 102–3). The French military also played a central role in the NATO intervention. After the United States, France would contribute the most aircraft to the bombing effort (Priest 1999).

The evidence does not support a conclusion that U.S. soft power was influential in that decision. Through process-tracing of the elite discourse of key French policymakers regarding their justification for the decision to use military force against the FRY, as found in records of

[26] For consistency in translation, the *Assemblée Nationale* will be referred to as the French National Assembly, or for brevity, the National Assembly. The bicameral French Parliament consists of the lower house, the *Assemblée Nationale* (French National Assembly) and the upper house, the *Sénat* (Senate). Records from the *Sénat* that provide any evidence relative to this case are all from joint sessions of the French Parliament. More records from the lower house that are not from joint sessions exist for this case. Therefore, all of the French Parliamentary records referenced in this dissertation are from the lower house as they provide a more complete record of the discourse and include the relevant joint sessions. In addition, National Assembly documents are largely from online resources, translated into English by the National Assembly website using Google Chrome (see http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/). Thus, specific page references for direct quotes are sometimes not available, however, using web browser search/find tools, the references are easily located on the appropriate web pages as cited.

governmental statements, parliamentary debates, and news sources, the data provide support for the role of identity as a more significant factor than U.S. purported soft power. The collection and analysis of the discourse focused on the president, prime minister, minister of Defense, and minister of European and Foreign Affairs. Because the president has great autonomy in foreign policy decisions, including the use of the military, the justification for intervention provided by French President Jacques Chirac is central to this analysis (see Zoller 1996). However, unlike the 2014 ISIS case examined in Chapter 6, Chirac's influence was likely constrained because of the atypical nature of operating during a period of cohabitation government (Masters 2017).

The president appoints the prime minister who forms the government, and the prime minister typically represents the majority party in parliament. As discussed below, as the leader of the Rally for the Republic Party (RPR) Chirac, after 1997, governed in cohabitation with the Socialist Party (PS). The key ministers noted were all members of the Socialist Party. According to the Constitution of France, the President of France does not require the National Assembly's permission to deploy military forces for an intervention abroad, but must inform the National Assembly within three days of the government's actions. If the intervention lasts more than four months, the government must then seek an extension from the National Assembly (Constitution of France 2008, Article 35). In the case of the Kosovo intervention, the government informed the National Assembly of the deployment of military forces to Kosovo as required. No vote in the National Assembly was taken, as the intervention lasted for just under three months. However, the existence of a cohabitation government during this crisis allows the examination of the motivations for different parties' decisions to support military intervention. In this case, with the exception of the small minority Communist Party (PC), the justifications for French participation align across parties. Key French policymakers consistently invoked sentiments congruent with

French identity to justify their support for France's participation in the military intervention, particularly the country's responsibility to protect human rights and to aid minority groups. Both of these aspects align with the understanding of French identity outlined in Chapter 3. They reflect the Gaullist belief in the historical role of France, which includes its place as the "spearhead" and originator of universal human rights (Bratberg 2011, 335). Less evident, though present in some of the procedural stages of the NATO policy process, are other elements of French identity, including the importance it places on multinational institutions, particularly its unique role in NATO, as paths to enhance its own prestige.

This chapter is presented in five sections. The first section provides background information regarding the situation in Kosovo and U.S. involvement in the crisis, as well as the French domestic political setting for the debate over French foreign policy at that time. Second, the evidence supporting French identity as the explanation most congruent with France's foreign policy decision to use military force against the FRY is presented. The third section disconfirms the balancing explanation. In the fourth section, evidence disconfirming the soft power explanation is presented. This organization helps to highlight the limited applicability of the soft power explanation. The fifth section summarizes the findings of this case.

Background

Understanding the problem of Kosovo and the position of the United States regarding the crisis are necessary to frame the French policy decision. Additionally, it is necessary to understand the potential implications of the Chirac-Jospin cohabitation government, France's historical relationship with NATO, and France's historical affinity toward Serbia that may have made the unified voice of French policymakers and participation by France uncertain in this

case. That the elite discourse across the cohabitation government was unified in this case offers strong support that state identity was influential in French policy decisions during the Kosovo crisis.

As part of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, several autonomous republics were recognized. Kosovo was, until 1989, considered a semi-autonomous region within Serbia. The FRY was composed of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, and led by the Serbian politician and then later the FRY President Slobodan Milošević. Though the region had experienced continuous unrest since the early 1990's, the conflict between Serbs and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo was the central issue in 1998 and 1999.

In 1989 after winning an election in Serbia, Milošević rescinded Kosovo's autonomy which resulted in ethnic violence in the region that would expand through the region in the mid-1990's, and result in the clash between NATO forces and the FRY from March through June 1999 (Lambeth 2001, 6). The situation in Kosovo continued to deteriorate in 1998 as evidence indicated that Serbian and the FRY military and police forces were engaging in violence against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. In the year before the NATO intervention it was estimated that Serb military actions had killed 1,500 Kosovar Albanians and displaced at least 300,000 from their homes (Roberts 1999, 112). Incidents of violence that gained world attention occurred in March 1998 when over fifty civilians were killed by Serb forces in the village of Prekaz, and in August 1998 when multiple Serb offensives in the Drenica region killed at least eighty people (Skrpec 2003, 97; Frontline 2014; see also French National Assembly 1998f; 1998a; 1998g; 1998h).

In October 1998, NATO produced an activation order, threatening military strikes against Serbian forces in the attempt to get Milošević to end military and police actions against Kosovo, and to enter into negotiations regarding the status of Kosovo. This threat appeared to work for a

short time as the violence ebbed. However, in January 1999, it became apparent that Milošević was continuing a campaign of violence in Kosovo after the killing of at least forty-five civilians in the village of Racak (Roberts 1999, 113; Lambeth 2001, 8–9; Haney 2017). This breakdown of the October agreement resulted in an extension of the NATO activation order, and another round of negotiations over the status of Kosovo at Rambouillet near Paris. After continued violence from FRY forces, including the killing of civilians, and a second round of talks following a failure to reach agreement at Rambouillet, the Albanians representing Kosovo signed a peace agreement on March 18, 1999. The Serbs refused to sign the agreement. A week later, after last-minute appeals by U.S. envoys to Belgrade failed to secure a peace agreement, NATO began air strikes against Serbian targets on March 24, 1999.[27]

The United States argued for a swift response to Milošević's continued stalling coupled with military offensives against Albanians in Kosovo. Having been successful in resolving the Bosnian conflict with the Dayton Accords following limited NATO airstrikes in 1994 and 1995, the United States thought that a similar threat of force would work to end the violence in Kosovo (Sperling and Webber 2009, 494; Frontline 2014). However, opposition to an early military solution from France and Germany led to continued negotiations through early 1999 (Labarre 2007, 48). The Europeans preferred the use of diplomacy whereas the United States preferred a policy motivated by "bottom line" efficiency in achieving desired policy results quickly (Skrpec 2003, 106–7). This conflict resulted in U.S. impatience with, and pressure on, European countries to threaten and ultimately follow through with the use of force, and even a threat from the United States to leave the Contact Group (Skrpec 2003, 94, 99). However, the United States acquiesced to continued negotiations at the request of the Europeans (Skrpec 2003, 102).

[27] For a complete timeline of events leading to NATO strikes on the FRY see Frontline (2014) and Haney (2017). A concise narrative of events surrounding the Kosovo issue is found in Lambeth (2001).

The Contact Group, which was established in 1994 by several states with interests in policy in the Balkans, served as a forum for discussions regarding the Kosovo situation (Schwegmann 2000, 4). The Contact Group, consisting of the United States, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Russia noted its concern regarding increased violence in Kosovo as early as 1997, and agreed at that time on a policy of diplomacy to resolve the problem (Schwegmann 2000, 11). As diplomatic efforts throughout 1997 and 1998 proved unsuccessful in ending Milošević's violent policies, the Unites States began suggesting air strikes, even without a UN resolution, which France initially opposed (Schwegmann 2000, 12; Skrpec 2003, 100). Because of friction between Russia and the Western members of the Contact Group, and the near certainty of Russian veto of a UN Security Council resolution for the use of force, the Contact Group considered NATO as the only available source of credible military pressure on Belgrade (Schwegmann 2000, 12–13; see also Labarre 2007, 45–47). President Clinton spoke with Chirac and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and gained their tentative support for the use of force in October 1998, while U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted that the United States would act despite Russian opposition within the Contact Group (Skrpec 2003, 103).

Albright had previously favored earlier intervention in the Bosnian crisis, and argued the same for Kosovo (Daalder 1998; Labarre 2007, 55). Advancing the call for "vigorous U.S. leadership and a credible threat to back up diplomatic efforts," Albright and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke drew from the lessons learned by the delayed response in Bosnia and urged they not be repeated in Kosovo (Daalder 1998). Based on the assertion that "Milošević understands only the language of force," Albright pressed the U.S. Congress for airstrikes in September 1998, even before NATO would announce its first activation order in October 1998 (Hehir 2006, 68; Frontline 2014). Congress was resistant to the idea, thus it has

been posited that Clinton had to conduct the intervention through NATO to skirt the requirement to gain congressional approval (Labarre 2007, 56; see also Paris 2002). To overcome resistance, the Clinton administration advanced an aggressive policy toward the FRY that noted the tendency for conflicts in the Balkans to spread through Europe and potentially result in global consequences similar to those in World War I (Hehir 2006, 74; Paris 2002, 433–38). A related argument the administration advanced also linked the current crisis to European history in that appeasing the likes of Milošević was akin to "the lessons of Munich" in 1938 before World War II (Paris 2002, 435). Early and aggressive intervention, in the U.S. view, was necessary to avert a larger war and punish aggression.

It has also been suggested that the hardline position of Albright and the United States, including the insistence for a NATO peacekeeping force rather than a UN force, doomed the Rambouillet Conference to failure by presenting the Serbs with terms they would not accept (Hehir 2006, 69–70). It was evident to some that during the Rambouillet Conference Albright pressured the Kosovar Albanians to sign the proposed agreement in order to make it clear that the Serbs were responsible for the failure to achieve a peaceful agreement, which opened the path for military intervention (Hehir 2006, 70). The lessons from Bosnia as understood by Albright and Holbrooke led to the belief that even if military force was required, Milošević would back down quickly, which likely led to the confrontational style of diplomacy of U.S. representatives, particularly Albright's (Hehir 2006, 76). Additionally, some U.S. officials noted that the U.S. acquiescence to European requests for another round of negotiations at Rambouillet was not to gain a peace accord, but to create consensus within the United States and NATO that the use of force was necessary, even inevitable (Hehir 2006, 78). After Milošević refused an agreement, the United States described him as "genuinely evil," a "psychopath," and "a cold-

blooded animal" (Hehir 2006, 80). This focus on Milošević by the United States contrasts with French, and as will be seen in Chapter 5, German justifications for military intervention, which instead focused largely on protecting human rights and human lives.

France's involvement in the Kosovo crisis was a continuation of its role in the diplomatic and military efforts to resolve the instability in the Balkans for several years before the 1999 intervention in Kosovo. France was an original member of the Contact Group for Bosnia and Herzegovina and for Kosovo. After previous negotiations and agreements between the FRY and the Contact Group failed, and FRY forces continued using violent tactics in Kosovo, the Contact Group sought another round of negotiations. Four of the countries in the Contact Group competed to be the site of the negotiations, and even though it was Germany that first suggested the conference, France was selected as the site (Schwegmann 2000, 14–15). Being selected as the site of negotiation was a symbolic victory for the primacy of France in European affairs, particularly because previous Balkan accords were made in the United States. One key French policymaker noted that "indeed there is a representativeness of the European security and defense identity in the making" with the selection of a French location for the important conference (Richard 1999).

A focus on France's domestic political situation provides insight into the influence of French identity on the decision making for the country's response to the Kosovo crisis. Identity serves as a common feature that united policymakers across party lines, at least in terms of the justification they advanced for support of French intervention in Kosovo. After calling for early elections in 1997 in a bid to increase his party's control in the National Assembly, Chirac's Rally for the Republic Party (RPR) lost 117 seats, while its typical ally, the Union for French Democracy (UDF), lost 102 seats (French National Assembly 1997a). The election resulted in

just the third period of cohabitation government in the history of the Fifth Republic, yet it was the second time for Chirac, having previously served as prime minister during the first instance of cohabitation with President François Mitterrand.[28] During the relevant decision time period, the PS held the most seats of any single party in the National Assembly (French National Assembly 2012), giving them approximately 43 percent of the 577 seats.[29] This led to the appointment of the Socialist Lionel Jospin as prime minister (Masters 2017). The president carries the most influence in setting French foreign policy direction. However, Chirac was considered center-right, while the other key foreign policy actors – Prime Minister Jospin, Minister of European and Foreign Affairs Hubert Védrine, and Minister of Defense Alain Richard, as well as a plurality of the National Assembly – were all from the PS.

Cohabitation may press a compromised president into focusing on diplomacy and security issues for which they retain significant authority, rather than a domestic agenda (Masters 2017). Chirac, prior to his support for France joining the NATO air strikes in 1999, had rejected French plans to return to NATO's integrated military command structure. President Charles de Gaulle, feeling slighted by the United States and NATO, pulled out of the integrated command structure in 1966, but remained in the political structure of NATO in order to maintain the ability to cooperate within NATO yet maintain French autonomy for foreign policy (Brown 2013, 289–90; NATO 2020). Similarly, Chirac balked at full reintegration because the United States would not approve France's proposal for major command roles if and when it reentered the command structure (Hunter 2002, 25).[30] The Kosovo situation demonstrates the "Gaullist arrangement"

[28] Periods of cohabitation to this point include the Mitterrand-Chirac period from 1986-1988, Mitterrand-Balladur period from 1993-1995, and the Chirac-Jospin period from 1997-2002 (see Elgie 2002).
[29] According to French National Assembly (1997a) records, Chirac's Rally for the Republic (RPR) Party held 140 seats in the National Assembly, the Socialist Party (PS) 250 seats, the Union for French Democracy (UDF) 113. The Communist Party (PC), Radical, Citizen, and Green coalition, and unaffiliated members held 36, 33, and 5 seats respectively.
[30] France would not rejoin the NATO integrated command structure until 2009 (NATO 2020).

expected by French identity outlined in Chapter 3 wherein the French maintain the "advantages of complete autonomy and cooperation with allies on its own terms" (Brown 2013, 290).

A potential benefit of cohabitation in the case of Kosovo, is the presence of key foreign policymakers from the PS led by the highly popular Jospin. Under Jospin's leadership, the PS was able to form a broad coalition among parties on the left (Willerton and Carrier 2005, 44).[31] However, the Communist Party (PCF) proved to be "the most contentious coalition element" during this period (Willerton and Carrier 2005, 56). Among the PCF's several defections from the left coalition was its opposition to French participation in the Kosovo intervention, consistent with its platform. Given that the PCF held only 36 seats, their opposition was inconsequential had a vote been required.

Also noteworthy in the context of French foreign policy decisions in this case is France's historical affinity toward Serbia dating to at least World War I (Trouillard 2015). This was captured by Chirac's predecessor, President François Mitterrand, who notably stated during the earlier crises in the Balkans that as long as he was president France would not bomb Belgrade (The Irish Times 1999). When he announced the commencement of French strikes against the FRY, Jospin (1999) noted that "we are not at war with the Serbian people. We remember [its] heroic past in the struggle against Nazi oppression." In the case of Kosovo, however, as will be discussed below, French consensus across parties regarding the responsibility to protect human rights and minority populations outweighed its historical ties to Serbia.

[31] Jospin's polling in 1999 was the highest of any prime minister in twenty-seven years (Willerton and Carrier 2005, 52)

Evidence of Identity as a Primary Explanation for French Intervention in Kosovo

Because of his role as Minister of European and Foreign Affairs, Védrine appears most in the earliest portions of the empirical record relevant to the immediate case of intervention in Kosovo. His message, early on, when the initial threats of NATO force were voiced, was consistent with that of the rest of the key actors throughout the crisis. Answering questions from the National Assembly in October 1998, months before the conference at Rambouillet, Védrine told the National Assembly that NATO preparations for military force were ongoing:

> [O]n the assumption that... force should be used to correct the current situation... to stop the repression, but also to trigger negotiation.... The principle position of France was recalled by the President of the Republic.... [A]n imminent humanitarian disaster may lead us to use means necessary to find a lasting solution to this immense crisis (French National Assembly 1998c).

This is an early example of a key policymaker in France calling attention not only to the humanitarian crisis that displaced people in Kosovo as winter approached, but also the repression they faced as an invocation of French identity as a protector of human rights and its responsibility to aid minority groups through military intervention if necessary.

A month later, Védrine (French National Assembly 1998e) would report to the National Assembly that the threat of NATO intervention had successfully forced Milošević to make several concessions, including allowing an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) verification force to observe Serbian withdrawals from Kosovo, and that the situation had stabilized "enough for the refugees to return *en masse*." In this statement he also emphasized France's leadership role, stating that "a Frenchman will... occupy an important responsibility within this force" (French National Assembly 1998e). This latter statement was to show that

French leadership in diplomacy had averted disaster and that France would continue to play an influential role, which is in keeping with the identity-based desire for French influence and prestige.

Védrine would again credit France's role for the improvements in Kosovo from October 1998 through January 1999, though it was unknown at the time the success would be temporary. In January 1999, Védrine told the National Assembly "significant progress [had] been made in Kosovo" and that "the human catastrophe that was looming" was averted (French National Assembly 1998i). Védrine credited this success to the international community, and particularly to the early leadership of "France, which in November 1997 made a preventative engagement" regarding Kosovo (French National Assembly 1998i). He then noted French prominence in the extraction force, a protective measure put in place for the OSCE observation mission, that had deployed to Macedonia noting that it was a force of soldiers "forty to fifty percent of whom are French" (French National Assembly 1998i). A spokesman for Védrine to the National Assembly relayed the message emphasizing France's leadership role stating that "France is very involved in the management of the Kosovo crisis. Let us recall that a Frenchman is the principal deputy... of the OSCE mission; it is still a Frenchman... who heads the NATO security [extraction] force... [and that] France will do everything to ensure that the [diplomatic] pressures succeed" (French National Assembly 1999b). These sentiments invoke French leadership and grandeur on the world stage, and called attention to its prestige and influence within these organizations, all in keeping with the expectations of French identity. Thus, leading up to the ultimate decision for the use of force, French identity-based reasoning was on display.

Richard, speaking about defense matters and the possibility of NATO intervention in Kosovo, invoked the same themes as other key policymakers. In October 1998, in a media

interview after the Contact Group first agreed to threaten Milošević with military force with the publication of the NATO activation order, Richard (1998) stated:

> In such a situation, it seems normal to take our responsibilities to achieve a political result.... [T]his conflict is taking place in Europe and involves rights we strongly believe in. France has therefore given its agreement to contribute to an air force capable of acting if there is no improvement.

Richard's justification highlights the core identity claims motivating French participation.

Richard further invoked elements of French identity to provide justification for France's involvement to this point, and to justify the use of force if it became necessary, noting the leading role France had played, and invoking elements of French prestige. Richard told the National Assembly that "we are the main contributor, which led us to assume command" of the Kosovo extraction force (French National Assembly 1999c). Richard went on, noting that "France is fully participating... in the preparation of [the] negotiation... in Rambouillet.... [O]ur diplomacy works tirelessly" and ensured that "France would be able, as with the [NATO-led multinational peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina], to ensure a high level of participation in order to ensure Europe is the first contributor" (French National Assembly 1999c). Being the source of the largest European military contribution enhanced French prestige and influence in decision-making, having been named to a command position. Richard also invoked an additional facet of French identity – independence in foreign policy – by stating "although it must be a NATO force, France will keep its complete autonomy" (French National Assembly 1999c).

The empirical record indicates that Chirac, prior to the opening of the peace conference at Rambouillet in February 1999, was silent on the topic of Kosovo. At the opening of the

Rambouillet Conference on February 6, 1999, Chirac called for a halt to FRY operations in Kosovo. Chirac (1999) began his remarks to the Conference referencing France's history and the significance of the location of the conference. In doing so, he alluded to the grandeur and leadership role of France in establishing peace in post-war Europe:

> France, you know, experienced the horrors of war. She knew the face of barbarism. But she was able to heal wounds that were thought to be eternal.... [S]he tells you today that the will to peace can be stronger than the temptation to war. This message takes on its full meaning here, in this place, where together General de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer built the future.

After emphasizing France's role as an independent arbitrator between East and West during the Cold War – an aspect of French identity – Chirac (1999) observed that France would continue to play a similar role in the present negotiations, stating that "in building peace you must turn your eyes to a new horizon: that of Europe.... Europe has succeeded in reconciling enemy nations. It has managed to bridge the divide of the Cold War." France had been and would continue to play the role of arbiter for peace in Europe in a manner consistent with its identity.

Facets of France's identity based on its values of peace and human rights were further invoked in Chirac's (1999) warning to the belligerents then meeting at Rambouillet:

> Be aware, France, no more than its European, American, or Russian partners, will not tolerate the persistence of a conflict which flouts the essential principles of human dignity. We will not accept that the cycle of violence threatens the stability of all south-eastern Europe.... Rest assured that France, as it has done since the origin of the conflicts in the [FRY], will assume its responsibilities. It owes [this] to [France's] European ambition. She also owes it to the memory of her sons, who died on Yugoslavian soil for

> an ideal of peace, dignity, and freedom which we will continue to serve with determination.

The statements of French leaders during the months of diplomatic efforts and threats of force prior to the NATO air strikes included not only its responsibility as a defender of human rights, but also French leadership and prestige.

Richard would invoke the similar identity-related sentiments when the NATO bombing started to justify France's participation. Answering questions in the National Assembly the day before Jospin would address that body as constitutionally required, Richard stated:

> Faced with today's situation, to stick to statements when a fair political objective has been defined... while we have the means to act, would be tantamount to giving in to Mr. Milošević's tactics who... hopes to maintain his brutal domination thanks to our lack of determination.... The President of the Republic, head of the armies, has given his agreement for the use of our air resources for action against the means of repression... by the Serbian power and [for] the restoration of peace.... If our soldiers are to take action... it will be in the service of principles and values which are those of the Republic (French National Assembly 1999f).

In answering another question, Richard invoked similar justification to take action:

> We find ourselves in a situation which demands the greatest responsibility.... France has an audience around the world linked to the clarity of its political positions and the determination it puts into action, weapons in hand if necessary, in crises where the principles it defends are at stake (French National Assembly 1999e).

The crisis in Kosovo created a vast human crisis and atrocities which placed France in a position to claim moral leadership based on its commitment to human rights.

In accordance with the French Constitution, Jospin informed the National Assembly of the government's decision to deploy military forces in the intervention against the FRY in Kosovo two days after NATO bombing started. A central theme of Jospin's justification for French participation in the intervention, and the necessity of military force, was consistent with the primary concern voiced in the French government since at least 1993 – human rights abuses and atrocities against civilians in Kosovo by FRY and Serbian military and police forces (Jospin 1999; see also French National Assembly 1993; 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997b; 1998f). The consistency of invocations of human rights and France's responsibility to protect human lives gives credence to the identity explanation.

Near the beginning of his remarks, Jospin (1999) emphasized that "our country, as you know, did everything to find a political solution to the Kosovo crisis, in vain. Except for abdicating our responsibilities and resigning ourselves to helplessness, the use of force has become inevitable." Jospin (1999) then recounted the refusal of the government in Belgrade to agree to any peace agreement, as well as the previous and ongoing human rights abuses, before turning back to France's role stating that "France played a driving role within the Contact Group to define the terms... for a balanced political solution." He (Jospin 1999) continued:

> For decades, Europe, at least our Europe, has been founded on peace and respect for human rights. To accept that these values are flouted at the gates of the [EU] would have been to betray us. What is at stake in today's conflict is a certain conception of Europe. Do we accept the return of barbarism on our continent or do we rise up against it? For us, the choice is clear.... It is in the name of freedom and justice that we intervene militarily.

Jospin (1999) summarized the government's justification for the use of military force, stating that "France's commitment is in line with our values... putting respect for the individual at the heart of state action."

In the debate that followed Jospin's address in the National Assembly, representatives of the Liberal Democratic, Socialist, and Green Parties (see Goasguen, Ayrault, Aubert statements in French National Assembly 1999a, 2971, 2974, 2978 respectively) expressed dismay that the government did not seek support from the National Assembly prior to the start of bombing based on their interpretation of Article 35 of the French Constitution which states that "[a] declaration of war shall be authorized by Parliament" (Constitution of France 2008).[32] However, each of these parties ultimately expressed support for the government's decision, and did so reiterating the necessity to protect human life and universal human rights (French National Assembly 1999a).[33] Only the Communist Party, a small minority holding only 36 of 577 seats, expressed outright disapproval of the military intervention (French National Assembly 1999a, 2982–84).

As the bombing continued, Jospin answered questions from the National Assembly regarding the ongoing situation. Jospin again invoked the French responsibility to protect human rights and the greatness of France. Answering a question on April 1, 1999, Jospin (French National Assembly 1999g) declared:

> When a great democracy like ours is faced with the question of peace or war, the question of oppression or freedom, civilization or barbarism, the country and the parliament debate

[32] However, as noted previously, the deployment of military forces for "intervention" requires only that the government inform the National Assembly withing three days of starting military operation, with a vote of approval from the National Assembly only for military interventions exceeding four months duration (Constitution of France 2008).

[33] For example, Goasguen, of the Liberal and Independent Democracy Group, stated that "France must regain its specific role.... [I]t's a role [to] which we are traditionally attached.... [W]e have... the feeling of legitimacy of the acts of France in the name of the rights of man" (French National Assembly 1999a, 2974). Even the typically passive Greens supported the intervention, stating that "from what point... can France... be accused of non-assistance to people in danger?" (French National Assembly 1999a, 2979).

> or discuss in the media and within a collegial political body.... [T]he debate then having taken place, we can say that we share two fundamental convictions. The first, which has been expressed by all political groups, is the absolute condemnation of Mr. Milošević, his regime and the policy of ethnic cleansing... the rejection of violence and atrocities.

This statement also reflects the previous consensus in the government and the National Assembly regarding the appropriateness of France's participation in the military intervention in order to protect the lives of minority civilians and promote human rights in keeping with its identity.

Similarly, a few days later, in response to another question, Jospin reiterated his earlier justification, stating that "these massive and voluntary violations of human rights... alone justify everything possible to stop them.... It is in the name of the values of freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights which, for fifty years, have provided stability for our peoples" – and that France had a duty to protect them (French National Assembly 1999h).

With the NATO intervention ongoing, Chirac pointed to Kosovo as an example for why France sought a greater role for France and a European defense organization should similar events occur in the future (Agence France Presse 1999). This is congruent with the expectations of French identity in terms of taking opportunities to enhance its stature and exert influence (Kolodziej 1974, 47). However, at that time, and well after the events in Kosovo, attempts at organizing a European military security organization have been largely "disappointing" and "symbolic" (Brown 2013, 292). Understanding that any extant European security organization did not possess credible military capabilities to carry out peacekeeping operations, or make good on threats of intervention in cases similar to the NATO operations against the FRY, Chirac was careful to note that a stronger European defense identity "should in no way mean a break with

NATO" (Agence France Presse 1999). These statements align with the expectations of French identity including its Gaullist tradition of inclusiveness and ambiguity in its relationship with NATO. That has resulted in a desire for independent foreign policy while maintaining the option to cooperate with NATO (Cerny 1983, 7). France cooperated with NATO in this instance thanks to its conception of the appropriateness of protecting human rights and human lives and the importance it attaches to its prestige.

Balancing Explanation Disconfirmed: No Evidence of French Balancing Behavior

The empirical record of key policymakers' discourse does not provide evidence of the balancing explanation. There are no indications that French foreign policy leaders perceived a threat to France from the FRY or other actors during this crisis, or that it was an opportunity either to gain power itself, or reduce the power and influence of the United States or anyone else. It is widely known that French leaders, including Chirac, influenced the conduct of the NATO intervention, including vetoing certain targets which irritated the United States (Sperling and Webber 2009, 499). However, evidence that French leadership decided to participate in the NATO operation in order to assert control over the operation itself, and thus, exert influence over or otherwise diminish the role of the United States in Europe, is not found in the public discourse. Furthermore, even though France was not part of the NATO integrated military command, during this intervention it placed its military forces under the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, U.S. General Wesley Clark (Gallis 1999, 21).

It might be argued that France's decision to participate in the NATO air strikes was a way of balancing against U.S. influence in Europe more broadly. However, the discourse bears no evidence of this as a factor in the French decision calculus in this event. France's choice to

participate in NATO strikes is in keeping with the Gaullist tradition of supporting multinational institutions, and particularly NATO, for its own ends. Even if France's unique historical relationship with NATO is viewed as a path to counter U.S. power and influence, this interpretation is more congruent with the expectations of French Gaullist identity since it links multinational organizations with French influence. Another possibility might be French leaders' acknowledgement of the need for a European security capability. However, the French desire for a European security organization predated the Kosovo crisis, and continued as a policy goal for years after the crisis (Hunter 2002). Chirac, who refused to reintegrate with the NATO military command structure as previously planned, even as France participated in the NATO operation, noted that a break with NATO was not the object of a European security organization (Agence France Presse 1999).

Soft Power Explanation Disconfirmed: No Evidence of U.S. Soft Power Influence

Several months before the Contact Group and the Serb and Kosovar belligerents would meet at Rambouillet, Jospin, in response to a National Assembly question regarding the situation in Kosovo, made one of the few references to the United States present in the empirical record for this event. In this statement, Jospin (French National Assembly 1998b) noted:

> In general, it seemed to me... that greater serenity has settled in recent Franco-American relations, in the way of approaching problems: frankly, without passion, without prejudice, but starting from our [France's] positions.... The Americans were struck... in a certain way reassured – to note that in matters of foreign policy, France, by the President of the Republic and the Government, spoke of one voice. They were all the more struck by the fact that this consensus... is far from existing in the United States.

Jospin's remarks specifically note that Franco-American relations were, in that instance, based on the France's positions, which aligns with evidence that the United States acquiesced to French pressure for continued diplomacy in late 1998. This is contrary to what would be expected had U.S. soft power – particularly attractiveness to the more aggressive U.S. policy – been at play.

This statement also indicates that the French held their foreign policymaking processes in higher esteem than that of the United States, even if French and U.S. policies toward the FRY were generally aligned. Jospin (French National Assembly 1998b) pointed out that French foreign policymaking, at least in this case, indicated the advantage the French political system had over that of the United States, noting that "the [U.S.] role of great power in the world [was] being so paralyzed by a congress, which... mixes internal and external problems." This indicates that the French did not find the U.S. political process attractive, nor did France consider the United States as "brilliant" – per Vuving's (2009) conceptualization of soft power – in addressing and solving foreign policy problems. To Jospin, the French foreign policymaking process was superior because of the unified voice that resulted on the universal values of liberty and the protection of human rights, as expected by French identity – even during a period of cohabitation government in France.

In another rare instance of a key policymaker referencing to the United States, Védrine (French National Assembly 1998d) noted French independence from U.S. policy by calling the National Assembly's attention to the fact that "while [U.S. Ambassador] Mr. Holbrooke is a prominent American diplomat... he has acted as an emissary for the Contact Group." This was to indicate to the National Assembly audience that France was not following the United States but instead that France was an equal member of the Contact Group, despite Ambassador Holbrooke's significant role in negotiations with the FRY. A soft power explanation would lead

us to expect that statements to make such a distinction would either not be made, or that they would give credit to the leadership of the United States and its representative as worthy of admiration.

In one of the few direct references to the United States during the period immediately after the intervention, Chirac stated "I salute their impressive economic and technological dynamism.... I deplore the present American diffidence in several major areas.... I wish the United States would once more take on all its responsibilities on the international scene" (Whitney 1999a). This type of statement corresponds generally with Nye's notion that states may be attracted to some facets of another country, but that an applicant's soft power in specific foreign policy events may not factor in the target's foreign policy decision calculus (Nye 2004b, 14).

In a critique of Jospin, who stated in response to a question in the National Assembly that "France is determined to take its part in military action" in Kosovo, a member of the Union for French Democracy – a party which later voiced support for military intervention – noted that the government's decisions to act in Kosovo "seem[ed] to depend excessively... on American decisions" (French National Assembly 1999d). This statement may indicate that even some of the French politicians who supported military action did not want to be dragged into conflict by the United States; moreover, it suggests that U.S. soft power was not a factor, and that any expression of the government's attraction to the United States would not have advanced its preferred policy.

The motivations invoked by the United States and France for intervention also differed in an appreciable way. The United States consistently invoked the need to avert another conflagration in Europe and to punish a dictator bent on domination (Paris 2002; Hehir 2006). In

contrast, the French discourse indicates that French support for intervention was based on protecting lives and human rights, and France's responsibility to do so.

Additionally, as noted in the introduction to this chapter, the conflict between the aggressive policy approach and the European desire for continued diplomacy indicate that U.S. soft power was not at work in this case. The U.S. threat to leave the Contact Group, coupled with its subsequent consent to additional rounds of negotiation, provide evidence that European states, including France, did not find the U.S. approach attractive or legitimate as expected by a soft power explanation. Had U.S. soft power influence been a factor, we would expect that France would acquiesce to the U.S. policy for an earlier military intervention as suggested by Albright.

Finally, if U.S. soft power influence were the explanation for French participation in the intervention, French justifications for its policy decisions would reference the United States as the source of values worthy of protection. However, rather than attributing the values – liberty, freedom from oppression, and human rights – to the United States, French policymakers consistently attributed such values as originating from, and central to, France's historical role in the world. While France and the United States may share many of the same values, French policymakers credited France for those values, and held that France, based on identity-driven appropriateness, had a responsibility to defend them abroad. While a country's foreign policies, when perceived "as legitimate and having moral authority," can be a source of soft power (Nye 2004b, 11), there is no evidence in the discourse that French policymakers credited the U.S. foreign policy toward Kosovo as part of their own decision calculus. The French discourse provides no indications that Nye's (2004b, 7) "sense of attraction, love or duty in" its relationship with the United States was a factor in its decision to support the NATO intervention.

Conclusion

The data presented above support for the more significant role of identity in shaping French decision-making than an explanation associated with soft power or balancing. While state identity cannot provide a monocausal explanation for French policy choices, the evidence found in the public discourse indicates that facets of French identity were the most consistently invoked justification for France's role in the NATO military intervention in Kosovo. No evidence supporting the influence of U.S. soft power through key policymakers' statements that attribute French military intervention to an attraction to U.S. values, policies, or capabilities were found in the empirical record. Nor is there evidence that French decision makers perceived or communicated a threat to France from the FRY that would support a balancing explanation.

French national identity is multifaceted and not all of its aspects outlined in Chapter 3 are found in the data. However, the consistency and recurrence of French policymakers' invocations – across members of the cohabitation government and across the entire period – of the need to respond to defend human rights provide evidence of this important aspect of French identity as a primary factor in this case. The humanitarian concerns over the violence committed against civilians and the mass displacement of Albanians in Kosovo provided the impetus for the use of force. As noted, even before and during the previous military intervention in the Bosnia-Hercegovina crisis in 1995, French officials indicated concern over the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Kosovo in particular (French National Assembly 1993; 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997b; 1998e). These concerns remained central throughout the 1999 NATO intervention. Other facets of French identity, such as the quest to maximize French influence and prestige, and preserve its foreign policy autonomy are also evident, though these facets received less emphasis from key policymakers and do not provide a foundation for their support for the bombing.

French identity, particularly its commitment to human rights as a universal value, for which France considers itself the "spearhead" (Bratberg 2011, 335), was invoked by policymakers as the justification of the decision to join the NATO intervention in Kosovo and is most congruent with the state identity explanation. Table 2 summarizes the three explanations and the key elements supporting the confirmed explanation.

Table 2. Summary of Findings: French Participation in the Kosovo Intervention

French state identity	Confirmed - responsibility to protect human rights and to aid minority groups driven by Gaullist belief of France as origin of human rights
Balancing	Disconfirmed
Soft power	Disconfirmed

Chapter 5

Germany's Decision to Participate in the Military Intervention in Kosovo

The case of Germany's decision to participate in the U.S.-led military intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1999 provides a second case to test for the presence of U.S. soft power influence in the era prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and nearly a decade after the end of the Cold War. Initially, Germany decided to support a NATO threat of air strikes in October 1998 which led to a temporary lull in violence in Kosovo. During this temporary pause, Germany deployed 350 soldiers to conduct unarmed surveillance flights to monitor FRY military activities and approximately 250 more as part of an extraction force to protect OSCE observers (German Bundestag 1998e, 2; Friedrich 2000, 11). When the FRY violated the October 1998 agreement and final peace negotiations failed in February 1999, Germany participated in the NATO bombing with fourteen Tornado strike aircraft (The Baltimore Sun 1999; Friedrich 2000, 11). This case is particularly significant for German foreign policymaking, as it represents the first time since the end of World War II that German soldiers were deployed for combat action. Additionally, Germany would participate in combat operations without a UN mandate, and against a sovereign state that had not attacked a member of NATO (ESI 2008, 13).

The evidence does not support a conclusion that U.S. soft power was influential in that decision. Through process-tracing of the elite discourse of key German policymakers regarding their justification for the decision to use military force against the FRY, as found in records of governmental statements, parliamentary debates, and news sources, the justification given by

these leaders for German participation is most congruent with the identity explanation.[34] The human rights crisis in the Balkans was the trigger for action which was framed by leaders through the lens of Germany's history. German decision makers drew on the country's identity to advance its policy to support the military intervention and to serve peace through multilateral cooperation in the defense of freedom reflecting its place as "irrevocably bound to Europe," all of which reflect Germany's supranational European identity (Banchoff 1999, 272–73). Key leaders invoked historical linkages to genocide and more broadly to Germany's dark past, including in the Balkans. However, instead of using such invocations to justify its post-war tradition of limiting the use of state power, key leaders used this identity as justification for the use of force abroad. Germany, in order to defend its own conceptions of human rights, used its past to justify its support of the military intervention in Kosovo as an appropriate obligation.

Under the German Constitution, the chancellor has significant powers in formulating foreign policy, while requiring approval from the Bundestag for the deployment of military forces for actions outside of the confines of NATO countries (DemiRtaş and Mazlum 2018, 37).[35] In the case of the use of military force, in addition to the chancellor, the members of the government most relevant are the minister of Foreign Affairs and minister of Defense. This case is complicated by the election and change in government that came on the cusp of an important decision for the German government to back a NATO threat of force in October 1998, discussed in greater detail below. The consistency and recurrence of German policymakers' invocations –

[34] In this chapter, many German government documents and other news sources were accessed on the Google Chrome browser and automatically translated into English. This precludes the citation of specific page references for some direct quotes of government officials. However, use of the find/search tool in most web browsers will allow readers to locate the text on the web pages noted in the reference section. Other German government resources were available only in PDF form in German. These data sources were uploaded and translated via Google Translate, and page references are from the original German PDF pagination.

[35] "Even though the German Basic Law (Constitution) awards the Federal Chancellor a strong position, the legislature retains control over him or her throughout his or her tenure. With an absolute majority the legislature can elect a successor to the current Federal Chancellor and require the Federal President to dismiss the current Federal Chancellor through a vote of no confidence" (Gesley 2017).

across governments and the change in majority control of the Bundestag – of the need to respond to defend human rights based on Germany's past provide evidence of this important aspect of German identity as a primary factor in this case.

This chapter is presented in five sections. The first section provides background information regarding Germany's domestic political setting for the debate over foreign policy for Kosovo. Second, evidence is presented supporting an identity explanation as the most likely explanation for Germany's foreign policy decision to participate in the NATO use of force against the FRY. The third section disconfirms a balancing explanation. The fourth section presents evidence disconfirming the soft power explanation. The fifth section summarizes the findings of this case.

Background

In the German federal election held in September 1998, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and coalition partner party the Free Democratic Party (FDP), were defeated by a large margin and, by consequence, lost their majority in the Bundestag. Kohl was pivotal in the integration of reunified Germany into Europe, having overseen the reunification of Germany, and previous peacekeeping operations in the Balkans (Cohen 1998b) which indicated an expanded foreign policy for Germany after reunification. The new chancellor, Gerhard Schröder of the left-leaning Social Democratic Party (SPD), and its coalition partner the left group the Alliance '90/the Greens (hereafter the Greens), formed a "Red-Green" coalition government after the 1998 election. Together, the Red-Green coalition

would control 345 of the 669 seats in the Bundestag (The Federal Returning Officer 1998).[36] This brought Joschka Fischer of the Greens into the government as the minister of Foreign Affairs, and Rudolf Scharping (SPD) as minister of Defense.

Up to this time, both the SPD and the Greens had held pacifist platforms. Both parties had previously proposed legal limitations on the government's use of force abroad which resulted in a 1994 German Constitutional Court ruling that required the approval of a majority of the Bundestag before deploying soldiers (Friedrich 2000, 6; DemiRtaş and Mazlum 2018, 37). In fact, both Schröder and Fischer personally demonstrated against previous interventions of the United States in Iraq in the late 1990's (Friedrich 2000, 2). The Greens had previously questioned Germany's continued membership in NATO (Cohen 1998a). Thus, the continuity of German foreign policy as NATO moved from the threat of force against the FRY during the Kohl government, to carrying out the threat during the Schröder government presents an interesting case. Germany's participation in the NATO intervention might not be expected given the electoral shift toward the more pacifist German left, and is a puzzle of Germany foreign policy itself.

After the September 1998 election, but before the new government was installed, the Kohl government proposed and the CDU/CSU-dominated Bundestag debated backing the NATO threat of force and activation order in October 1998. The Kohl government's proposal to back the NATO threat, without a UN mandate, received overwhelming support from the outgoing Bundestag with 500 votes in support, and 62 against the measure (Hofmann 1999).[37] It is notable

[36] After the September 1998 election, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) held 298 seats, the Christian Democratic Union 198, the Christian Social Union 47, The Greens 47, the Free Democratic Party held 43 seats, and the Party of Democratic Socialism 36 seats (The Federal Returning Officer 1998).

[37] The outgoing Bundestag which voted in favor of backing the NATO threat of force consisted of 672 total seats with the following breakdown of party control: SPD – 252, CDU – 244, CSU – 50, Greens – 49, FDP – 47, and PDS – 30 (The Federal Returning Officer 1994). The shift to the left in the 1998 election is apparent.

that twenty-one of the no votes came from the SPD (Friedrich 2000, 11). Even though the incoming Red-Green coalition had stated that they would "work to preserve the United Nations' monopoly on violence," once they were in power, Schröder, Fischer, and Scharping all advanced the argument to execute German air strikes as part of the NATO offensive against the FRY during the Kosovo crisis (Hofmann 1999).

In October 1998, before the Bundestag vote and prior to taking office, Schröder and Fischer met with U.S. President Bill Clinton and were reportedly pressured to agree to maintain the commitments regarding Kosovo, including the threat of NATO strikes, that were made by Kohl and Kinkel earlier that year (Friedrich 2000, 2; Hofmann 1999). Additionally, the outgoing Kohl-Kinkel government consulted with Schröder and Fischer prior to the vote held by the outgoing Bundestag (Friedrich 2000, 11). Fischer would recall the pressure that was felt in making this commitment prior to taking office stating that "we had fifteen minutes to decide on a matter of war and peace" (Friedrich 2000, 11).

The new government and Bundestag would have many opportunities of its own to debate German actions during the developing crisis. These included two debates in November 1998 over German participation in an air surveillance mission and the deployment of soldiers as part of the extraction force put in place in case of the need for emergency withdrawal of civilian OSCE observers (see German Bundestag 1998b; 1998c; 1998d). A third debate was held in February 1999 over the proposed German airstrikes against the FRY (see German Bundestag 1999b).

Evidence Supporting an Identity Explanation for German Intervention in Kosovo

Germany's identity provided reasons legitimating its support for the use of force. These reasons were made clear well before NATO bombing began. In a statement to the press in June, Kohl (1998a) called attention to the atrocities being committed in Kosovo by the FRY:

> Apart from the... suffering of the people affected, the dead and the horrific bestialities that occur and which are terrible... nobody is affected as much... as we, the Germans. We took in 350,000 refugees [previously]. I don't boast of it; I think that's right. It has something to do with the moral stature of our country... [and] it is right that we help.

Several days later, Kohl would emphasize this argument, and make one of the earliest references of the potential for German military intervention, this time to the Bundestag. Referencing the Contact Group's list of demands on Milošević, Kohl (1998b) stated:

> In the event these demands are not met, an extensive catalogue of measures has been promised... [including] military intervention.... The daily reports of murders are completely unbearable.... One of the primary goals of the international community must be to end the bloodshed... in Kosovo, and to ensure that fundamental human and minority rights are... preserved there.

Kohl (1998b) then referenced Germany's post-war history, stating that "we still know about the dire conditions after the collapse of the Nazi regime... when we received help from others" which he connected to Germany's responsibility to protect and aid the people of Kosovo. In August, a government spokesman told the Bundestag that "the Federal Government is extremely concerned about the escalation of violence... [and] the primary goal remains the immediate end of the bloodshed.... [I]f the situation worsens, military intervention may become necessary. The Federal Republic of Germany will participate in accordance with its obligations" to protect lives and

human rights (Hauser 1998). Kohl (1998c) would emphasize the potential humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo again in September 1998, noting it as the reason that "the EU and NATO must do everything possible" to stop it.

Kohl's minister of Foreign Affairs, Klaus Kinkel, echoed the same themes throughout the spring and summer of 1998 before the change in government. Kinkel (1998a) noted that "the importance of effective protection of minorities is shown... by the situation in Kosovo." Further, he (Kinkel 1998b) emphasized the role NATO continued to play in the stability of Europe, stating that "the problem child of Europe remains the former Yugoslavia" and recounted the ongoing NATO peacekeeping on Bosnia. Kinkel (1998b) added, "after [World War II], NATO stood for the freedom of our divided country.... Even today... NATO's job is to ensure peace – but now for all of Europe." These statements align with the expectations of German identity which recalls the mistreatment of minorities and Germany's obligation to prevent such atrocities from recurring, and also its role as a member of a multinational organization with the responsibility to serve peace.

In July 1998, Kinkel (1998c) again emphasized the appropriateness of Germany's possible use of force abroad, referring to German Basic Law as a foundation for action, noting that "the basic orientations of German foreign policy... are determined by the requirements of our Basic Law and our national interests: peace, freedom, and prosperity.... [T]he Basic Law also binds foreign policy to respect for human dignity." In this speech, Kinkel (1998c) recounted the mistakes of German history and its integration into NATO, Europe, the United Nations, OSCE, and the Council of Europe, then stated that "the crises in the Balkans make it clear that lasting stability in Europe is unthinkable without NATO. Germany must not stand apart from this in the future."

In September 1998, Kinkel (1998d) noted that the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo "remained a wound in the flesh of Europe" and called attention to the ongoing refugee crisis. Kinkel (1998d) reiterated the potential for the use of force, stating that Milošević "must know that the international community will react – if necessary also with military measures.... NATO is ready [through military force] to ensure a political solution." The continued atrocities committed by Milošević during ongoing negotiations were cause, in Kinkel's reckoning, for military intervention if the situation did not improve.

In the October 1998 debate prior to the Bundestag vote to support the NATO threat of force, the same invocations were made by Kinkel, and outgoing Minister of Defense Volker Rühe. Each called attention to the deteriorating humanitarian situation, and the necessity of backing up diplomatic efforts with the potential for using military force. Kinkel noted that "because the humanitarian disaster continues, NATO's military threat must continue" (German Bundestag 1998a, 23128–29). He pointed out that some who question "the need to use violence... have maybe have forgotten that we in Germany... were to free ourselves from the tyrant... through the violence of others" (German Bundestag 1998a, 23128–29). Kinkel further noted that if Germany did not "participate, the credibility of the military threat" would be damaged and send the "wrong signal to Belgrade" that NATO was not unified, which would serve to embolden the intransigent Milošević (German Bundestag 1998a, 23129–30). Recalling Germany's past, he further noted German responsibility to protect human rights, stating "whoever does not stop evil, becomes guilty of evil.... [That] is the lesson from Bosnia... from our own German [history]... [and] it also applies to Kosovo" (German Bundestag 1998a, 23131).

During that debate, Rühe also recalled the lessons of the past, including the German debate over actions in Bosnia in 1995, noting that regarding Kosovo "violence must not pay off

in Europe.... There are enough examples in history to show that it can be immoral to deploy soldiers; but there [are] other situations where you have to say that it is profoundly immoral not to [send] soldiers... to stop [a] massacre" (German Bundestag 1998a, 23135). Rühe went on to note that historical similarities to the ongoing situation in Kosovo show that in such a situation that inaction may make one guilty of immorality (German Bundestag 1998a, 23134).

The vote of the outgoing Bundestag was 500 in favor, with 62 votes against the measure to back the NATO threat of air strikes against the FRY (German Bundestag 1998a, 23161). Representatives of each of the parties in the Bundestag, with the exception of the PDS, all spoke in support of the measure (see for example statements of the CDU/CSU, the Greens, FDP, and SPD in German Bundestag 1998a, 23138, 23141, 23143, 23147, respectively). It is notable that in their statements that each of the supporting parties reiterated Germany's responsibility to intervene because of the humanitarian crisis and the country's history (see German Bundestag 1998a). Additionally, emphasis on the benevolent purpose of the use of force was evident in the title given to the measure – "German Participation in NATO Planned Limited and Phased Air Operations to Avert a Humanitarian Disaster in the Kosovo Conflict" (German Bundestag 1998a, 23161). In addition, as members of the Bundestag, before taking their new offices, Schröder and Fischer both made statements in support of the measure. Schröder noted that in addition to the humanitarian concern, that had Germany not participated it "would be considered a German refusal [and would damage] the [NATO] Alliance" by weakening the threat against Milošević meant to force the FRY to negotiate a peace settlement (German Bundestag 1998a, 23138). Fischer, speaking for the Greens, and referencing the brutality of Milošević, noted that "if we learn from our history and from the bloody first half of the twentieth century, then it can be... no more warmongering" (German Bundestag 1998a, 23141).

The threat of NATO air strikes in October resulted in a temporary lull in the violence and an agreement from Milošević to withdraw FRY forces from Kosovo. In November 1998, following the arrival of the new government and Bundestag, the government advanced a proposal for German military aircraft to participate in the NATO air surveillance mission to monitor the withdrawal of FRY forces. On this occasion, Schröder stated in the Bundestag that "German foreign policy is and remains peace policy.... [T]his applies especially for the situation in southeastern Europe" (German Bundestag 1998b, 64). Fischer noted the importance of "continuity... [and] predictability" of German foreign policy, stating that "wherever Helmut Kohl has stopped in European politics and the European integration process, the new federal government must go on" and that "the crucial point is human rights" (German Bundestag 1998b, 108).

In that same Bundestag session, the new minister of Defense, Rudolph Scharping, invoked similar themes. Scharping recalled the displacement of refugees, and that the air surveillance mission would "serve one purpose – to enable peaceful development in this part of the Balkans" and provide necessary "reliability, predictability, and continuity of German foreign policy" (German Bundestag 1998b, 112). In addition to being a reliable partner as indicated by German identity, Scharping also stated that "the essential task of the Bundeswehr is defense. So how we defend [peace and democracy] at present is the best expression of our shared responsibility.... The decisions of recent years show that Germany's stronger contributions to international peace provide security" (German Bundestag 1998b, 115).

In the debate that followed the remarks from Schröder, Fischer, and Scharping, and similar to the October vote held by the previous Bundestag, each party representative, with the exception of the PDS, spoke in support of the government's proposal for the aerial surveillance

mission. In this instance, the four supporting parties echoed the government's invocations of the need for continuity in foreign policy, the need to integrate as a member of Europe, and the appropriateness of acting to defend human rights (see German Bundestag 1998b, 115–16, 122–24; and 1998c, 360, 363). The vote in support of German participation in the air surveillance mission was 540 in favor, and 30 against (German Bundestag 1998c, 369).

The next significant foreign policy decision regarding Kosovo followed in November 1998 with a debate and vote on deploying German soldiers to Macedonia as part of the force intended to extricate OSCE observers from Kosovo if endangered. Fischer relied on the same logic he invoked in the previous debates, adding that the previous measures had been successful up to that point in "averting a humanitarian catastrophe" (German Bundestag 1998d, 421). Again, all of the parties of the Bundestag except the PDS spoke in favor of sending soldiers to be part of the extraction force, noting the appropriateness of applying German capabilities in the role of protection for the OSCE observation mission (German Bundestag 1998d, 422, 425–26, 428–29). The vote was 553 in the affirmative, and 35 against (German Bundestag 1998d, 433).

The most significant test of German foreign policy decision-making during the Kosovo crisis came in February 1999. This debate would determine Germany's participation in actual offensive combat operations, in the form of aerial bombing, for the first time since World War II. On February 25, 1999, the Bundestag debated whether Germany would support the implementation of an agreement made during the Rambouillet Conference by force. Up to this point in the crisis, German military support was for noncombat roles including unarmed aerial surveillance and the extraction force but now it was debating whether German forces would join offensive air strikes. Scharping spoke for the government first, and noted that "what happens in the Balkans affects us very immediately. If our efforts fail, humanitarian disaster with the worst

impact for the population" will occur (German Bundestag 1999b, 1699). Scharping also made comments aligned with other elements of German identity – German European integration and loyalty to the community. Scharping stated that because Germany held the presidency of the EU and WEU that "Germany must not stand aside" and possibly "risk [the] isolation of [Germany] in the Alliance" (German Bundestag 1999b, 1700–1701). Germany's deep integration into Europe through post-war institutions created an obligation for Germany to support the use of force in Kosovo.

When Fischer addressed the Bundestag after Scharping spoke, he noted that the threat of force made in October 1998 was ultimately not successful and that Milošević had broken his word, as evidenced by the "massacre at Racak" and that "looking away means accepting murderous logic" (German Bundestag 1999b, 1704).[38] Fischer once again invoked the lessons of German history stating that "if we look at the Balkans, we see the Europe of the past... the wars and the ethnic cleansing" which Germany had a responsibility to prevent based on its post-war identity (German Bundestag 1999b, 1705).

With the exception of the PDS, all party representatives who spoke in the ensuing debate were in favor of the measure. Their remarks once again echoed that of the government, noting aspects of German identity outlined in Chapter 3, including solidarity with partners, the desire for commonality with European foreign policy, and the appropriateness of acting to protect human lives based on Germany's history (German Bundestag 1999b, 1705–10). The vote was 41 against and 553 in favor of Germany's commitment to take part in NATO air strikes to enforce an agreement made at Rambouillet (German Bundestag 1999b, 1715).

[38] Fischer would note in a press interview that the "Racak Massacre" in which 45 civilians were killed by Serbian forces was "the turning point for me" (Hofmann 1999).

When the Rambouillet Conference failed to reach an agreement, and the final negotiations ultimately failed, NATO bombing began. Though the decision for the use of force was previously made by the government and supported by the Bundestag, the discourse during the intervention provides further support for the identity explanation. On this occasion, Schröder (1999e) addressed the nation regarding the situation in Kosovo:

> The Alliance wants to prevent further serious and systematic violations of human rights and prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo.... Milošević is waging a merciless war there... [and] the international community cannot stand by and watch the human tragedy.... We are not waging a war, but we are called upon to implement a peaceful solution to Kosovo by limited means.... We are also defending our common fundamental values of freedom, democracy, and human rights. We cannot allow these values to be trampled on, just an hour's flight from us.... With a view to the difficult mission in Kosovo, Europe speaks with one voice.

Two days later, Schröder (1999c) repeated his comments to the Bundestag, and added that Germany "had no choice but to realize the threat of NATO... to send a clear signal that we as a community of states are not prepared to accept... [the] violation of human rights in Kosovo."

Speaking to the Bundestag on March 25, 1999, a day after NATO, including Germany, started air strikes, Scharping noted that the efforts were meant "to enable the people of Kosovo [to have] a peaceful life" and that the bombing was the "result of the brutal behavior... against the population of Kosovo" (German Bundestag 1999c, 2424). Scharping then once again invoked Germany's past as justification for German air strikes stating that "it is a commitment based on the experience of the first half of this century, and [it is] an obligation on our own ideal not to allow the [wars] of the first half of this century and the past to determine the future" (German

Bundestag 1999c, 2424). On this occasion all parties in the Bundestag spoke in support of Germany's actions, with the exception of the PDS (see German Bundestag 1999c, 2425–29).

In April 1999, as bombing continued despite earlier assumptions that the mission would be brief, Schröder, Fischer, and Scharping addressed the Bundestag again. The PDS held only 30 of 672 seats in the Bundestag, but voiced strong opposition to German involvement in Kosovo and faulted NATO bombing for worsening the humanitarian problem in Kosovo (German Bundestag 1999a). In response, Schröder stated that the increase in violence after the start of NATO strikes had been part of Milošević's plan of ethnic cleansing prior to the air strikes, and that "NATO had to respond to the escalation.... NATO is a community of values. Together we fight for ours with our partners in Kosovo: for human rights, for freedom, and for democracy" (German Bundestag 1999d, 2621). The reliance on and importance of institutions was clear throughout his address, as he (Schröder 1999d) noted that the situation in Kosovo "show[ed] once again how much... the Western international community stands together without exception because [it] affects the values and basic orientations of the... European model of civilization." Schröder (1999d) went on:

> After experiencing two terrible world wars in this century, should we Europeans really allow dictators to rage freely in the middle of Europe? The federal government will continue to stand firmly with its partners in NATO and the EU and will not tolerate violence against innocent people.... Against the background of our German history, there can be no doubt about our reliability, our determination, and our firmness. The integration of Germany into the Western community of states is part of the German rationale.

Schröder called upon Germany's history to indicate the appropriateness of its current actions. He noted that "Yugoslavia, like Germany in 1945, needs democracy" and that the goal of the Federal Government was to end the "humanitarian disaster and the severe and systematic violations of human rights as quickly as possible" (German Bundestag 1999d, 2621–22).

In the same session, Scharping showed pictures of the violence to the Bundestag, and stated that politics had to include morality, and that the bombing was necessary to "stop... the murder" (German Bundestag 1999d, 2645–46). Scharping called attention to the Helsinki Final Act, noting that "human rights is a matter that in one individual state is no longer solely an internal matter"; and to the World Security Council of 1992 which "expressly and unanimously decided that the enforcement of human rights may be required against state sovereignty" (German Bundestag 1999d, 2647). Scharping also alluded to the evils of Germany's past, citing the United Nations which in April had noted that "we are under the dark cloud of genocide" and tied that directly to the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, which had been the result of German atrocities in World War II (German Bundestag 1999d, 2647). Scharping then cited a European Parliament statement of 1994, declaring that states "can intervene... [in] an extraordinary and extremely serious humanitarian emergency situation" (German Bundestag 1999d, 2647). An additional element of identity appears in these statements: Germany's attitude of self-binding in which Germany is guided to limit its use of state power within the bounds of international law and within the confines of international institutions with the intent to "reassure neighbors and signal that 'Germany would remain loyal to the community'" (Banchoff 1999, 268). In this case, German leaders deemed that working within post-war institutions was the legitimate option to prevent atrocities and humanitarian crises, by military force if required, as expected by Germany's identity as outlined in Chapter 3.

The majority in the Bundestag continued to support Germany's participation in the NATO air strikes, despite PDS opposition claiming that NATO actions violated international law (German Bundestag 1999d, 2636). The representatives of the other parties in the Bundestag did not find the PDS argument compelling, and advanced the same identity-based arguments for continued air strikes as Schröder. The CDU, CSU, SPD, FDP, and the Greens declared their continued support based on the need to end ethnic cleansing and genocide, protect human rights, and end the brutality of a dictator (German Bundestag 1999d, 2623, 2627, 2629, 2632). As outlined in Chapter 3, this broad and continued consensus across political parties is expected when policy choices are congruent with state identity.

A few days later, Schröder reiterated invocations of German identity as justification for Germany's foreign policy. Noting that some argued that the optics of German soldiers in the Balkans were reminiscent of World War II, Schröder turned that same German history on his critics. He (Schröder 1999a) claimed that Germany's involvement in Kosovo was due "precisely because we have an ominous history in this region" and that Germany was thus "obliged to fight for human rights." In this speech Schröder (1999a) further emphasized Germany's past noting that:

> It has become clear why, against the background of its history, Germany has intervened militarily with the international community for the first time since World War II. We do this to enforce the values that we believe cannot be abandoned. And we do that because we have received solidarity from NATO... so we too are committed to solidarity.

The appropriateness of Germany's foreign policy action was framed within the history of Germany's own dark, pre-war past, and its current role as a responsible member of the international community defending its values.

In a later address to the Bundestag, Schröder (1999b) again invoked not just the responsibility to protect lives, but also the responsibility Germany had as a member of the NATO alliance, stating that "for the sake of its credibility as a community of values, NATO was forced to act against mass displacement and mass murder in Kosovo." Yet, he (Schröder 1999b) also noted that Germany's "contribution is not only a natural expression of our solidarity with the Alliance" but that Germany also acted "against the background of our history" which obligated Germany to "stand up for peace and security."

Insufficient Evidence to Support a Balancing Explanation

There are some statements in the empirical record for this event that may be interpreted to satisfy aspects of the balancing explanation, but they are incomplete insofar as the threat perceived by Germany. There is no evidence indicating that German leaders perceived a threat to the country's security – from the FRY or anyone else – that would be expected by a balancing explanation. Further, very few examples of such statements are found in the record of the discourse, particularly in light of the considerable number of statements congruent with German identity. Two examples of key policymakers' references to security will suffice to support disconfirmation of the balancing explanation in this case.

A few weeks before the scheduled Rambouillet Conference and the votes in support of NATO operations, Scharping (1999a) noted the need for increased European security capabilities in light of the ongoing events in Bosnia and Kosovo, stating:

> Freedom and democracy in Germany are inextricably linked to the historic success of NATO.... We want a new forward-looking division of labor between the United States and Europe. We have to achieve a balanced European-American partnership in which

> Europe takes on more responsibility. Europe must also be able to act in foreign and security policy.... The painful experience of European incapacity to act in Bosnia must under no circumstances be repeated.

Scharping (1999a) added, "it is about security in and for Europe.... We have learned that conflicts outside the Alliance can directly or indirectly affect the legitimate security interests of the Allies." These remarks provide minimal support to the notion that German leaders viewed the situation in the Balkans as a security issue, but not as one requiring balancing behavior based on fear, but rather on German responsibility as part of the European community. The latter corresponds better with the expectations of identity than balancing. Additionally, the audience for these remarks was not the general public or the Bundestag, but a security policy academy in which it might be expected the defense minister would speak more broadly about increasing European capabilities, rather than attempt to justify a specific policy position.

In another instance that could be construed as balancing, in May 1999, with NATO bombing ongoing, Fischer (1999) also noted the need to increase European security capabilities:

> The conflict in Kosovo is showing us dramatically these days how urgent and indispensable it will be to strengthen the European security and defense identity for the Europe of the future. Only if Europeans succeed in pooling their strengths in this area and become able to act independently will Europe be able to fully exploit its values and interests. We Europeans must be able to manage crises that affect us directly, even if our transatlantic partners do not participate.

Yet, the key aspect of this statement around which Scharping argued for increased European capabilities pointed to Kosovo, which was viewed across German party lines as a humanitarian crisis, not a defense or security issue in the realist sense. Scharping's comment also points to the

need for an increased capability to address future problems, rather than the current situation in Kosovo. Additionally, Scharping (1999b) noted in April 1999 as airstrikes continued, "NATO is the only organization that has the governance structures, powers, and resources to accomplish such a difficult mission." Thus, despite the desire for increased European capabilities, Germany's commitment to NATO as a European institution, and defense of human rights are congruent with its identity. In the latter instance, the decision for the use of force had been made, and was being carried out. The Kosovo intervention was offered by leaders as evidence of the need for greater European capabilities, but the decision to participate in the intervention was not based on balancing concerns according to the available discourse.

Evidence Disconfirming a Soft Power Explanation

The events in Kosovo compelled Germany to act in light of what it viewed as human rights violations and genocide. Germany's supranational European identity was invoked to justify its participation in the NATO intervention, including air strikes. Nye (2004b, 145) suggests that Germany participated in the NATO intervention in Kosovo because Germany found the U.S. policy legitimate, leading Nye to argue this as evidence of soft power influence.[39] However, nothing in the discourse of German leaders lends credence to that conclusion. No German leader referenced the legitimacy of U.S. policy or otherwise credited U.S. leadership for Germany's participation. The United States is almost entirely absent from the discourse of key foreign policy decision makers in Germany.

Similarly, as noted in Chapter 4, the conflict between the aggressive policy approach of the United states and the European desire for continued diplomacy in late 1998 and early 1999 indicate that U.S. soft power was not at work in this case. Germany had argued in October 1998

[39] Nye provides no evidence to support this claim.

for continued negotiations and competed with France to host the conference that would eventually be held at Rambouillet in early 1999 (Schwegmann 2000, 15). The U.S. threat to leave the Contact Group, coupled with its subsequent consent to additional rounds of negotiation, provide evidence that European states, including Germany, did not find the U.S. approach attractive or legitimate as expected by a soft power explanation. Had U.S. soft power influence been a factor, we would expect that Germany would acquiesce to the U.S. policy for an earlier military intervention.

Germany's commitment to NATO, as a U.S.-dominated organization, and its role in the defense of Germany during the Cold War might be interpreted as an intermediate factor that indicates U.S. soft power influence. Thus, Nye's (2004b, 7) notion that soft power influence may result from earlier hard power influence, through the establishment of institutions, could be argued in this case. Yet, through the lens of the evidence of the discourse surrounding German decision making in this particular event, this proposition is not supported for two reasons.

First, the evidence of Germany's commitment to NATO is more congruent with Lukes' (2005a) third dimension of power outlined in Chapter 2, which has an involuntary aspect, rather than being a voluntary attractive force as suggested by Nye's conception of soft power. A simpler answer may be that pressure from the United States and Germany's subordinate status and location proximate to the crisis provided Germany with little choice but to participate. NATO had served as a model post-war institution and served German security purposes for decades. The comments that Germany owed a debt to NATO for its decades of protection reflect a debt more than an attraction, and is best understood as an intrinsic characteristic of German supranational European identity, even if Germany shared in the ideals and values of the United States through the institution of NATO. Germany's commitment to NATO was more about

consistency in German foreign policy and the cohesion of NATO as an institution – both of which accord with the expectations of the identity explanation – than "an observable but intangible attraction" to the United States culture, values, or benignity, brilliance, or beauty (Nye 2004b, 7; Vuving 2009).

Second, Lukes (2005a, 54) makes an argument about the difficulties of attributing power to institutions:

> The third difficulty is that of attributing an exercise of power to collectivities, such as groups, classes or institutions. The problem is: when can social causation be characterized as an exercise of power, or, more precisely, how and where is the line to be drawn between structural determination, on the one hand, and an exercise of power, on the other?

While German leaders credit NATO with the defense of Germany (see for example Scharping 1999a; Schröder 1999b; and comments from Rühe in German Bundestag 1998a, 23133), membership in NATO signifies German integration into Europe and its role as a reliable partner. NATO remained in this case the primary method of justifying German use of force as appropriate based on Germany's past experiences. Additionally, the few instances in which key leaders made references to the United States during this crisis further indicate that U.S. soft power did not factor in German decision-making.

German policymakers identified shared values with the United States but did not credit the United States for those values. In the July 1998 speech previously cited, Kinkel stated:

> Even in the age of globalization, Europeans and Americans have more common interests than with any other partner. I know we don't always agree on some issues. But we share

> a common view of the world as it should be: based on human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and a market economy.

This is one of the few clear references to the values of the United States in the German discourse during the events surrounding the crisis in Kosovo. However, Kinkel emphasized shared values, rather than crediting the United States specifically as being a leader in promoting those values, as would be expected by the soft power explanation. Indeed, power, influence, or even the need to cooperate are not necessary if parties share the same interests. Additionally, Kinkel's remarks here were not directly tied to comments regarding the Kosovo situation specifically, even though the speech did note the crisis in other places.

Later, in a November 1998 address to the Bundestag, Schröder (1998) also commented about the closeness of Germany and the United States:

> We owe a lot to our friendship with the United States of America: nothing less than peace and our freedom.... [S]ome... did not always agree with everything our American partners did... [However], friendship with America was not forced on this generation, it was offered to it by American democracy and culture.

This statement indicates a broad affinity for the United States and its role in German peace and security during the Cold War. Yet, while other portions of this speech made mention of the situation in Kosovo, the affinity for the United States and the German decisions to back NATO did not appear to be connected insofar as the reference was made in order to justify Germany's role in Kosovo. Moreover, as noted above, the vast majority of the discourse specific to the debates over the Kosovo crisis, and the role Germany should play in it, were devoid of similar references to the values of the United States.

Finally, it is also notable that Schröder and Fischer felt pressure from the United States to commit to the NATO threat of force, even before taking office (Friedrich 2000; Hofmann 1999). Kohl and Kinkel had previously supported the NATO threat of force, and the United States pressured Schröder and Fischer to act in a manner consistent with previous German commitments, even though the Bundestag had not yet approved the outgoing government's proposal. Contrary to Nye's (2004b, 7) conception of attraction, this was not a case of an actor being "persuaded to go along with [U.S. purposes] without any explicit threat or exchange taking place."

Conclusion

The data presented above provide support for the more significant role of identity in shaping German decision-making than an explanation associated with soft power or balancing. State identity cannot provide a monocausal explanation for Germany's participation in its first combat operation since the end of World War II. However, the evidence found in the public discourse indicates that elements of Germany's supranational European identity were the most consistently invoked justification for Germany's use of military force in Kosovo. No evidence supporting the influence of U.S. soft power through key policymakers' statements that attribute German military intervention to an attraction to U.S. values, policies, or capabilities were found in the empirical record. There is no evidence to support the notion that German leaders perceived a threat to Germany from the FRY or the unrest in the region that would support a balancing explanation, or that Germany had the desire or capability to balance against any other relevant actor.

As observed in Chapter 4 regarding French national identity, German state identity is complex and multifaceted. Not all of the elements of German identity outlined in Chapter 3 are found in the data. However, the consistency of policymakers' invocations of the appropriateness of defending human rights, particularly as framed by Germany's dark history, make a compelling case for the role of identity in shaping German policy decisions in this event. The humanitarian concerns over the violence committed against civilians, particularly a minority population, provided the impetus for the use of force. An attitude of self-binding and limiting the use of state power through institutions, loyalty to the community, and a sense of being bound to Europe are facets of identity that are present. However, the strongest evidence of German identity in this case called upon Germany's past as justification to defend human rights and prevent the horrors of the past from recurring through the use of military force. These elements of identity were consistently invoked across the political parties of two governments and different party majorities in the Bundestag as the Kosovo crisis unfolded. Table 3 summarizes the findings of this case and the key elements of the confirmed explanation.

Table 3. Summary of Findings: German Participation in the Kosovo Intervention

German state identity	Confirmed - historical linkages to genocide create responsibility to stop it currently; serving peace through multilateral cooperation in the defense of freedom; being bound to Europe
Balancing	Disconfirmed
Soft power	Disconfirmed

Chapter 6

France's Decision to Participate in the Military Intervention Against ISIS

The case of France's participation in the U.S.-led military intervention against ISIS in 2014 provides an opportunity to test for the presence of U.S. soft power influence in the era after U.S. operations pursuant to the 2003 invasion of Iraq ended.[40] When ISIS began its massive offensive in 2014 it gained a more prominent place on the agenda of the French government. During this offensive, ISIS also fomented terror attacks and recruited fighters from places outside of Iraq and Syria, including France. France's actions against ISIS progressed from humanitarian aid to Iraqi civilians in early August 2014, to military aid in the form of various military materiel to Iraqi and Kurdish fighters on the ground in mid-August (Borger 2014). French airstrikes on ISIS in Iraq began on September 19, 2014, over a month after the United States began aerial bombing of ISIS sites in Iraq (Al Jazeera 2014; Bannelier-Christakis 2016, 750; Scharf 2016, 8). The United States expanded strikes to ISIS targets in Syria on September 22, 2014, while French military strikes against ISIS expanded to Syria in late September of 2015 (Chrisafis 2015; Bannelier-Christakis 2016, 766).

The evidence does not support a conclusion that U.S. soft power was influential in France's decision to participate in the military intervention. Through process-tracing of the public discourse surrounding the decision to fight against ISIS, as found in records of governmental statements, parliamentary debates, and news sources, the justification given by key French leaders for French participation is most congruent with the balancing explanation. As expected by the balancing explanation, fear of the offensive capabilities and intentions of ISIS,

[40] The United States officially declared an end to U.S. military operations subsequent to the 2003 invasion of Iraq on December 15, 2011 (History.com 2019).

as well as its ability to export violence directly to France caused French leaders to take international and domestic actions in order to balance against ISIS. The collection and analysis of the discourse focused on the president, prime minister, minister of Defense, and minister of European and Foreign Affairs. Because the president has great autonomy in foreign policy decisions, including the use of the military, the justification for intervention provided by French President François Hollande is central to this analysis (see Zoller 1996). The president appoints the prime minister who forms the government. The government conducts the day-to-day affairs of the country. It is expected that the government ministers are important voices in justification of policies to the National Assembly and the French public. Hollande and the ministers noted were all members of the Socialist Party (PS), and during the relevant decision period the PS held a majority of seats in the National Assembly (French National Assembly 2012).[41]

This chapter is presented in five sections. The first section provides background information regarding ISIS, and the French political setting for the debate over French foreign policy regarding ISIS. Second, the evidence that indicates that a balancing explanation offers the best understanding of the motivations for France's foreign policy decisions toward ISIS is provided. The third and fourth sections provide evidence disconfirming the state identity and soft power explanations, respectively. This ordering once again helps to highlight the limited applicability of the soft power explanation. The fifth section summarizes the findings of the case.

[41] According to French National Assembly (2012) records, the Socialist, Republican and Citizens and related members numbered 295 seats in the National Assembly, while the other major party, the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) and its related members numbered 196. The four other groups represented in the National Assembly numbered fewer than thirty each, and totaled 77 seats.

Background

In the summer of 2014 ISIS "seemed to come out of nowhere," even though the origins of the group had roots in other terrorist organizations that had existed in the region for several years (Bunzel 2015, 4; Shatz and Johnson 2015, 1). What made ISIS different from other terrorist organizations in 2014 was its conduct of a military offensive across Iraq during which it was able to defeat Iraqi military forces and capture Iraqi territory, including major cities such as Mosul and Tikrit (Garcia and Elsea 2014, 1; Katzman, Blanchard, and Humud 2014, 2).

In addition to seizing cities, ISIS was able to loot several banks and capture military equipment supplied to the Iraqi Army by the United States, making it an even more formidable terrorist and military threat (Katzman, Blanchard, and Humud 2014, 3). By mid-June 2014 ISIS had advanced to within approximately thirty-eight miles of Baghdad, and in August began an offensive against Kurdish Peshmerga forces in northern Iraq (Katzman, Blanchard, and Humud 2014, 3).

The offensive against the Iraqi Kurds is estimated to have forced 30,000-50,000 civilians, including minority Christians and Yazidis, from their homes and led to the ISIS siege of hundreds of Yazidis on Sinjar Mountain which drew global attention (Garcia and Elsea 2014, 1; Katzman, Blanchard, and Humud 2014, 4). In 2014 it was estimated that ISIS had displaced 1.8 million Iraqis (Katzman, Blanchard, and Humud 2014, 16). ISIS was notably brutal, and stories of murder, rape, and kidnapping were common (Katzman, Blanchard, and Humud 2014, 4). ISIS spread through portions of Iraq and Syria, declared itself an Islamic caliphate, and called on "all able-bodied Muslims to emigrate to territory" they had captured (Bunzel 2015, 31). After this military offensive, ISIS was able to attract tens of thousands of followers around the world

through a social media campaign that not only drew new fighters to Iraq and Syria, but also spread terror abroad (Bunzel 2015, 36; Alfifi et al. 2019, 58).

Like the rest of the international community, France was taken off-guard by the sudden and effective military and media blitz by ISIS. French government records and media sources indicate little mention of ISIS prior to the summer of 2014.[42] However, references to previous suggestions from France urging U.S. intervention against ISIS in Syria and the Syrian government are present. Iraq and ISIS did not appear to be on the agenda in France in an appreciable way before May 2014 when a member of the National Assembly noted almost in passing with two sentences, the worsening situation in Iraq and the rise of ISIS (French National Assembly 2014g). Prior to that time, most National Assembly debates centered on domestic issues. Parliamentary records noted only intermittent and infrequent discussion of international affairs from 2013 until the 2014 intervention in Iraq. Up to that time, the international issues discussed centered on the ongoing civil war in Syria (French National Assembly 2013a), France's own intervention in Mali (French National Assembly 2013b), and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2014 (French National Assembly 2014b).

According to the Constitution of France, the President of France does not require the National Assembly's permission to deploy military forces for an intervention abroad, but must inform the National Assembly within three days of the government's actions. If the intervention lasts more than four months, the government must then seek an extension from the National Assembly (Constitution of France 2008, Article 35). In addition to the constitutional role of the French president, the specific context of the Hollande presidency in the summer of 2014 may have colored his approach to French foreign policy toward ISIS and France's participation in the U.S.-led military intervention.

[42] In any form (ISIS, ISIL, IS, Daesh, Islamic State).

Hollande was unpopular within France, the least popular of any president since World War II (Chrisafis 2016). Hollande's unpopularity was driven by poor economic conditions and other unpopular domestic policies (Williamson 2014). In March 2014 the PS lost several local elections which threw the government into disarray just before the decision on the ISIS intervention (Penketh 2014). Hollande was forced to appoint a new prime minister, the centrist Emanuel Valls, in March 2014. Hollande's first term did not expire until 2017, and the next National Assembly election was to be that same year, so it is doubtful that immediate electoral considerations drove his decision to intervene in Iraq.[43] However, the president's weakened domestic situation may have required him and his relevant ministers to devote more effort to persuade the National Assembly and the public to support the intervention.

Additionally, previous events surrounding the war in Syria may have influenced Hollande's stance toward the United States and his approach to the ISIS issue in Iraq. Despite the French public's and policymakers' opposition to intervention in Iraq in 2003, French leadership strongly advocated for strikes in Syria in 2013 after the regime there used chemical weapons on rebel factions. However, France declined to conduct these strikes when the United States demurred. Barzegar (2013) reported that in the case of striking Syria that "Hollande seem[ed] more eager than Obama." Hollande had stated that "the chemical massacre of Damascus cannot and must not remain unpunished" and that "there are few countries that have the capacity to inflict a sanction by the appropriate means. France is one of them. We are ready" (Barzegar 2013). This was a strong stance by Hollande, despite nearly two-thirds of the French public being opposed to French military action in Syria (Barzegar 2013). Kuhn (2014, 446) posits that "Hollande miscalculated on the question of military involvement in Syria in the late summer of

[43] Based on consistently low public approval and continued terrorist attacks in France, Hollande decided not to run for a second term in December 2016, becoming the first French president elected since World War II who did not run for second term (Chrisafis 2016).

2013, overestimating France's influence in the international community, underestimating the resistance to such intervention in the UK and USA and as a result leaving France diplomatically isolated" (Gaffney 2014). Thus, Hollande's foreign policy decision regarding strikes in Syria may have been driven by his own domestic problems as well as his concerns over his personal image, popularity, and political legacy (Gaffney 2014; Ramani 2015).

Another important factor is that for many years France has had the largest Muslim population of any European country, estimated to be between five and eight percent, and totaling five to six million people (Heneghan 2008; Le Figaro 2011; Pew Research Center 2014; Hackett 2017). At the time of the summer 2014 ISIS offensive in Iraq and Syria, France had been the source of the greatest number of Western fighters to Iraq and Syria, and had been the site of multiple attacks from ISIS sympathizers and ISIS fighters who returned to France (Counter Extremism Project 2015).

Though the United States had committed to military intervention against ISIS in Iraq, Hollande's approach to the ISIS threat was more cautious than his previous approach to the Syria problem. Furthermore, Hollande's policy for ISIS was couched in language that differed from previous statements regarding the Assad regime in Syria. Syria had violated international norms against the use of chemical weapons, as well as atrocities committed on its own citizens. The language regarding the approach toward the ISIS problem cited a direct threat to France. In this respect, the evidence indicates that a balancing explanation is the most plausible of the three.

Evidence Congruent with the Balancing Explanation

In July 2014, Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Development Laurent Fabius addressed the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee. In this address, Fabius preceded

Hollande's justification for fighting ISIS with similar sentiments later voiced by the president. Fabius noted that France had a clear interest in stemming the flow of French citizens and residents going to fight in Iraq and Syria as part of the newly declared ISIS caliphate. Fabius also noted the weakness of current French laws that did little to stem the flow of these fighters to the front lines in Iraq and Syria, and the potential that they may return to France and become a domestic threat (French National Assembly 2014d). Noting again that ISIS posed a real threat to Iraq and other countries in the region, and particularly ISIS' spread to Syria, Fabius also called for French support of the "moderate opposition" fighting against Assad in the ongoing Syrian civil war (French National Assembly 2014d). His argument for supporting the moderate opposition in Syria was that ISIS was helping strengthen Assad's regime, which France had previously condemned for its use of prohibited weapons and for which it had called for military strikes (French National Assembly 2014d). Fabius' position indicates some of the earliest evidence of the desire to balance against ISIS and the Assad regime both externally and internally. Changes to domestic laws coupled with actions abroad would be necessary to balance against both ISIS and Syria.

On August 20, 2014, to a joint session of the National Assembly and Senate, Fabius recounted the barbarity of ISIS, noting the murder of American journalist James Foley, whose beheading ISIS had recorded and publicized on the Internet (French National Assembly 2014c; ABC News 2014). Again, Fabius noted the threat of ISIS recruiting French and other nationalities to their cause, and also noted the significant capabilities ISIS had gained in capturing American military equipment from Iraqi forces (French National Assembly 2014c). Fabius also stated that "in Mosul, the terrorists found $500 million in the Iraqi central bank.... For the record, the attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York had 'cost' only one million

dollars.... Imagine what... ISIS can do today, with the financial and technological capabilities it has" (French National Assembly 2014c). Clearly, Fabius understood the need to balance against ISIS with domestic and international actions in order to prevent ISIS from exporting terrorism to France.

Initially, Hollande's policy for France was to provide only humanitarian aid to those suffering from the attacks from ISIS on the Iraqi population (CNN 2014b). When Hollande decided in mid-August 2014 to provide weapons to Kurdish Peshmerga forces fighting against ISIS in Iraq, he justified this move in a media interview by noting that the threat is not the same as that posed by other terror groups, and that ISIS was a "terrorist quasi-state" and that the situation was "the most serious that we have known since 2001" (Ayad, d'Allones, and Wieder 2014). In the same statement Hollande went on to note that "we do not do this to simply support the Kurds or Iraqis. We act for our security. We face a real threat with jihadists who are recruited into operations [of ISIS] who may at some point come back to strike [in France]. Among them there are French" (Ayad, d'Allones, and Wieder 2014). As expected in the balancing explanation, Hollande's statements point to a French response driven by fear of a third party threat and the need to expend state resources on increased security measures.

At that time, there was also concern among members of the National Assembly over the potential that working with Iran to solve the ISIS problem would strengthen Iran's position in the region (French National Assembly 2014e; see also French National Assembly 2014i). In response, Fabius noted that "the dangerousness and the particular nature of [ISIS] impose it on us" to include Iran as part of the potential solution in Iraq (French National Assembly 2014c). It is clear from the early discourse that France's view of the instability in the Middle East was thought to contribute directly to France's domestic security problems. The potential need for

cooperation with Iran to help solve the ISIS problem is evidence of external balancing. This was a case in which cooperation occurred "even when [states] have strong reasons not to cooperate with one another" (Waltz 1979, 125). The threat posed by ISIS outweighed the threat of a strengthened Iran.

In early September 2014, just weeks before France would engage with military air strikes against ISIS, Hollande noted that "France [would] fight if Iraq" supported the coalition plan to fight ISIS militarily (Meichtry 2014). During a visit to Iraq, as the first by a head of state to visit the new government there, Hollande stressed that "[ISIS] militants are waging a war on 'all people who do not share their vision or ideas'" (Llana 2014), and that ISIS "[poses] a security threat the world over" (Al Jazeera 2014b). Hollande argued that "combating [ISIS] has now become a question of France's own national security" (Meichtry and Landauro 2014). Upon the start of French reconnaissance operations in Iraq on September 15, 2014,[44] in preparation for the air strikes that would follow, Hollande refuted criticisms regarding the legality of intervention by relying on UNSC Resolution 2170, reiterating that the Security Council had recognized that ISIS "constitute[d] an immense danger" (Guibert and Riols 2014). Hollande's statements are in keeping with internal balancing behavior insofar as the French strategy to fight ISIS abroad in order to preserve security at home.

Addressing the UN Security Council on September 24, 2014, Hollande again invoked the security argument for intervention, which is consistent with the balancing explanation. Hollande noted that the number of French residents fighting for ISIS had dramatically increased, and that this problem was "a threat to our own security" and that "none of our countries are safe from this threat" (UNSC 2014a, 6). He further noted that "we are facing a shared threat and we have a

[44] French military actions on this date included only reconnaissance flights over Iraq, which were followed by bombing missions against ISIS targets within the next several days (Guibert and Riols 2014; Al Jazeera 2014).

shared, multiple military response" (UNSC 2014a, 6). Such a statement indicates a call for both French internal balancing actions as well as external balancing against ISIS through multinational cooperation.

After France deployed military forces to the region, but before flying air strikes, Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian assured French military troops of the purpose of their mission in Iraq, stating "France stands ready at a time that is decisive for its security – because it is also France's security that is threatened by [ISIS]" (Bacchi 2014). In September 2014, two days before France started direct military intervention with aerial bombing missions against ISIS in Iraq, Le Drian addressed a joint session of the National Assembly and Senate. In his address, Le Drian noted the increase in ISIS violence, and the capture of modern military equipment and vast sums of cash with which ISIS may carry out attacks globally (French National Assembly 2014h). However, he went further, noting that the threat to the French citizenry, if not the French state, was real:

> [T]he security issue we face is almost immediate, which implies determined action by all. My colleague Bernard Cazeneuve now estimates that 930 of our fellow citizens are involved in supply chains to Syria – it is the first time in many years that an external crisis has had such a marked impact on the security of the national territory itself. With these French people, there would be a total of around 12,000 foreign fighters – including Europeans (Belgians, English, Tunisians, Chechens, Caucasians) and Australians – which shows the need for international action (French National Assembly 2014h).

More to the point, Le Drian declared that "France must take part in [the military intervention] in view of the insecurity that an absence of intervention would present for our territory" (French National Assembly 2014h). Together, it is apparent that Le Drian, similar to Hollande and

Fabius, considered ISIS' offensive capabilities and intentions a clear threat to France which necessitated action to balance that threat.

The Hollande government spoke with unified voice throughout the decision for military intervention and subsequent continuation of French actions. As required by law, Prime Minister Manuel Valls addressed a joint session of the French parliament in September 2014 to inform them of the military intervention (French National Assembly 2014i). In this address, Valls noted that "the security of the world [is] threatened" by ISIS, and that France's "national security is at stake as it has never been in recent years" (French National Assembly 2014i). He further noted the wealth and military equipment that had been captured by ISIS during their offensive, which would "allow him to recruit and pay for auxiliaries from all over the world," including France (French National Assembly 2014i). Valls called attention to the spread of ISIS message, stating that "[ISIS] will not stop at Iraq" and that Syria and Iraq are also training grounds for those who would return and attack Western countries (French National Assembly 2014i). Valls repeatedly noted the direct and immediate threat to France posed by ISIS, and that "helping Iraq means protecting France and acting for our national security" and that the "situation... has major consequences for our national security. That is our main concern" (French National Assembly 2014i). In order to balance against the threat of ISIS at home, France would undertake a strategy of fighting abroad, which is consistent with the notion that security concerns and fear – the need to balance against ISIS – was the determining factor in France's decision to participate in the military intervention against ISIS.

In accordance with the French Constitution, no vote was taken upon the government's notification of the military intervention in September 2014. However, the comments during the debate from representatives of each party in the National Assembly, with the exception of the

Democratic and Republican Left (GDR), were favorable toward French military intervention (French National Assembly 2014i).[45] The parties supporting the intervention invariably noted the ISIS threat to French security.

Four days after the first French air strikes in Iraq on September 19, 2014, Fabius repeated a theme prevalent among French leaders at this time, noting in reference to ISIS the need "to defend ourselves because they are murderers, they are throat cutters" (CNN 2014a). He added, "it is not just Iraq and Syria and the region, it's all of us, U.S., France, Europe, and we have to defend ourselves" (CNN 2014a). Again, invoking France's position within an international coalition is clear evidence of external balancing behavior in the face of the ISIS threat.

After an initial notification to the National Assembly of a military intervention, if the intervention lasts longer than four months, the National Assembly must vote on whether or not to reauthorize the action (Constitution of France 2008). There was only a single vote against continued military action in the first National Assembly vote held to reauthorize the intervention in January 2015 (Calamur 2015). Nearly a year later, the vote of the National Assembly to extend the operation was 515 in favor, and four against (The New York Times 2015). Both of these National Assembly votes, at the constitutionally required four-month intervals, followed directly on the heels of major terrorist attacks in France.

In September 2015, when France decided to expand air strikes against ISIS into Syria, Hollande noted that "we will strike any time our national security is at stake" (Chrisafis 2015). In October 2015, when France began its strikes on ISIS targets in Syria, Valls noted that "terrorist attacks have taken place [in France].... In the name of self-defence [sic] it is obligatory to

[45] In addition to comments from each party in the National Assembly, the record of the debate indicates that upon Valls' closing remarks that "long applause on the benches of the SRC and RRDP groups, from which the deputies rose, as well as on the benches of the UMP, UDI and environmentalist groups" which indicates that the majority across party lines favored the policy just announced by Valls (French National Assembly 2014i).

strike [ISIS] and we will continue" (France 24 2015, 24). Valls stated that "we know that [ISIS terror] operations [in France] were being prepared" in Syria (Doherty, Henley, and Traynor 2015).

When terrorists killed over one hundred people in France on November 13, 2015, purportedly in response to French strikes in Syria, Hollande stated during a televised address that "this is horror" and noted that France was "going into battle. We will be pitiless" (Meichtry, Landauro, and Varela 2015). According to government statements, the security concern emanating from ISIS sympathizers conducting attacks in France continued as the foundation for the expansion of French military actions in Syria (French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs 2020). In an address to a joint session of parliament following the attacks, Hollande stated that "this organization must be destroyed, both to save the populations of Syria and Iraq... and to protect ourselves, to keep foreign fighters from coming to our country" (Hollande 2015). He noted that he would "marshal the full strength of the State to defend the safety of its people" (Hollande 2015). The willingness to mobilize state resources, including military and political capabilities, constitutes strong evidence of internal balancing behavior as outlined in Chapter 3.

External balancing behavior also increased after the November attacks. Hollande (2015) referred to the Paris attacks as an "act of war" and called on the European community, under the mutual defense clause of the European Union (EU) Treaty, Article 42, to spur EU actions against ISIS, noting that "Europe cannot live in the belief that the crisis around it has no effect on it." He (Hollande 2015) also called attention to the refugee crisis, and the need to "ensure safety of European populations, and to resist oppression." Notably, this call from France to the European Union was the first time that the EU mutual defense clause was activated since its inclusion into

EU law in 2009 (European Parliament 2015).[46] Hollande then announced that he had ordered expanded strikes against ISIS forces in Syria (Hollande 2015).[47]

The centerpiece of Hollande's speech was ISIS and the threat it posed. Hollande (2015) urged action because of the threat that such jihadist organizations bring to the populace of France:

> It hurts to say it, but we know that these were French people who killed other French people on Friday. Living here in our land are individuals who start out by committing crimes, become radicalized, and go on to become terrorists. Sometimes they leave to fight in Syria or Iraq. Sometimes they form networks that provide training, in certain cases, or which help one another, with a view to carrying out terrorist acts at a time determined by their sponsors.... It is therefore urgent for us to defend ourselves, on a long-term basis. What's at stake is the protection of our fellow citizens and our ability to live together.

Later, in a statement to the press following a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Hollande continued to justify France's military intervention, and now cooperation with Russia, based on the threat ISIS posed to French national security, stating that "the only goal we must have is fighting [ISIS].... [T]here is no other goal" (NBC News 2015). The increased cooperation with Russia in Syria occurred despite previous concerns that France should not be viewed as sympathetic to or cooperative with Russia or the Assad regime in Syria (Bilefsky 2014). This is a second example of French cooperation with another state in this case when it would not be expected in order to balance against what it perceived as a greater threat.

[46] The fact that this was the first time France or any member nation invoked EU Article 42 is also noteworthy because France had suffered at least eight terror attacks prior to the November 2015 attacks (Capatides 2016).
[47] On November 15, 2015, France conducted the largest airstrikes thus far in Operational CHAMMAL (Rubin and Barnard 2015).

Additionally, the press noted the consensus across parties for the intervention against ISIS before Valls informed the National Assembly of the decision (Roger 2014) and after (Chapuis and Euzen 2014). Some editorials were written in support of French intervention (Bauchard 2014; Benraad 2014; Chaliand 2014). The record shows little evidence of concerted opposition from the public. Some opposition was penned by those who do not favor military intervention on principle (Fussman 2014; de Villepin 2014b; 2014c; 2014a). Others criticized Hollande's approach as "vague and risky" because of the poor state of the French military and that Hollande appeared to be following rather than leading in the international community (Lellouche 2014).

The overwhelming justification advanced for France's military intervention against ISIS in 2014 is congruent with the balancing explanation. The repeated invocations of the security threat ISIS posed to the population of France was used to justify French military actions abroad. Additionally, French actions required cooperation not only with Western countries, but also with Russia and Iran, despite French desires to distance themselves from or limit the influence of the latter countries.

Domestic Actions against the ISIS Threat: Support for the Balancing Explanation

French policymakers' belief that ISIS and its sympathizers in France posed a domestic threat, requiring a domestic response, preceded the debate over French foreign policy decisions. Internal balancing behaviors by France indicate that the security threat was perceived as real, and that broad political consensus existed for measures to balance against the threat of ISIS domestically. This consensus is evident based on the majority of the National Assembly passing laws intended to reduce the threat of ISIS to France. Additionally, the state of emergency giving the French president expanded domestic powers after the November 2015 terrorist attacks in

Paris was extended by the National Assembly six times until 2017 (Osborne 2017). Such laws, and the commitment of state resources to enforce them with personnel and technology are consistent with the balancing explanation.

Before France started its offensive military intervention against ISIS, the domestic debate in reaction to the rise of ISIS focused on recruitment of French residents as fighters and the terrorist threat they posed. The efforts to stem terrorists' messages in France increased after several ISIS videos urged French residents to carry out attacks in France if they were unable to travel to Syria or Iraq (Counter Extremism Project 2015). The French National Assembly debated domestic internet controls meant to hamper ISIS efforts at recruiting and gaining sympathy for its cause (French National Assembly 2014b). This led to both the increased enforcement of existing speech laws and the eventual enactment of new laws restricting internet and social media use for the promulgation of speech that supports terrorism or terrorist groups (Human Rights Watch 2018).

Along with the national state of emergency, France established several de-radicalization centers and, notably, created a new National Guard (Counter Extremism Project 2015). The French government also initiated a "Stop Jihadism" campaign that promoted the identification and reporting of suspected terrorists, and quarantine of incarcerated terror suspects from the rest of the prison population (Counter Extremism Project 2015). Additionally, France passed a law banning travel of suspected terrorists in an attempt to stem the flow of fighters moving to and from France and Syria and Iraq where they receive training and return to carry out attacks (Counter Extremism Project 2015). These domestic measures all indicate France's internal balancing against the ongoing messaging, recruitment, and incitement to violence by ISIS within France. Because these measures all required legislation and funding, it is evident that a majority

supported the security argument the Hollande government advanced. This perception of ISIS and the flow of fighters out of and back into France as a direct threat to France framed the ensuing foreign policy debate.

Evidence Disconfirming a State Identity Explanation

The language expected in a state identity explanation for this case appears a few times in the discourse during the lead-up to France's initial engagement in Iraq against ISIS, but it is insufficient to support an identity explanation. In one instance, Hollande attempted to distance French foreign policy decisions from the U.S. policy, even as France followed the U.S. lead in aerial bombing of ISIS targets in Iraq. The best evidence for an identity-based explanation for French foreign policy toward ISIS comes over a year after the initial decision to use military force in Iraq. Early in the debate, the language expected in the identity explanation features minimally at times but is not central to the justification used to garner support for France's foreign policy.

Hollande stated in September 2014, coincident with the first strikes on ISIS in Iraq, that France's decision to engage ISIS was independent of U.S. actions, and that unlike the United States, France's military actions would not extend to Syria (Al Jazeera 2014). In an address to the National Assembly a week prior to the official notification of France's military engagement in Iraq, Valls had also invoked the language congruent with the expectations of state identity and French policy independence. Valls called attention to the fact that:

> Fortunately, for the past two years... France, on the international scene, has fully assumed its responsibility. She assumed it in Mali, in the Central African Republic. A year ago, she also wanted to assume it in Syria. She assumes it when it comes to supporting the

> Kurds and the minorities chased in the Middle East. She will assume it and will assume it – obviously before Parliament – also in Iraq (French National Assembly 2014a).

Valls' singular claim of France fulfilling its international responsibility invokes French grandeur, as did Fabius' argument that for France to be great it must make a commitment to the intervention. Fabius argued that "French foreign policy is divided between two temptations. The first is the neutralist temptation; but how can one claim to be an influential country if, each time a commitment is necessary, one refuses to do so?" (French National Assembly 2014c).

The speech Hollande made to a joint session of parliament after the November 2015 Paris terror attacks reflects the strongest evidence of state identity as a potential factor in foreign policy decisions. Beginning his speech by noting that the November 2015 ISIS inspired attacks in Paris were an act of war, Hollande cited the courage and dignity of France and French people in facing threats (Hollande 2015). Hollande (2015) then turned to ISIS and noted that "they are fighting us because France is a country of freedom, because we are the birthplace of human rights." A segment of this speech was dedicated to recounting the characteristics of the French people, and the life, culture, and sports that France brings to the world (Hollande 2015). However, Hollande did not link France's identity to the need to carry out new and more extensive air strikes, relying instead on justifying continued strikes as a security requirement.

The few comments from key leaders that attempt to claim French policy independence or grandeur are betrayed by French policy actions, and the predominance of security invocations throughout the discourse. It is clear based on previous French desires for engagement in Syria (Daley 2013; Daily Mail 2014), that France was not in a military or diplomatic position to take action themselves previously, or in this current instance against ISIS in Iraq or Syria. Additionally, a year after France started bombing ISIS targets in Iraq, it began strikes in Syria,

despite its earlier inclination not to do so, and again following the United States rather than leading in that action. The weak and scarce attempts at invoking the language of policy independence and French international status as a great power fall short in terms of evidence to support a state identity explanation for this foreign policy decision. The majority of the language in the political discourse French leaders used to justify the changes in policy is consistent with concerns for security.

After the November 2015 terror attacks in Paris, the invocations of French state identity increased. However, the invocation of security concerns also intensified along with invocations of identity, thus, balancing continued to outweigh identity even in 2015 as the intervention against ISIS widened. The increased invocations of identity came only after at least eight notable terror attacks on French soil, and on the heels of the most deadly domestic attack to date (Capatides 2016), over a year after the first French military engagements in Iraq, and a month after expanding air strikes into Syria. Even after strong invocations of French identity in the post-Paris attack speech, Hollande (2015) reverted to the message, consistent since mid-2014, that "this organization must be destroyed, both to save the populations of Syria and Iraq... and to protect ourselves, to keep foreign fighters from coming to our country."

Evidence Disconfirming a Soft Power Explanation

The evidence in the discourse of key French foreign policymakers does not confirm a soft power explanation. There are few references to the United States and those do not indicate any form of attraction to the United States.

Hollande was careful to emphasize that France's decision to engage ISIS was independent of U.S. pressure (Al Jazeera 2014), which, as noted previously, aligns, however

weakly, with the expectations of the identity explanation in terms of French foreign policy independence. Likewise, during the September 2014 debate that followed Valls' notification to the National Assembly of the military intervention in Iraq, Valls stated in response to a critique from a minority opposition party "let's avoid the caricatures that we often hear that this or that government follows the United States" (French National Assembly 2014i).

In August 2014, Fabius noted apparent changes in world order based on the many crises the international community faced at that time, including the dramatic rise of ISIS:

> We are living in a depolarization of the world. From a bipolar world, where the Soviet Union and the United States together controlled crises, the fall of the Berlin Wall first brought us to a unipolar world where American power alone was raining and the good weather. But no power, even through a set of stable alliances, can now master all crises. If we aspire to an organized multipolar world, it is clear that today we now live in a "zero-polar" world. This explains why crises can spread without being controlled, since there is no longer any power capable of doing so (French National Assembly 2014c).

Fabius further noted that "the action taken against [ISIS] finally receives the assent of the whole international community, not only of the European Union, but also of the United Nations, which adopted a resolution putting its leaders out of the law. Our country should therefore not be ashamed of what it has done" in terms of following the U.S. lead (French National Assembly 2014c). Fabius was again firm in his justification for the French approach to ISIS to that point, stating that "we supported the American approach, but we should not be ashamed of what we did – and just because we approve of what the United States does, [does] not mean that we should disapprove of what the French Government [does]" (French National Assembly 2014c).

The comment from Fabius in August 2014, one of the very few direct references to the United States by a key French policy actor, is notable because it emphasized that France's policy approach was due to changing global circumstances, and the fact that the United States was unequal to the task of managing this crisis. This position is a clear rejection that U.S. beauty, brilliance, or benignity influenced the French policy decision.

In August 2014, Le Drian noted that the French military had placed liaison officers within the U.S. command centers that were involved with ongoing military operations in Iraq and Syria, "to keep us informed and possibly to express our point of view" (French National Assembly 2014h). This statement is evidence that France may have held a different view than the United States on the conduct of the strikes or possibly the overall goal of the operation. Le Drian was careful to add that the French military was carrying out intelligence gathering flights so as "to preserve our autonomy in assessing the situation" (French National Assembly 2014h).

Le Drian's comments to the press regarding French military coordination with the United States indicate a desire to maintain French autonomy which is evidence that U.S. soft power was not influential. The soft power explanation would suggest that the prowess of the U.S. military, or its brilliance in Vuving's (2009) estimation, would create soft power attraction. Le Drian's comments regarding French military liaisons in U.S. command centers does not indicate an attraction, but a material, practical consideration. France required coordination with the United States during the intervention, but was purportedly not following the United States.

In June 2014, the entire French parliament received an extensive report on ISIS (French National Assembly 2014e). In that report, then Director for North Africa and the Middle East at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development Jean-François Girault stated that the position of France was to support a political solution (French National Assembly 2014e).

Girault noted that “it would be pointless to conduct an operation in Iraq” and called for a political solution. Girault laid the blame for the current situation in Iraq and Syria on the United States, stating that “We are paying the price of the American turnaround today. Because this is one of the reasons for the strengthening of the Syrian dictatorship and its playing partner, namely [ISIS]” (French National Assembly 2014e). Girault continued:

> The United States is in a phase of reflection because the situation runs counter to the doctrine of non-engagement of President Obama. The American responsibility in this crisis naturally results from the intervention of 2003 but especially from an assumed disengagement. President Obama announced that there would be no "boots on the ground"; the alternative is to do nothing or strike at [ISIS] (French National Assembly 2014e).

Girault is not considered a key policy leader in this dissertation, however, he provided a government report on the ISIS situation that was widely disseminated to members of the National Assembly, thus making his remarks relevant to this case. Girault noted Iraq’s domestic strife fomented by the divisive politics of Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, but placed responsibility for the ongoing violence in Iraq, and the rise of ISIS, squarely with the United States (French National Assembly 2014e). Not only did Girault note that Iraq continued to be in political disarray since the U.S. invasion in 2003, but he also noted with some disdain the reluctance of the United States, previously and currently, to engage ISIS decisively in Iraq. Both of these statements call into question U.S. soft power influence in this case.

Those who opposed and those who cautiously supported the intervention during the September 2014 National Assembly debate following Valls’ official notification of the government’s intervention, also made references to the United States. A member of the second

major group in the National Assembly, the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), which ultimately supported the intervention, voiced criticism of the United States, stating "when will we understand that American strikes aim above all to restore the tarnished international coat of arms of Barack Obama" (Roger 2014).

Those on the far left in the National Assembly were reluctant to intervene without a clear mandate from the United Nations (Roger 2014), and placed blame for the current situation in Iraq on the United States. Speaking on behalf of the Democratic and Republican Left group (GDR) regarding the policy announced by Valls, François Asensi stated:

> [T]he Iraqi people have constantly paid the price for this crazy idea to reshape the Middle East by forcing the *pax americana* by force.... The results of this modern crusade are dramatic.... The American choice to install an Iraqi prime minister, Mr. El Maliki, in favor of the marginalization of the Sunnis, was a disastrous decision.... In 1991, the American secretary of state promised to bring Iraq back to the Stone Age. Ten years of embargo, a second war followed by the American occupation, finished dismantling the Iraqi state.... This war, justified by the "global war against terrorism," has finally created a new center of international terrorism.... Al Qaeda, [an] "American creation," in the words of Hillary Clinton, is now supplanted by the armed forces of [ISIS].... Yes, it is necessary to bring military aid to those who resist the jihadists as well as political, humanitarian, economic support, but not just how and certainly not under an American command and under NATO supervision.... France finds itself in the front line, isolated alongside the United States.... In 2003, France rightly refused to follow in the footsteps of the American hawks. History has proven us right. What sense does it make today to join a

> coalition led by those responsible for this chaos? No, France does not have to do after-sales service in the United States! (French National Assembly 2014i).

Despite the reluctance from a minority to intervene militarily, coupled with their negative expressions toward the United States, there was overwhelming support from the National Assembly for the intervention which was justified without positive references to the values or leadership of the United States.

Moreover, despite the speech from the reluctant members of the far left faulting the United States for the ISIS problem, Valls dismissed the concerns with a simple reply that the issue at hand should not be framed in terms of the caricature of the United States. The evidence better supports the conclusion that soft power – attraction to U.S. culture, values, or this particular foreign policy – did not factor in the decision making and is absent from the discourse of key French policy leaders. In no sense was the brilliance, benignity, or beauty – or the language expected in association with those traits – invoked by French leadership. References to the United States in the discourse of key policymakers leading up to the initial engagement in Iraq, and the expansion of the fight against ISIS in Syria, were notable because they were rare. Thus, soft power as a factor in French decision making does not explain French support in the fight against ISIS.

Conclusion

In sum, there is no evidence in the discourse that supports an explanation that U.S. soft power was influential in France's foreign policy decision for this military intervention. The data presented above provide support for the more significant role of balancing in shaping French decision-making than an explanation associated with soft power or state identity. Regarding

Nye's third source of soft power, France may have called into question the legitimacy of U.S. foreign policies toward the Middle East in prior instances and attributed them as the cause of the current ISIS situation, but French leaders did not question the current U.S. policy to intervene in Iraq and Syria against ISIS. Not surprisingly, French leaders did not call on the legitimacy of U.S. policy to garner support for French participation, choosing instead to rely on a state security justification. France's highlighting of the instability that ensued from previous U.S. policies serves to bolster the balancing explanation based on the perceived threat to France and call into question a soft power explanation focusing on France's attraction to the United States.

The French identity-based desire for an independent foreign policy, though stated on a few occasions, was also not decisive in this case, particularly for the initial decision to intervene during August and September 2014. Furthermore, it is not evidenced by French actions. France's need for a global coalition to address the ISIS threat betrayed the Gaullist notion of state obligations and independence of action through the assignment of external security "to other states or political bodies" (Kolodziej 1974, 24–25). The desire for grandeur was besieged by the quest for security. French leaders infrequently and inconsistently invoked French state identity during this crisis. Even the few apparent attempts to justify its ISIS policy based on its identity – independence, greatness, and uniqueness – were consistently coupled with the predominant justification based on French security interests domestically and abroad.

Hollande's speech of November 2015 after the Paris attacks remained consistent with his security-based foreign policy stance toward ISIS in August 2014. Since ISIS began in 2014 seizing large portions of territory and using media to publicize murder, recruit fighters, and grow the caliphate, Hollande and his ministers consistently invoked the threat of French nationals and

residents returning as threats to the French population. Table 4 summarizes these findings and highlights the key elements supporting the confirmed explanation.

Table 4. Summary of Findings: French Participation in the ISIS Intervention

Balancing	Confirmed – domestic threat of ISIS to French public; fear of returning jihadists
French state identity	Disconfirmed
Soft power	Disconfirmed

Chapter 7

Germany's Decision to Participate in the Military Intervention Against ISIS

In 2014, Germany faced at least one of the same issues regarding ISIS as France. German nationals were travelling to and from Iraq and Syria as fighters for ISIS (Eddy 2014; Karg 2014). Germany was called upon as part of the international community to participate in a coalition to fight ISIS, initially in Iraq and then expanding to Syria (UNSC 2014b; Workhauser 2014). Germany first sent military aid in the form of weapons to Iraq in September 2014. In January 2015, Germany decided to deploy military personnel for a training mission to Iraq. Later, after the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, Germany expanded its military operations to Syria. However, at no time were German military forces engaged in direct combat missions. German participation in the intervention was limited to providing arms, training, aerial reconnaissance, aerial refueling of the combat aircraft of other countries, and the defense of a French aircraft carrier (Dewitz 2015). It is notable that Germany's participation in the military intervention in this case was outside of the auspices of an international organization which, as noted in Chapter 3, is unexpected.

This chapter tests U.S. soft power as an explanation for Germany's decision to participate in the military intervention against ISIS. The data in the discourse of key foreign policymakers offer evidence congruent with the balancing and state identity explanations. The evidence indicates that the threat posed to German domestic security was coupled with identity-based concerns for the atrocities committed by ISIS on minority groups. These two explanations work interactively to trigger Germany's response. The evidence does not support an explanation that U.S. soft power played a role in this case.

This chapter is presented in four sections. The first section provides background information regarding the ISIS situation vis-à-vis Germany as well as the political setting for the debate over German foreign policy regarding ISIS. The second section provides evidence supporting a combination of balancing and state identity as the most likely explanation for Germany's foreign policy decisions toward ISIS. Section three disconfirms the soft power explanation. The fourth section summarizes the findings of this case.

Background

The rapid ISIS offensive in Iraq in 2014 was as much a surprise to Germany as elsewhere (Steinmeier 2014f).[48] Few references to ISIS are found in the empirical record up to June 2014. Prior to that time, the foreign policy conversation in the German government was dominated by the recent Russian actions in Ukraine. In July and early August 2014, when the United States and others began delivering humanitarian aid to the Iraqi Yazidi minority group trapped by ISIS in the Sinjar Mountain region, there was a notable shift in the German foreign policy agenda. Subsequently, Germany began delivering weapons to the Peshmerga in September 2014, then became more actively involved through deployment of military advisors, naval assets, and reconnaissance and refueling aircraft over the next several months. Germany declined to participate in offensive military strikes, and despite U.S. requests, maintained a limitation on direct involvement in combat operations (de Galbert 2015; DW.com 2019b). While it may be argued that reductions in the German military budget, size, and the end of conscription (see

[48] In this chapter, many German government documents and other news sources were accessed on the Google Chrome browser and automatically translated into English. This precludes the citation of specific page references for some direct quotes of government officials. However, use of the find/search tool in most web browsers will allow readers to locate the text on the web pages noted in the reference section. Other German government resources were available only in PDF form in German. These data sources were uploaded and translated via Google Translate, and page references are from the original German PDF pagination.

DW.com 2014c; Spiegel 2014; Chambers 2015) may have influenced how Germany participated in this intervention compared to the 1999 Kosovo case, it does not appear that these considerations factored into the decision calculus to participate. The cuts would not seem to matter in terms of the research design and the binary dependent variable, and because German military participation in both the 1999 and 2014 cases, in terms of deployed capabilities, was symbolic at best.

As outlined in Chapter 5, under the German Constitution, the chancellor has significant powers in formulating foreign policy, while requiring approval from the Bundestag for the deployment of military forces for actions outside the confines of NATO countries (DemiRtaş and Mazlum 2018, 37). As in the previous case involving Germany, the members of the German government most relevant in the German foreign policymaking process, and particularly the use of force, are the chancellor, minister of Foreign Affairs, and minister of Defense. This places Chancellor Angela Merkel, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, and Minister of Defense Ursula von der Leyen as central figures in advancing the government's policy for Germany's participation in U.S.-led actions against ISIS in 2014. The consistency of the invocations of German identity and the threat to German security across time and across parties makes a strong case that Germany's supranational European identity, coupled with the need to respond to a security threat, offer the best explanation for Germany's role in the military intervention against ISIS.

In 2013, Merkel was elected as chancellor for the third time. In that election, her Christian Democratic Union Party (CDU) gained 61 seats in the Bundestag. However, the CDU's sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), lost seats requiring the CDU to form a coalition with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) (Class World 2013; The Federal Returning

Officer 2013). Forming the coalition required extensive negotiations with the SPD, and prior to an agreement over half of the members of the SPD opposed forming a coalition government (Martin 2013; Moulson 2013). Together the CDU and SPD controlled 448 of 631 seats in the Bundestag, providing the coalition a seventy percent majority (The Federal Returning Officer 2013). The agreement to a CDU-SPD coalition led to the appointment of Steinmeier, a member of the SPD, as minister of Foreign Affairs. Despite the shift in the SPD's policy stance in the 1999 Kosovo case, the SPD remained reluctant to break with its platform of limiting Germany's use of force, even as it justified Germany's participation in Kosovo and against ISIS (Friedrich 2000, 5–8; DemiRtaş and Mazlum 2018, 38–39). Governing through a coalition may have influenced the approach taken by Merkel and Steinmeier in gaining support for Germany's participation in the fight against ISIS. Despite the small minority in the Bundestag opposed to Germany's actions, there was a large consensus within the German government regarding German policy decisions.

The first German policy decision to participate in the U.S.-led military intervention against ISIS led to a debate in August and September 2014 over providing weapons to the Kurdish Peshmerga to enable their fight against ISIS in northern Iraq. In this debate, there existed two conflicting elements of the same German identity, both of which derive from the negative aspects of the German historical narrative. The first of these was a long-standing post-war taboo against providing weapons to areas of conflict (Conrad 2014; Heinrich 2014; Wallace 2014). Germany made a distinction between the appropriateness of exporting armaments that may be used by a state for defense, and those that might be used against its own populace. Regarding the criteria for which types of arms are and are not appropriate to export, a long-serving prior foreign minister noted "whatever floats is fine, whatever rolls is not" (Augstein

2015). This taboo and reluctance to provide weapons to a ground army derives from the formerly belligerent nature of German nationalism and the post-war desire to serve peace, as expected by Germany's identity outlined in Chapter 3. Yet, this principle was challenged by other elements of German identity, which resulted in policymakers noting that sending arms in this instance was an exceptional action. As noted by the minority of policymakers who opposed arming the Peshmerga, Germany at that time was the third largest exporter of military weapons in the world (German Bundestag 2014, 4421).[49] Ultimately, a second element of Germany's supranational European identity outweighed the weapons taboo in this foreign policy decision.

The second, and competing, facet of German identity derives from its history of genocide and dictatorship which drives the appropriateness of "preventing the horrors of the past" from being repeated (Banchoff 1999, 275). The resulting responsibility to protect lives is "enshrined in German Basic Law" Article 1 as "inviolable and inalienable human rights" as "the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world" (Facts about Germany 2018). Evidence from the discourse shows this element of identity outweighed the German desire to "serve peace" by holding to the taboo against sending arms to a crisis area (Banchoff 1999, 280). Both of these elements of German identity were present in the debate over Germany's participation in the intervention against ISIS, but the taboo proved less central as it was deemed expendable in this case. Also present was the limitation German identity places on the use of force abroad, and to a lesser extent, Germany's embeddedness into Europe and acting as a responsible member of the international community.

[49] As of 2019, Germany was ranked as the fourth largest exporter of military weapons during the five year span from 2014-2018 (SIPRI 2019). Another source notes that from 1950 to 2017 Germany ranked as the fifth largest arms supplier, though its total is dwarfed by both the United States and Russia (Armstrong 2018). It would not be unusual for any country to fluctuate in specific ranking year-to-year. It remains that Germany, despite identity-based claims of a taboo against arming others, ranks consistently among the top five arms exporters.

The debate over appropriate actions was coupled with the perceived threat that ISIS and its supporters posed to Germany and Europe. The invocations of the ISIS threat and elements of German identity together provide a better explanation for German foreign policy decisions in this case than an explanation based on balancing or identity alone, or an explanation based on soft power.

Evidence: Balancing the Threat of ISIS and Germany's Supranational Identity

Each of the arguments for German participation in the military intervention against ISIS were present in an early statement regarding Germany's need to act. On August 25, 2014, prior to Merkel's proposal and the Bundestag debate over arming the Peshmerga, Steinmeier (2014c) spoke publicly about how "Germany has struggled [due to] dark chapters in [its] history" and noted that the pacifist post-war Germany was a "happy island, but not completely sheltered from the stormy ocean" and that "just staying out of the 'raging world' just doesn't work anymore." He (Steinmeier 2014c) noted the threat ISIS posed to Germany because "the murderous ones among the... ISIS-bands are also those who came from Germany and – we have to fear – who could return to Germany." Steinmeier (2014c) also acknowledged the German tradition of not providing arms to crisis areas but that in this case it was outweighed by "the principle of protecting human life." Steinmeier (2014c) further argued that greater involvement in global affairs was part of "Germany's responsibility in the world." Yet, he (Steinmeier 2014c) was careful to emphasize that "active German foreign policy only exists in and through Europe! We can only have weight with our partners and in our alliances." A few days later, Steinmeier (2014g) again noted the threat to Germany and Europe posed by ISIS stating that ISIS is "against the immediate external borders of NATO." These key elements of German identity – stopping

genocide, protecting human lives, and its embeddedness and loyalty to Europe – along with the fear of the offensive capabilities and intentions of ISIS toward Germany necessitating internal and external balancing, are consistent with a combined identity and balancing explanation.

These factors were also invoked during the September 1, 2014, Bundestag debate over sending weapons to Iraq. Merkel's speech emphasized the two primary motivations for the exception to the weapons taboo: genocide and security. While the deployment of German military forces requires approval by a majority of the Bundestag (DemiRtaş and Mazlum 2018, 37), the decision to send arms abroad does not (Conrad 2014; Kimball 2014). The government nonetheless sought Bundestag support for this decision. As expected by Germany's supranational European identity, the appropriateness of aiding the Kurdish and Yazidi minorities by making an exception to the taboo on sending arms was reflected in Merkel's proposal to the Bundestag. Calling attention to the atrocities perpetrated by ISIS, Merkel noted the "threat to religious minorities in Iraq," the fact that there were currently over a million people escaping from ISIS, and that ISIS actions had been deemed "crimes against humanity" by the United Nations (German Bundestag 2014, 4419–20). Merkel had previously commented that – regarding the treatment of minorities in Iraq – "one can speak of genocide... considering the atrocities" and that therefore "I think it is justified for us to say that – to a limited extent – we will also help with weapons deliveries" (DW.com 2014a). The word genocide is notable in its use during the debate on arming the Peshmerga (German Bundestag 2014) and by Merkel and Steinmeier on other occasions (DW.com 2014a; Stute 2014) because of its link to German history which is central to

its post-war identity.[50] Therefore, the situation was identified as a case in which German participation was legitimate.

Merkel recognized the seventy-fifth anniversary of Germany's invasion of Poland and Germany's associated responsibility for cooperation in solving global problems since the end of World War II (German Bundestag 2014, 4417–18).[51] Merkel declared that "new security challenges are increasing" and these made it increasingly clear that "there are situations in which only military means" can resolve them (German Bundestag 2014, 4419). She then recalled Germany's previous deployments of the German military in support of NATO operations, including to the FRY and Afghanistan, stating that "the decision to be debated today is not about the use of soldiers" only of sending arms (German Bundestag 2014, 4419–20). Merkel then invoked Germany's integration with Europe and its responsibility to the international community, noting that the decision to provide arms was "like some of our EU partners" (German Bundestag 2014, 4420). Merkel (2014b) also stated that "this is an exceptional case. When we are asked to supply arms and ammunition on a limited scale, we cannot simply say that is impossible." She (Merkel 2014c) acknowledged the choice Germany faced between its weapons taboo and its responsibility to prevent atrocities, then stated regarding the choice to send arms to the Peshmerga: "we have chosen to support those who need our help. Can we really wait and hope that somebody else will see this as his or her responsibility?" Thus, for Merkel's government, the appropriateness of preventing atrocities against the Kurdish people, and being a

[50] There were multiple uses of the term by different members of the Bundestag during this debate. Merkel did not use the word "genocide" on this occasion, but does note "crimes against humanity" which carries similar weight, and did use the term on other occasions as noted.

[51] It did not escape the attention of the political left, the minority in the government at that time, that the debate on providing arms to an active conflict occurred on the anniversary of the start of World War II (German Bundestag 2014, 4421; Steiner 2014).

responsible partner in the international community outweighed the appropriateness of holding to the taboo on sending weapons to a crisis region.

Merkel also emphasized German domestic security issues in her speech, reflecting the need to balance against ISIS. Merkel noted that ISIS was creating a "safe haven" from which to spread terror which "increases the danger to us, and affects our security interests" (German Bundestag 2014, 4420). Merkel stated that "more than four hundred Germans are in the region [of Iraq and Syria].... [T]his is our responsibility" (German Bundestag 2014, 4420). After stating this concern over Germans fighting for ISIS abroad, she noted that "we also have a fear that one day these fighters [will] return" and threaten Germany's security (German Bundestag 2014, 4420). The responsibility Germany had to prevent German residents from committing atrocities was equally coupled with the need to prevent terrorist attacks in Germany. Having weighed the reluctance to provide arms against other concerns, she reported that the government had concluded:

> The immense suffering of many people cries out to heaven... and our own security interests are threatened.... In this case, what is [proves to be] heavier than what could be. We now have a chance to help stop an inhuman terrorist group and avert their further spread. We have now the chance to save people's lives and to prevent further mass murders in Iraq. We have now the chance to prevent terrorists from creating a new, safe retreat and from there spread hatred and violence into the world. This opportunity we use (German Bundestag 2014, 4421).

Such statements and the mobilization of state resources out of a sense of fear of ISIS' offensive capabilities and intentions are consistent with the expectations of internal balancing. At the conclusion of the debate, despite no constitutional requirement, a vote of support was held in the

Bundestag. Despite a minority who held strong to the taboo against sending weapons, the plan to equip a brigade of 4,000 soldiers was approved by an overwhelming majority of the Bundestag (Heinrich 2014; Kimball 2014).[52]

The next day, Steinmeier (2014h) called attention to the security threat ISIS posed to Germany and that the increasing number of ISIS terrorists "from Europe is a cause of alarm for all of us" and to "[Germany's] own interests." He (Steinmeier 2014h) also pointed to the increased capabilities of ISIS to recruit and carry out attacks globally, noting that "the advanced weapons that [ISIS] has captured, and its significant financial means" justified sending military equipment to the Kurds. Later, Steinmeier (2014a) addressed the conflicting principles of Germany's identity regarding the importance of enabling Kurdish self-defense despite the weapons taboo, as well as German security concerns, stating that "there is also the principle of protecting human lives and ultimately our own security." The invocation of the fear of domestic terror attacks and the call for a response from both Germany and the international community are congruent with the expectations of internal and external balancing as outlined in Chapter 3

Additionally, Steinmeier (2014h) noted that ISIS had demonstrated "monstrous brutality, persecuting and killing anyone who stands in its way.... [ISIS] terrorists enslave and humiliate people... [including minority] Yazidis and Christians." Germany's responsibility to stop such atrocities required making trade-offs regarding the appropriate foreign policy response:

> We must calibrate our engagement depending on what is at stake for the fundamental principles of a peaceful and just international order, for our own interests and our closest partner countries and allies. Germany's skepticism about military intervention and its restrictive approach to arms exports are politically well-founded and deeply ingrained in Germans' collective consciousness. There is no paradigm shift regarding our foreign-

[52] Statistics for this vote were not listed in the available records.

> policy principles, which include a policy of military restraint. But in the face of a threat like the one posed by ISIS, we must not hide behind principles. We must take responsible decisions, knowing full well that they involve difficult trade-offs (Steinmeier 2014h).

Arguing the responsibility Germany has to stop atrocities he (Steinmeier 2014h) stated, "we in Europe must not indulge the illusion that we could just shut ourselves away from the world if it goes to pieces, and maybe offer a bit of humanitarian aid."

Von der Leyen invoked a similar theme. Combining invocations of the ISIS threat and Germany's responsibility, the Minister of Defense (von der Leyen 2014) declared that "we all see that the security of an entire region is threatened.... [W]e... support those who oppose [ISIS] because we are firmly convinced that on the one hand this is, of course, primarily our responsibility, but on the other hand it is also our interest in security policy, and that both are therefore two sides of the same coin." Von der Leyen (2014) also noted that "our responsibility grows" because of new threats such as ISIS, and that Germany has a responsibility, as a member of the international community, to "act together with our partners." Approximately three months later, Steinmeier (2014e) noted that Germany's partners in this situation needed to include Russia because of "the barbaric terrorism of ISIS... [which] without cooperation between Europe and Russia" could not be stopped. Both von der Leyan and Steinmeier invoked the fear of ISIS and its increasing offensive capabilities, indicating that Germany policy preferences were in part driven by internal balancing behavior. In terms of external balancing, cooperation with Russia was deemed necessary to balance the threat of ISIS, despite the ongoing Russian conflict in Ukraine which Germany opposed as a violation of international law and for which it supported

EU sanctions on Russia in early 2014 (Steinmeier 2014e; Merkel 2015; EURACTIV 2016; DW.com 2019a).[53]

In January 2015, just over three months after the decision to send weapons, the government sought to expand Germany's role, and proposed the deployment of soldiers for a training mission in Iraq. This increased mobilization of state resources to counter the ISIS threat is further evidence of internal balancing behavior, but it does not fully explain Germany's decision to participate in the intervention. The proposal to deploy soldiers led to subsequent debate, and the continued invocations of the ISIS threat and appropriateness of the German response based on its identity. Pursuant to German law, the government's January proposal required approval by the Bundestag. Steinmeier (2015c) emphasized elements of German identity, stating that "we cooperate with international, primarily European partners.... [W]e comply with this request [from Kurdish authorities] within the scope of our legal options. This fulfills the requirements of international law as well as the Basic Law." Steinmeier (2015c) noted that "an authorization under Chapter VII of the UN charter is not required for... the training and advisory engagement in northern Iraq." However, he justified the expanded German involvement based on UN resolutions, which did not sanction military intervention under Chapter VII, but did support states taking action against ISIS because of the threat it posed. Steinmeier (2015c) stated, "the Security Council has determined that ISIS poses a threat to world peace and international security." These claims link the government's response to German law and UN resolutions as justification for Germany's use of power within a framework of multilateral cooperation to ensure peace and security as expected by the German identity outlined in Chapter 3.

During the same debate, von der Leyen emphasized the government's concern for both the threat of terrorist attacks in Germany and Germany's responsibility to protect lives as

[53] The EU sanctions, supported by Germany, have been extended multiple times as of 2020 (Simsek 2020).

expected by its identity. Von der Leyen (2015) noted that German support in the fight against ISIS "is not just about the fight against terror... but also about the values that have been attacked: respect for the lives of others, the right to lives one's own religion freely and peacefully.... [I]t is this conviction that unites us." The government's proposal for the military training mission gained overwhelming support from the Bundestag, garnering 457 affirmative votes, 79 votes against, and 54 abstentions (BBC News 2015; DW.com 2015).

A few days after that debate, Steinmeier (2015a) emphasized the security threat, noting "the specific topic of the foreign fighters. The threat is immense.... The sheer extent is terrifying." He (Steinmeier 2015a) recounted that "over 500 Islamists from Germany alone... have traveled to the combat zones in Syria and Iraq" and that it was necessary to take action "to tackle the dangers" those fighters posed to Germany. Such invocations are consistent with the expectations of the balancing explanation in terms of policies motivated by fear and the offensive capabilities and intentions of ISIS.

Ten months after the decisions to arm the Kurdish Peshmerga and six months after the vote to deploy German troops to train Iraqi forces, Merkel was consistent in her justification for Germany's actions. In a July speech, Merkel (2015) recalled recent terrorist attacks in France, and stated:

> [W]e have to dry up support for extremism and terrorism. That means we have to back those who take an active stand against the ideology of intolerance and hatred.... That means that here in Europe we have to ensure that young people do not fall victim to radical ideologies. We sense that the evil of terrorism affects us all. Even in Europe far too many young people are being lured into joining terrorist groups. In Europe, too, terrorists are wreaking havoc.

Merkel (2015) invoked the security threat of ISIS-inspired terrorism in Europe. She also linked her foreign policy actions to Germany's past, noting that "Germany had brought immeasurable suffering on Europe and the world" and its post-war responsibility was to prevent similar "betrayal[s] of all civilized values."

After the November 2015 attacks in Paris, Steinmeier justified expanding Germany's actions against ISIS to include operations in Syria by invoking the same security concerns and elements of German identity. As noted in Chapter 6, France called on the European community to fulfill obligations under the premise of collective self-defense. Germany expanded its role, but limited its participation to non-combat support activities. Germany supported other countries' combat operations with aerial refueling, aerial reconnaissance, and the deployment of a frigate to defend a French aircraft carrier (Dewitz 2015; Roscher 2015). Justifying Germany's expanded involvement, as well as the limitations placed on Germany's role, Steinmeier (2015b) stated that "we only have to give what we are responsible for.... [Yet], we must not refuse without reason. Otherwise our promise to our closest neighbor is not worth much." Germany had reservations about operations against ISIS in Syria based on questionable legal standing, but the requirements of European collective self-defense invoked by France outweighed those reservations and obligated Germany to participate as expected by Germany's European identity (Frymark and Gotkowska 2016).[54] However, the same German identity called for limitations on the use of force.

The government further justified its policy proposal to support the call to collective self-defense with a security argument, stating that "the attacks ... in Paris [have] shown that the

[54] Germany viewed the intervention against ISIS in Iraq as legal because the Iraqi government had requested assistance in fighting ISIS from the international community (Merkel 2014c; Wallace 2014). However, Syria, though embroiled in a civil war, remained a sovereign state and did not make any such request. Sliney (2015, 12) notes that the Syrian foreign minister warned that attacks in Syria against ISIS "would constitute an act of aggression."

terrorist organization is a global threat to peace and security" and that "ISIS attacked France and Europe's liberal order of values directly" (Müller 2015). Steinmeier (2015b) also noted that, in the case of the ISIS threat, a "seemingly distant crises has come close to Europe.... [T]he terror of [ISIS] has arrived in Europe." These statements from Steinmeier repeat the fear and threat of ISIS previously invoked, but also invoke the proximity element of the threat as expected by Walt (1985) providing additional evidence of balancing as a partial explanation for Germany's response. The government also quoted Article 24, paragraph 2 of Germany's Basic Law which states: "To maintain peace, the Federation can fit into a system of mutual collective security; in doing so, it will consent to the restrictions on its sovereign rights, which bring about and ensure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and between the peoples of the world" (Müller 2015). On December 4, 2015, the Bundestag voted in support of the deployment with 445 affirmative votes, 146 against, and 7 abstentions (Connolly 2015; Smale 2015).

As Germany's participation in the coalition military operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria continued, the justification for action remained consistent. In a January 2016 Bundestag debate and vote to continue Germany's military training mission in Iraq, Minister of Defense von der Leyen (2016) recalled the difficult decision to send arms to Iraq because "[ISIS] overran the Peshmerga a year and a half ago, [and] tried to exterminate the Yazidis.... [I]t slaughtered the Yazidis and hunted them into the Sinjar Mountains." Von der Leyen (2016) then noted the success of the Peshmerga in beating back ISIS and that "it is absolutely justified that we did that... [so that] they could protect their own people." In calling for continued support from the Bundestag, she (von der Leyen 2016) concluded "[o]ur contribution shows that we live up to our responsibility in the region. It shows that we stand by our partners in Europe, but also in the world, in the common fight against [ISIS], that we can be relied on and that indifference is not an

option for a country like ours." The Bundestag vote was 455 for and 139 votes against the continuation of the training mission (Simsek 2016).

German domestic actions to thwart ISIS terrorism in Germany offer additional support for the balancing explanation as a motivation for German participation in the military intervention. After the 2015 attacks in Paris, Germany enacted laws similar to those enacted by France, including banning membership in and support for terrorist groups in public or on the Internet, and increased police ability to investigate suspected terrorists (Eddy 2014; Counter Extremism Project 2020). These measures were similar to the policies and practices aimed at other terrorist groups across prior decades since terrorist attacks during the Munich Olympics in 1972, and do not indicate a large domestic policy shift (Counter Extremism Project 2020). Instead, they indicate the practical need to keep up with changing forms of terror groups and tactics as they evolved with changes in communications technology. Domestic policy was based on the need to counter the terrorist threat. Thus, even though the ISIS threat was invoked as a significant factor in Germany's domestic and foreign policy decision, the discourse does not support the explanation that invocations of balancing alone were used to justify German participation in the military intervention abroad.

The attitude of self-binding and limiting the use of state power was evident throughout the debates. Even with majority backing and a strong German identity to justify its position, the government was careful to indicate the limitations of their military support in the fight against ISIS. German leaders pointed to the "limited scale" (Merkel 2014b), the notion that aid allowed Iraqis and Kurds to "protect their own people" (von der Leyen 2016) and that "everything remain[ed] the overall responsibility of the Kurdish authorities" (Steinmeier 2015c). It was also emphasized that this was strictly a "non-combat mission" (Auswärtiges Amt 2014; Merkel

2014b; Steinmeier 2015c). Steinmeier (2015c) noted that "it is not about a combat mission" and that the German military deployment would be limited to "a maximum of 100 soldiers and in association with other Europeans, nothing more and nothing less." The limitations placed on German participation are congruent with German state identity. The threat posed by ISIS and the responsibility to protect human lives together outweighed the taboo on supplying weapons and reluctance to deploy soldiers outside of NATO countries, yet German identity still limited the use of force abroad to a level deemed appropriate.

Soft Power Explanation Disconfirmed: No Evidence of U.S. Soft Power Influence

Key German policymakers made few references to the United States in their public statements or the debates leading to the decision to provide weapons, training, and other military support to thwart ISIS. Some of these references were innocuous, indicating that Germany was simply part of a broad Western and Arab coalition against a brutal organization (see for example Merkel 2014a; Steinmeier 2014d).

On the occasion of requesting support from the Bundestag for the extension of German military operations to Syria, Minister of Defense von der Leyen stated to the press that "we are part of the alliance against terrorists. The [United States] has the supreme command based in Tampa, Florida. Below the command structure is a broad multinational structure" (Auswärtiges Amt 2015a). This matter-of-fact statement of U.S. military command, followed immediately with a statement on the broad coalition in which Germany participated is evidence that U.S. soft power was not influential in German decision making. Additionally, the government took care to note that this coalition was different from past "coalitions of the willing" (Wallace 2014), a reference to the phrasing used by President George W. Bush leading up to the 2003 invasion of

Iraq, which Germany opposed (see for example J. King 2002). Additionally, in 2015, when the United States pressed Germany for increased participation by carrying out its own air strikes, Merkel flatly replied, “I believe Germany is doing its part and that we don’t have to talk about new questions” (Dewitz 2015). This statement reflects a strong disconfirmation of U.S. soft power.

In at least one of the few references to the United States in the German discourse, the United States received blame for the situation. Steinmeier (2014b) noted that “Germany has done the least to create disorder in the region. We did not participate in the intervention in Iraq in 2003 that ultimately threw the region into severe turbulence.” This statement strongly disconfirms U.S. soft power as influential in this instance by placing responsibility for the instability in the region that led to the rise of ISIS with the United States. It is also a clear attempt at distancing German participation in the present U.S.-led coalition from the 2003 invasion.

There were other comments made to publicly distance German policies from the United States and show that the decisions were made independent of American influence. This distancing is clear in the words of Steinmeier (2014c) early in the debate that “the German decision on the Iraq war has shown that we can also say no. But one thing has become increasingly clear over the years, just staying out of the ‘raging world’ just doesn’t work anymore.” This statement may or may not have been intended to lay blame on the United States for the unrest in the region. Yet, it points out that military interventions of the past have not always been successful. It also notes that despite Germany’s pacifist past, its foreign policy could no longer be pacifist and isolationist. Germany’s integration into the international community, and its responsibility to serve peace as part of Germany’s global responsibilities both foster and limit its foreign policy choices. There were no references linking that integration or

responsibility to the United States. The ISIS threat and elements of German identity which obligated and shaped German participation in the intervention outweighed the need to be disassociated with the United States and the origins of unrest in the Middle East.

It may be argued that German leaders' occasional references to NATO during the debates over Germany's role in the ISIS intervention are evidence of U.S. soft power influence (see for example Merkel's remarks on NATO in German Bundestag 2014, 4418; and Steinmeier 2014g). Over the entire post-war history of NATO, U.S. soft and hard power influence have possibly been influential on the attitudes of German policymakers. NATO is foundational to German security (see for example Merkel 2015). However, the intervention against ISIS was not conducted under the auspices of NATO, and any invocation of NATO in the discourse was ancillary to the larger debate. It is evident in the context of the debates that references to NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations were intended to indicate Germany's commitment to European and international institutions, rather than a specific attraction to NATO in terms of U.S. leadership.

As noted previously, Germany justified its actions based partly on UN resolutions, which were, in part, shepherded through the United Nations by the United States (Scheinin 2014; UNSC 2014a; 2014b; Myers and Sengupta 2015). The sponsorship of resolutions could be understood as an indirect form of U.S. soft power influence through institutions as suggested by Nye (2004b, 10). However, even those in the Bundestag who were opposed to Germany's actions argued that "the United Nations must make the decision and not the [United States] or individual nations" (DW.com 2014b). Based on such statements, if the United Nations were perceived as a proxy for U.S. soft power, it is doubtful that those in the Bundestag who opposed Germany's involvement would call for deference to that institution in order to prevent German

participation.[55] Additionally, as noted, as part of his legal justification for military intervention, Steinmeier relied on UN resolutions and German law. No key policy actor made reference to the United States in the attempt to provide the moral or legal basis for Germany's participation.

Conclusion

In sum, there is no evidence that U.S. soft power explains the policy choice for German participation in the U.S.-led intervention against ISIS first in Iraq, or later in Syria. Germany made some limited attempts at distancing its policy choices from the United States, and clearly did not attribute its action to attraction to U.S. values, policies, or its beauty, brilliance, or benignity.

There were claims by German leaders of the need to ensure Germany's security against fighters returning to Germany to conduct attacks. The frequent invocations of the threat of ISIS to Germany are consistent with the expectations of balancing as triggered by security concerns. Closely coupled with the invocations of German security were the appropriateness of using military force to prevent atrocities similar to those perpetrated by Germany in the past. Elements of German identity also required that the use of force be limited to a level deemed appropriate, which resulted in German forces participating in only non-combat roles. The emphasis on protecting lives and preventing atrocities as justification for participating in military actions against ISIS appropriate, coupled with the limited nature of the military support Germany provided, are both congruent with German identity.

[55] See for example the speech of Gregor Gysi, of the Left Party (formerly the PDS noted in the Germany-Kosovo case), in response to Merkel's proposal to arm the Kurds in 2014. Consistently the most pacifist party in the Bundestag at the time, and vociferous in his opposition to German military intervention, Gysi consistently invoked international law, and the necessity of deferring to the Security Council for any use of force (German Bundestag 2014, 4422).

The German training mission in Iraq was initially supported by the majority of the Bundestag (Auswärtiges Amt 2015b) and was reauthorized by the Bundestag several times through 2020 (Deutschlande.de 2018; Simsek 2019a) indicating that the government's justification for Germany's participation was widely and continuously accepted as valid. The invocations of both the threat posed to Germany by ISIS, and the responsibility to stop atrocities against minority groups make a strong case that balancing against ISIS and Germany's supranational European identity together motivated German foreign policy decisions in this case. The evidence supports a conclusion that elements of identity played the stronger role, but that balancing concerns were also important, and cannot be discounted as a significant part of what explains Germany's policy choices. Table 5 summarizes the findings of this case and the key elements of the two explanations supported by the evidence.

Table 5. Summary of Findings: German Participation in the ISIS Intervention

German state identity	Confirmed - historical linkages to genocide; protecting minority populations; serving peace through multilateral cooperation in the defense of freedom; being bound to Europe (collective defense)
Balancing	Confirmed - domestic threat of ISIS to German public; fear of returning jihadists
Soft power	Disconfirmed

Chapter 8

Conclusion

Nye's concept of soft power has captured the attention of many scholars, pundits, policymakers, and even the U.S. military for thirty years, despite theoretical shortcomings and lack of empirical evidence that soft power influences the policy decisions of target states. Does the United States have soft power? Does U.S. soft power translate into foreign countries' support for U.S. foreign policies? If U.S. soft power does affect other states' foreign policy choices, how does it do so? Answering these questions has been the goal of the dissertation. In order to answer these questions soft power is tested against two alternate explanations – balancing and state identity. The test examines the public discourse of key foreign policymakers in France and Germany – two countries in which U.S. soft power might be expected to factor in foreign policy decision making – as they justified their participation in the U.S.-led interventions in Kosovo in 1999 and against ISIS in 2014.

Evidence from the policymakers' discourse suggests that soft power was not a factor in France's or Germany's decisions to participate in U.S.-led military interventions in Kosovo in 1999 and against ISIS in 2014. The finding that soft power was not a factor in any of the four cases examined suggests caution for policymakers who believe soft power is an effective alternative to other facets of power in international relations. This approach also provides an alternative to studying soft power influence through approaches that are problematic, including correlation with public opinion or voting in the United Nations. This dissertation also offers a methodology for studying soft power effects in instances other than military intervention.

This chapter is presented in five sections. The first section summarizes the findings and offers additional analysis of the cases. The second section discusses the scholarly implications of

this dissertation. The third section discusses potential policy implications. In the fourth section, some limitations of the dissertation are noted. The fifth section suggests possible refinements of the approach taken herein and areas for future research.

Summary and Analysis

The decision calculations of policymakers in each case reveal that forces other than soft power motivated the states to intervene. The evidence supports an identity explanation in the cases of French and German participation in the military intervention in Kosovo in 1999. French leaders invoked France's leadership role in preventing and stopping human rights abuses in Kosovo. Important in this regard are the country's sense of a responsibility to protect others and its Gaullist fixation on its stature. Germany also found it appropriate to intervene due to its identity, invoking those aspects related to its own past with genocide and subsequent need to be a responsible member of the international community. German leaders advanced their preferred policy by invoking Germany's past atrocities and the appropriateness of using military force to stop atrocities against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Thus, one key element of its identity motivated its participation in the NATO bombing in Kosovo.

The sources differed for the two countries' decisions to intervene against ISIS. In the case of France's participation in the intervention against ISIS in 2014, French leaders clearly advanced their policy preferences by invoking the threat ISIS posed to France and the need to balance that threat. German leaders also advanced their preference to support the intervention based on the threat of ISIS. However, in addition to the need to balance against the ISIS threat, German policymakers invoked identity norms to justify arming anti-ISIS forces and deploying German military capabilities while simultaneously constraining German participation to support

operations rather than combat. Table 6 summarizes the explanations that were confirmed in each of the four cases.

Table 6. Summary of Explanations Confirmed in the Case Studies

	Soft Power	Balancing	State identity
France-Kosovo (Chapter 4)			X
Germany-Kosovo (Chapter 5)			X
France-ISIS (Chapter 6)		X	
Germany-ISIS (Chapter 7)		X	X

As noted in Chapter 1, it has been posited that the United States has lost soft power due to the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Nye 2004b; 2010; Kurlantzick 2005; Pape 2005; Keohane and Katzenstein 2007; Datta 2009; Kearn 2011). Because neither the pre-2003 cases nor the post-Iraq cases provide evidence that U.S. soft power factored in the decision calculus of policymakers in France and Germany, it is not possible to make any conclusions regarding the posited loss or gain of U.S. soft power surrounding the 2003 war in Iraq. Without evidence that soft power was present in either pre- and post-Iraq cases suggests a more telling problem for the approach. Failure of soft power to manifest in any case makes it impossible to answer the question regarding the posited loss of U.S. soft power subsequent to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The findings point to the problem of not only testing for the presence of soft power influence, but measuring how much may exist in any case. As noted in Chapter 3, the ISIS case may also be a tougher test for U.S. soft power based on prior U.S. actions in Iraq and will be discussed below.

Some scholars point to previous events as motivating the 1999 intervention. For example, earlier events in the Balkans during which Western nations did not respond in a timely manner, and cases such as the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 in which the Western community failed to respond entirely, are seen to have impacted responses to the crisis in Kosovo (Manulak 2009, 570; Fritz 2018, 21–22; Latawski and Smith 2018, 130). Such events may have motivated France and Germany. As noted in Chapters 4 and 5, state leaders in France and Germany did make occasional references to the earlier crises in Bosnia when justifying the use of military force in Kosovo. It is not unreasonable to expect that previous atrocities in the Balkans and elsewhere were a factor in how France and Germany approached this crisis. Yet, this consideration does not offer evidence that U.S. soft power, or lack thereof, was reflected in the discourse. In fact, such considerations may offer further evidence that states made later decisions because of the realization that previous inaction was not aligned with what was appropriate behavior given their identity. It may be that Germany and France did not act out of attraction to the United States because the United States was viewed as responsible for previous inaction and delay (Daalder 1998; Pelz and Corbett 2009).

Threats to the security of France and Germany, not soft power, loomed large in motivating policymakers in both countries' responses to ISIS. As a consequence, a balancing explanation helps to explain French and German participation. The threat of ISIS drove France's policy to follow the U.S. lead against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The threat also drove Germany to justify its part in the military intervention, but its identity was also invoked by policymakers and significantly shaped its participation. The evidence does not affirm the role of soft power attraction to the United States and points to other motivations. The atrocities, made widely known internationally through ISIS's own media operations, likely made the choice to use

military force against ISIS an easy decision relative to the Kosovo case. The numerous ISIS-linked terror attacks in France and Germany brought attention to the threat.

In the case of Germany's support of operations against ISIS, it is clear that the security trigger was present in German policymaking as it was in France. However, unlike France, which engaged in direct combat strikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and invoked collective-defense after the Paris attacks based on the continued threat to France, German military actions were further influenced by its identity. The need to address the threat is present, but the decision calculus to do so within the limitations of appropriateness given German identity is clear throughout the discourse. Germany, faced with the same threat, could not adopt a foreign policy similar to France because of Germany's identity. German identity holds that Germany has a responsibility to stop atrocities, but that it also limits its use of military force in solving international problems, especially outside of the auspices of international organizations. This accords with the expectations of constructivist approaches that posit that "state actions in the foreign policy realm are constrained and empowered" by state identities (Hopf 1998, 179). It also points to the unique nature of the German supranational identity.

The fact that Germany participated in combat operations in 1999, but only provided non-combat support for operations against ISIS, when the latter was viewed as a direct threat to German citizens, is a puzzle. A possible explanation for Germany's involvement in actual combat bombing operations in Kosovo – its first since the end of World War II – is that it was a NATO operation. While German policymakers may have been reluctant to use force in both cases, Germany's embeddedness into European institutions in the 1999 case may have been a significant factor in its decision to conduct combat operations. In the case of ISIS, the intervention did not benefit from the explicit authorization for the use of force from an

international organization, thus, German participation in direct combat operations may not have been viewed by German leaders as appropriate in terms of its identity.

There may be other reasons that Germany's identity made its policymakers reluctant to engage in direct combat operations against ISIS. When military operations were expanded to Syria in 2015 and when France invoked collective defense after the November 2015 terror attacks in Paris, German participation remained limited to non-combat support. Russia supported the Syrian government; therefore, Germany would likely not want to cooperate with the Assad regime which had allegedly used chemical weapons and was supported by Russia. Germany also opposed Russian actions in Ukraine and Crimea, making it difficult for German leaders to justify cooperation with Russia against ISIS. Thus, while Germany supported the intervention, its identity may have limited its support because policymakers did not want to be perceived as aiding a regime that used chemical weapons reminiscent of German past atrocities, or the violation of international norms by Russia.

It is also possible that Germany needed to balance its obligations to the European Union vis-à-vis France and ISIS, while also not provoking Russia. Even though the European Union, supported by Germany, enacted sanctions against Russia because of its aggression in Ukraine, Germany and Russia have strong economic ties and Germany is heavily reliant on Russian energy (Härtel 2014; Auswärtiges Amt 2020). Additionally, despite misgivings about Russian actions in Ukraine and in spite of objections from the European Union and the United States, Schröder and Merkel have both continually expressed Germany's interest in completing energy pipeline projects from Russia (Dempsey 2017; Simsek 2019b; Felschen 2020). Germany's comparatively cautious approach may have been due to this "dual foreign policy" toward Russia (Härtel 2014). However, the discourse of German foreign policymakers regarding participation

in the intervention against ISIS does not support either of these arguments. Additionally, German resources dedicated to operations against ISIS in Syria were greater than those provided for operations in Iraq. Germany sent significant armaments to Iraq, as noted in Chapter 7, but actually deployed more German assets and personnel to support operations in Syria, likely due to its perception of obligation to collective security invoked by France.

As noted, the ISIS case may be a harder test for soft power than Kosovo. In 2003, Germany and France opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq. In 2014, German and French policymakers both referenced the U.S. 2003 invasion and subsequent departure of Iraq as a root cause for the rise of ISIS. Thus, even though U.S. soft power was not apparent in French or German decisions to participate in Kosovo, the notion that U.S. soft power would be equally influential in the ISIS case is dubious. Additionally, the media campaign by ISIS advertised the threat ISIS intended to pose not only in the Middle East, but also in other countries. It was likely not difficult for other countries, and different parties within France and Germany, to agree on the threat ISIS posed since they experienced its effects. Iraq also requested international assistance for the fight against ISIS there, likely making potential persuasion by the United States a secondary issue. Importantly, ISIS referred to itself as a state, but it was not recognized as a sovereign in any way. Because ISIS was not a state actor it is likely that the rationale for intervention was based on a different calculus than that for Kosovo. Additionally, even though operations against ISIS expanded to Syria, which did not request assistance from Western countries, the initial response to ISIS in 2014 was in Iraq, which did. This combination of factors likely reduced French and German resistance to military intervention, and makes a balancing explanation more likely. The rationale used by target state policymakers, particularly in France,

to justify intervention against ISIS required less nuance than the actions taken against the FRY as a sovereign state that was recognized by the international community.

It may be argued that politicians invoke state identity strategically. They may do so in order to gain support from the mass public, while their preferred policies are based on realpolitik which may not be popular with the public, as suggested by Mearsheimer (2001, 22–27). There is no evidence in the discourse of key leaders that public opinion influenced foreign policy decisions in any of the cases. In the cases in which state identity factored as all or part of the explanation for German or French policies, key leaders invoked only state identity and did not link that identity with references to the public or public opinion in any way. The research design of this dissertation does not include public opinion polling. Public opinion only factors if it is invoked by policymakers, and then, only as part of the soft power explanation as outlined in chapter 2. Because the discourse of key policymakers contained no references to public opinion and because soft power was not evident in any of the cases, no inferences can be made regarding consequentialist motivations of politicians under a soft power explanation or the possibility of their strategic use of state identity.

Scholarly Implications

This dissertation fills a gap in the soft power scholarship by examining target states' foreign policy decisions vis-à-vis the United States to determine the presence of U.S. soft power in terms of policy outcomes. Answering one criticism of soft power scholarship, the findings of the case studies add empirical evidence to the soft power literature which has been viewed as lacking. Unfortunately, the cases included herein do not provide support for soft power.

Additionally, by operationalizing and testing soft power in terms of target states' motivations, this method helps to overcome some of the indeterminacy of Nye's

conceptualization of U.S. soft power. By examining the motivations for action from the viewpoint of the target, this dissertation offers a method for how scholars might operationalize soft power in terms of policy preferences of target states rather than attempting to measure the level of a state's soft power resources using opinion polls, or things such as patents, and the number of films exported (Nye 2004b, 33–34), and attempting to correlate those things with support for U.S. policies. By focusing on the elite decision makers and the arguments they use to advance their preferred policies, we gain insight into whether or not they are motivated by some form of attraction to the United States. This provides a direct path for testing soft power, rather than indirectly with proxy variables. This approach also provides a method of testing for the presence of soft power effects which, if soft power were present in a given case, may aid in uncovering the mechanisms through which soft power works.

This method has external validity. Using target state elite public discourse provides a method that is generally applicable to investigate the state motivations for state policy choices in additional cases and countries. The availability of electronic records from many countries, and the technology to translate them into other languages, opens a path to examine a greater number of cases. Additionally, in cases other than those involving the use of force, other alternate explanations besides balancing or state identity may also be plausible. Testing soft power in a similar manner using elite discourse, but against different competing explanations may provide further insight into whether soft power is influential in such circumstances.

It may be possible that soft power is, as Nye (2004b, 17; 2011, 16) claims, more effective at achieving a state's milieu goals such as human rights, democracy, and open markets. However, research focused on these milieu goals increases the definitional and operationalization issues in soft power research since it adds a number of difficult to measure variables and

outcomes. Discovering if, let alone how, the soft power resources of a particular applicant translate to achieving such goals in a target would be fraught with methodological obstacles. The approach taken here can be applied in any situation in which we know what the would-be soft power influencer wants. Focusing on the discourse of target state foreign policymakers, and whether or not they advance their preferred policies with references to U.S. soft power as operationalized in this dissertation, allows for the examination of soft power influence in achieving either specific or general goals across and doing so over potentially long periods of time.

Policy Implications

The lack of evidence that U.S. soft power affected target state policy preferences suggests at least two policy implications for soft power, including for the purposeful of soft power in policymaking, and the notion of expending national capital on increasing soft power resources. Additionally, the findings that state identity was evident in three of the cases offers implications for understanding the motivations of target states.

These results, coupled with the lack of empirical evidence that U.S. soft power has been effective in gaining policy support over the last thirty years, should indicate that caution is warranted by policymakers who believe that U.S. soft power should be a prominent tool in foreign policymaking. The results of the four case studies indicate the applicant state will not know, *a priori*, if or when soft power will factor in target state policy decisions. Combined with the fact that states may not control all soft power resources, this finding will make wielding soft power as a foreign policy tool difficult for any state. Expecting soft power to be influential in discrete foreign policy events is not justified by the findings of this test.

Policymakers may also question the wisdom of devoting additional effort and capital to increase a state's soft power. While Nye (2011b, 22–23) does not eschew the utility of hard power, the attractiveness of his ideas on soft power – which promise to make gaining support from others less costly – has made the concept of soft power inherently attractive to policymakers. However, the evidence to support its efficacy is minimal. The mixed empirical evidence linking public opinion to state policy choices, and findings of this dissertation that U.S. soft power did not factor in target state policy choices, make it difficult to justify the allocation of state resources to increase its level of soft power in hopes of gaining foreign support for its policies. Determining how much stock a state should place in increasing its soft power resources, many of which it may not control, versus resources committed to mitigate perceived or real threats via traditional hard power resources may be a risky political gamble, both domestically and internationally.

The findings of the case studies also prescribe caution regarding the predictive nature of state identity in international relations. I have not investigated either country's identity in this dissertation and instead posited the existence of a certain identity as identified by other scholars. Therefore, conclusions regarding state identity should be qualified, and further research is called for with respect to the contours of both countries' identities. Additionally, the presence of invocations of identity at the top levels of government are not unexpected, making state identity a particularly suitable alternative explanation against which to test soft power. Given that this dissertation looks only at key policymakers legitimating action, we would be surprising not to see state identity factor in some way. This suggests the necessity for further research, including policymakers at lower levels of analysis to determine if state identity inheres throughout levels of government.

In three of the four cases examined, state identity played a significant role in explaining German and French policy decisions. However, state identity cannot alone cause a particular state response, but may inform and frame a response to an event. Much like soft power, state identity explanations for target state policy decisions in one instance may not be reliable predictors in future policy events. Because state identities are relatively stable, but multifaceted, it is not possible to predict which facets upon which target state policymakers will draw to reach conclusions about what policy is appropriate *a priori*. Soft power theory, in terms of resources and variables, remains indeterminate and has little predictive value. Likewise, state identity, though theorized to be consistent over time (Wendt 1992, 397; Banchoff 1999, 271), is equally difficult to use for predictions regarding when and how it will influence decision making. As shown in the cases involving Germany, a state may have a consistent identity over time, but the behavior that results from that identity may not be predicted which is in line with constructivist approaches more generally. Rather than causing a specific action, identity provides only reasons for action (Ruggie 1998, 869; see also March and Olsen 1998, 951). Germany's same supranational European identity could just as easily have resulted in leaders invoking German history as the reason that the use of military force was not appropriate based on the same "dark chapters" of Germany history (Steinmeier 2014c). Policymakers highlighted certain facets of identity to advance their preferences while deemphasizing others, as noted in the debate over arming the Peshmerga in Iraq versus the taboo on sending arms to areas of unrest. Additionally, the facets invoked, such as Germany's history in the Balkans, could be interpreted in different ways. To those who supported military intervention, World War II atrocities were the motivation for stopping modern atrocities. Another interpretation, to those who opposed the intervention,

could be that German bombing in a Balkan state was inappropriate and made for terrible optics on the world stage.

Despite these issues surrounding state identity explanations, in the cases in which state identity offered the best explanation for target state policy choices, identities transcended parties. This finding may offer policymakers greater potential for influencing a target state's policy preferences than with soft power attraction. Attempting to influence a target's policy preferences by appealing to aspects of a known target identity may be more successful than relying on an applicant's supposed soft power. Even when there is a question about which facets of an identity may prevail in a given situation, applicants may gain greater influence by making policy appeals that focus on a target's identity rather than relying on vague, and possibly nonexistent, forms of attraction to some indeterminate characteristic of the applicant. Appealing to aspects of identity would also cast a broader net in attempts to gain support for an applicant's policies, rather than focusing on specific actors who may find the applicant attractive, and who also have meaningful influence over policy decisions. This finding aligns with the power literature which notes the importance of the target's values in determining the outcomes of an influence attempt (Baldwin 1979, 171).

Nye's theory does not account for domestic politics in the target state. Without a notion of how domestic factors link to an influence attempt, Nye – based on the evidence from the discourse in this dissertation which seldom references the United States – overestimates the influence of the United States, its values, culture, and policies on other states' policy decisions. As noted by Robert Jervis (1976, 343), "actors [may] exaggerate the degree to which they play a central role in others' politics." Further, soft power theory may make the mistake of "taking the other side's behavior as the product of a centralized actor with integrated values, inferring the

plan that generated this behavior, and projecting this pattern into the future" which "will be misleading if the behavior was the result of shifting internal bargaining, ad hoc decisions, and uncoordinated actions" (Jervis 1976, 338) – and, we might add, domestic politics. It is likely that attraction to the United States plays little obvious role in policymaking except in rare circumstances, and possibly over a lengthy period in which the causal process is difficult, if not impossible, to observe. U.S. policymakers should not overestimate U.S. influence – soft power or otherwise – on target state policies. Target state domestic processes and institutions, and even regional concerns are likely to overshadow U.S. influence in many cases. Additionally, if U.S. policymakers were to adhere to a soft power strategy despite these findings, a better understanding of which actors in target states are potentially attracted to the United States, and how those actors are involved in the process of foreign policymaking is necessary.

Limitations of the Dissertation

The operationalization of power in international relations research is difficult due to the vagueness of the concept. The conceptualization of soft power, and subsequent measurement leave room for significant interpretation by different scholars. These problems remain in this dissertation, despite the focus on the discourse of elite policymakers in target states. An attempt was made here to adhere closely to Nye's (2004a) own definitions, aided by scholars who, rather than revising his original theory, have attempted to refine it enough to enable other scholars to identify observable implications. Yet, public discourse may not reveal all of the factors that make up the decision calculus of state leaders.

This dissertation relied primarily on the records of the discourse made available by the French and German governments. These governments may not have provided all of the available

discourse in their public records. Additionally, publicly available statements of French and German leaders that were given or translated to English serve as the primary evidence to understand policymakers' motivation. While electronic translation tools, such as Google Translate, provide new paths for researching foreign language records, the translations may not provide the nuance and linguistic accuracy necessary to make interpretations with certainty. In addition, there could be material that is not examined in this dissertation that was available to domestic or French or German speaking audiences that differs from the material otherwise available to this researcher.

Interviews with key foreign policymakers might have afforded the opportunity to ask more pointed questions about motivations and revealed new or different information. The ability to ask these policymakers if U.S. soft power – some form of attraction to culture, values, or the perceived leadership and legitimacy of the United States in a policy area – affected their decisions, might have provided additional insight into their motivations.

The issue area explored herein – the use of force – might have limited the transparency of leaders' public statements. Even post-event interviews in cases that include the use of military force, state leaders may reflect on their decisions with different considerations than those that may have been at the forefront of the decisions made during the event. Policy leaders may each recall different aspects, recall aspects differently, or may desire to justify their past positions based on hindsight and the desire to protect information and their own political legacies.

Additionally, relying on state leaders to invoke attraction to U.S. values, policies, or culture to advance their preferred policies to a domestic audience, no matter how popular the United States may be among the public or elite in that country, may be asking too much of state leaders and the record of their public discourse. Advancing their policy preferences – and doing

so in the public domain of their national political arena – by invoking their attachment to the United States, its leadership, culture, or policies – even if public opinion toward the United States was positive – may not be politically strategic for them in a given case. Additionally, because elites "on the public stage" may "present images and play roles that often have little to do with their true beliefs and interests backstage" (Copeland 2000, 202), access to private communication would be required to definitively uncover their motivations should they differ from those stated in public. Were it possible to access private communications of leaders in France and Germany, for the results of this analysis to be different, we would have to see the leaders stating that they were motivated by a sincere admiration of the United States, but offering public arguments based on security concerns or state identity. Such behind-the-scenes discourse regarding the United States seems unlikely.

Inferences or conclusions drawn from the limited number of cases used here indicate only preliminary theoretical conclusions and policy implications for scholars and practitioners. As noted in Chapter 3, the cases do not vary in outcome, therefore, no explanation for French or German non-support of a U.S.-led intervention is offered. However, as noted, the relevance of the work remains significant for policymakers and scholars. The findings suggest that these two countries will support U.S. foreign policies when doing so either aligns with their identity or when they identify a threat to their security. Policymakers in the United States and elsewhere, notably China and Russia, have presumed the importance of co-optive power behavior, or soft power, but the dearth of empirical support upon which to base specific policy decisions is worrisome. The findings of the four case studies provide more cautionary evidence, as the analysis of target state elites shows little role for soft power.

Future Research

The method used herein limited the operationalization of soft power to characteristics expected by Nye (2004b; 2011) and Vuving (2009), and attempted to find language associated with those aspects in the discourse of key leaders in target states. While the approach taken here attempted to remain as close to Nye's conceptualization as possible, it may be useful, and possibly necessary, to expand the lexicon expected in soft power explanations. Casting a wider net may make for an easier test of soft power, while remaining true to Nye's conceptualization of soft power as an attractive force.

Additionally, if data sources were available, similar analysis of the discourse from different perspectives may hold promise. Approaching an analysis of soft power from the perspective of parliament or other legislative bodies, interest groups, or relevant think tanks may offer additional insights. The approach taken in this dissertation remains valid for such studies.

Future research should also be undertaken that poses less of a challenge to soft power. Cases where the soft power of the power wielder is more apparent and where there are fewer conspiring alternative forces should be sought. Such a test might allow us to see if soft power operates in a less intense environment and allow the identification of scope conditions in which soft power may have more efficacy. The approach should also be applied to influencers other than the United States and in issue areas that may be less contentious than the use of military force toward third parties.

Policy events that do not include the use of force and are on lower levels on Nye's (2004b, 4–5) "three-dimensional chess game" may offer examples of soft power attraction to an influencer being invoked by target state foreign policymakers. It may be that the use of force abroad, even in cases not directly related to what policymakers perceive as national security

issues, brings with it the need for target state leaders to advance state policies by invoking rationale that does not rely on attraction to the applicant. Using the same approach – examining target elite discourse – may be useful in the examination of cases involving economic policy.

On this middle board, Nye (2004b, 4) suggests that "the distribution of power is multipolar" and that the United States cannot achieve policy goals without agreement from others. Thus, economic issues may provide contexts that result in an easier test of soft power. Such cases might reveal the presence of U.S. soft power influence. Economic issue areas may also allow the examination of applicants other than the United States. In the economic realm, more states might have soft power to wield. Examining China with the same methodology used in this dissertation might prove fruitful. As noted in Chapter 1, China has adopted soft power approaches. In light of China's Belt and Road initiative and the Asian Development Bank, and general economic success, if and how target states perceive China's soft power could offer useful insights. China's soft power influence, much like the U.S., will likely not apply to all state, thus, selection of targets that find Chinese culture, values, and policies attractive, rather than China's economic incentives may prove difficult.

This dissertation addressed a policy case that Nye (2004b, 4) might consider to be on the "bottom board of transnational issues" – terrorism. However, the ISIS case, because of the massive summer offensive in which ISIS conquered territory and captured Iraqi financial and military resources, cannot be considered purely a case of international terrorism. Rather than focusing on the military actions states have taken to combat terrorists, examining other policies such as intelligence sharing, coordination information warfare and strategic communications, and measures to inhibit terrorists' economies – in which states cooperate to thwart terrorism – may be useful. The drawback in examining these other anti-terror activities might be that no power

relationship between states may exist. All states involved may simply agree to cooperate because of the threats they face, thus negating the need for soft power or other influence attempts. However, examining the discourse may reveal differences in the preferred anti-terrorism approach, and which state's approach others find most attractive, and why.

Another bottom board issue suggested by Nye (2004b, 4) is the spread of infectious diseases. The international response to the 2014-2016 Ebola crisis in West Africa might offer an opportunity to examine soft power. In this instance, it may be possible to determine the presence of not only U.S. soft power influence, but also that of France, and possibly Russia as applicants. In this case, France's response has been touted as a factor that increased France's level of soft power, moving it ahead of the United States on aggregate measures of global soft power (Soft Power 30 2018).

Nye (2011b, 99) suggests that actors not only attempt to influence others directly through soft power, but also that they "compete to deprive each other of attractiveness and legitimacy." Thus, in the same case, the Russian disinformation campaign conducted against Western powers to diminish their credibility (see for example Pfannenstiel and Cook 2020), indicates the potential of competitive soft power influence; and the necessity to effectively package and convey information, as noted in Chapter 1, with a clear understanding of the strategic context of an influence attempt. The approach taken here could be applied to an examination of the discourse of three or more actors in a single foreign policy event. This may reflect a more accurate picture of the complexity of international relationships among multiple actors involved in an event.

Another possible area in which to test soft power against other theories is antipiracy, which fits another bottom board issue area proposed by Nye (2004b, 4) – international crime. For

over a decade the United States, along with an array of European and Middle East states have cooperated to fight piracy, particularly near Somalia, the Gulf of Guinea, and Southeast Asia (U.S. Navy 2020). As in the Ebola case, this case may afford the opportunity to examine not just U.S. soft power, but also the soft power of other states as there are multiple coalitions, under the leadership of different countries, including France, that provide the opportunity to examine other states' potential soft power influence (Regaud 2020). Because France's soft power has increased according to the Soft Power 30 index, it is a good candidate for future research as a soft power applicant.

Selecting cases on lower levels, offering less intense conditions for the test of soft power, is based on the assumption that all parties involved perceive that the issue is on that lower level. If an actor in the case gives greater importance on the issue it may change the decision calculus and the potential for soft power influence to factor. Another potential problem with such case selection is the relevance of the case historically and for insights into future policy events. If actors already agree on values and policies, then power, soft or otherwise, does not factor in the decision making. However, in cases higher on the chessboard – which have greater scholarly and policy relevance – soft power may be less likely to inhere.

While Nye (2004a, 4) suggests that soft power may be more relevant in cases involving the bottom board, this suggest that if soft power can be wielded at all, it will be only in less significant issue areas. Further, any test of soft power will prove difficult because of the potential for different preferences and perceptions between an applicant and target state. Moreover, cases on higher levels of Nye's chessboard, including the use of force, are likely more relevant to international politics for both policymakers and scholars. The use of military force against third parties in the two cases examined herein balance the policy and scholarly relevance with the

likelihood that soft power may have factored in target state decision making. The cases used here also increase the likelihood that the actors involved held the same perception regarding the significance of the events in terms of Nye's chessboard.

In sum, the approach taken in this dissertation can be applied to any number of cases across Nye's chessboard, and may show different results for the efficacy of U.S. – or another applicant's – soft power. It eliminates reliance on public opinion polls, which in itself expands the number of cases available for study. Yet, the lack of U.S. soft power in the four cases examined should give pause to U.S. policymakers that have faith in soft power despite the continued lack of empirical evidence linking it to actual policy results in target states.

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